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Wind power has the potential to play a leading role in the exigent challenge to 
facilitate a global transition away from fossil fuel electricity generation. Unfortunately, 
it is still a comparatively costly form of electricity generation when external costs 
associated with electricity generation technologies are ignored, as they historically 
have been in all advanced nations. Accordingly, a great deal of attention is given to 
evaluating the effectiveness of economic policy instruments to help close the cost 
disparity between wind power and coal-fired power, which is the preferred source of 
electricity generation technology in many nations around the world. Although such 
attention is certainly warranted, this thesis demonstrates that there is a growing body 
of evidence to suggest that non-economic impediments to wind power development 
also exist and can threaten the efficacy of even the most suitable economic 
instruments in terms of catalyzing expedient development of wind power.    
 
The focus of this thesis is on examining STEP (social, technical, economic and 
political) impediments to wind power development both at a project level and at a 
national planning level. It will be demonstrated that these forces interact to form a 
web of impediments. If wind power development policies are to be designed and 
implemented for optimum impact, policymakers cannot afford to neglect non-
economic impediments. 
 
Part 1 of the thesis examines STEP impediments at the micro (regional or project) 
policy level. For policymakers who are tasked with the responsibility for either 
creating regional wind power development support policy or overseeing the 




development of public wind power projects, part 1 of the thesis provides insights in 
cost control, community relation management, environmental planning, wind power 
potential analysis, project tender design and CO2 emission evaluation that are deemed 
necessary to optimize policy decisions at the micro-level.  
 
Part 2 of the thesis examines STEP impediments at the macro (national) policy level. 
This part introduces detailed case studies of wind power development in four 
advanced nations (Australia, Canada, Japan and Taiwan) which have track records of 
phlegmatic wind power development. The intent of the case studies is to extract 
insights into impediments that cause such stilted progress. Therefore, part 2 concludes 
by tying all four case studies into a STEP framework which explicates the social, 
technical, economic and political barriers that hinder adoption of effective national 
wind power development policies.  
 
For energy policy practitioners, this thesis represents a necessary consolidation of 
requisite knowledge to improve the efficacy of wind power development policy. From 
an academic perspective, this work remedies a major lacuna in wind energy policy by 
explicating the impediments to effective wind power development from a 
policymaking perspective. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION: WHY WIND? 
 
The climate centres around the world, which are the equivalent of the pathology lab of 
a hospital, have reported the Earth's physical condition, and the climate specialists 
see it as seriously ill, and soon to pass into a morbid fever that may last as long as 
100,000 years. I have to tell you, as members of the Earth's family and an intimate 
part of it, that you and especially civilisation are in grave danger.  




Climate change presents a unique challenge for economics: it is the greatest and 
widest-ranging market failure ever seen… Our actions over the coming few decades 
could create risks of major disruption to economic and social activity, later in this 
century and in the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and 
the economic depression of the first half of the 20th century. And it will be difficult or 
impossible to reverse these changes.  
– Sir Nicholas Stern, 20062 
 
1. 1 THE GLOBAL IMPERATIVE 
The year 2006 represented an intellectual tipping point for climate change advocacy. 
It was a year which saw the beginning of a general convergence of understanding 
between many environmentalists and economists on the perilous threat posed by 
climate change.  
 
                                                 
1
 Source: The Independent (Lovelock, 2006) 
2
 Source: The Stern Review- Executive Summary (Stern, 2006) 




In the summer of 2006, the release of Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth brought the 
issues associated with climate change to the general public, eventually becoming the 
third-highest grossing documentary in United States’ history.  
 
In October 2006, a comprehensive independent study called the Stern Review 
commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the UK, presented an assessment 
of the anticipated impacts of climate change. As a foreboding sign of the content 
which would follow, the report began by describing climate change as ―the greatest 
and widest ranging market failure ever seen‖ (Stern, 2006, p. i). The report concluded 
that the long-term costs of climate change are expected to be so great, that early action 
to abate global warming is the most cost-effective alternative. It estimated that the net 
benefits (benefits less costs) from reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 
achieve a stabilization level of 550 parts per million (ppm) by 2050 would be in the 
neighbourhood of US$2.5 trillion (Stern, 2006).  
 
In February 2007, the first of four reports that comprise the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was 
released. The goal of this first report was to ―describe progress in understanding of 
the human and natural drivers of climate change, observed climate change, climate 
processes and attribution, and estimates of projected future climate change‖ (IPCC, 
2007b, p. 2). Overall, the report upgraded international agreement on the likelihood of 
human activities being responsible for global warming from likely (66% or greater 
probability) to very likely (90% or greater probability). The data presented in the 
report was unexceptional in the sense that it mirrored data already available in the 
public domain; however, the report was significant in that it represented a consensus 




view of UN member nations. Symbolically, it represented the juncture in which 
humanity formally accepted culpability for causing climate change. 
 
In April 2007, the second of four reports that comprise the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the IPCC was released. This second report focused on ―current scientific 
understanding of impacts of climate change on natural, managed and human systems, 
the capacity of these systems to adapt and their vulnerability‖ (IPCC, 2007c, p. 1). 
Comparatively, the report was less comprehensive than the Stern Review in its 
assessment of the current and anticipated economic impacts of global warming on 
humanity and global ecosystems. However, it did serve to solidify the emergent 
consensus that climate change was significantly harming hydrological, terrestrial and 
biological systems (IPCC, 2007c).  
 
Given the emergent international consensus that climate change is an immediate threat 
to both the social and economic well-being of humanity, the intuitive international 
response should be to cast vested national interests aside, hoist the sails of initiative 
and embark on rigorous greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement programs. However, such 
departures have not materialized. In fact, one is tempted to glibly question whether 
members of the international policy community have misconstrued Stern Review’s 
admonition – ―delay in taking action on climate change would make it necessary to 
accept both more climate change and, eventually, higher mitigation costs‖  (Stern, 
2006, p. xv)  – as a policy recommendation. 
 




1. 2 ENERGY AND THE GLOBAL IMPERATIVE 
Of the six greenhouse gases covered under the Kyoto Protocol (carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, and 3 fluorine gases- HFCs, PFCs and SF6), CO2 emissions 
represent by far the largest anthropocentric threat to our atmosphere due to the sheer 
volume of annual CO2
 
emissions. To illustrate this point, in 2004, CO2 emissions 
(combined fossil fuel combustion and deforestation activities) accounted for 75% of 
all GHG emitted (on a comparative CO2 basis
3
) (Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency, 2006). In the same year, methane emissions (CH4) accounted for 
approximately 16% of total GHG emissions and nitrous oxide accounted for 
approximately 9% of the total GHG emissions. As Figure 1.1 outlines, the remaining 
three fluorine gases represent a very small proportion of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Figure 1.1: Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 1970-2004 
 
Chart Source: (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2006) 
 
The main hurdle stymieing international efforts to reduce CO2
 
emissions appears to be 
difficulty that all countries are having breaking free from a dependence on fossil fuel 
                                                 
3
 Greenhouse gases exhibit different global warming potentials so aggregate impact is often compared 
by translating global warming potential to a common metric- CO2 equivalent. 




energy. As UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon pointed out in his 2008 World 
Environment Day Message: 
 
―Addiction is a terrible thing.  It consumes and controls us, makes us deny 
important truths and blinds us to the consequences of our actions.  Our world 
is in the grip of a dangerous carbon habit…The environmental, economic and 
political implications of global warming are profound.  Ecosystems -- from 
mountain to ocean, from the poles to the tropics -- are undergoing rapid 
change.  Low-lying cities face inundation, fertile lands are turning to desert, 
and weather patterns are becoming ever more unpredictable.‖ (Ban, 2008) 
 
As Figure 1.1 indicates, CO2
 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion accounted for 
approximately 60% of all GHG emissions in 2005. Clearly, if humanity is to avoid the 
worst effects of global warming alluded to by the Stern Review and the IPCC 4
th
 
Assessment Report, progress in terms of reducing emissions related to fossil fuel 
combustion is essential. Unfortunately, data points to increasing – not decreasing – 
trends in combustion-related CO2
 
emissions. Globally, total combustion-related CO2
 
emissions increased by 28% between 1990 and 2005 (Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency, 2006). Although the main catalyst of this unsettling trend was a 
75% increase of CO2
 
emissions in developing countries, industrialized countries have 
also failed to reduce CO2
 
emissions despite commitments made under the Kyoto 
Protocol to do so. As of 2006, Annex B nations (industrialized nations committing to 
reduction targets) had recorded an aggregate annual increase in CO2
 
emissions of 4% 
compared to 1990 levels.  
 




Looking forward, the US Energy Information Administration projects that under a 
scenario whereby current laws and policies remain unchanged, global energy 
consumption will increase by 50% between 2005 and 2030 (EIA, 2008c). Furthermore, 
the proportion of energy generated through fossil fuel sources will remain virtually 
unchanged. Thus, despite indications that CO2
 
emission reductions of up to 80% are 
needed to abate the worst impacts of global warming (Stern, 2006), CO2
 
emission 
projections indicate that emissions will increase rather than decrease.  
 
It is notable that a great deal of global interest has arisen regarding the prospects of 
carbon capture and sequestration technology (CCS technology). The premise behind 
CCS technology is to capture CO2 emissions from a point source (i.e. a coal-fired 
power plant) and then store the emissions either aquatically (deep sea injection), 
biologically (biological assimilation) or geologically (in natural geological storage 
chambers), thereby preventing CO2
 
from dispersing directly into the atmosphere. 
Unfortunately, the volume of CO2 which must be sequestered each year to abate 
global warming is of such magnitude that the management of captured CO2 would 
likely present insurmountable hurdles, thereby rendering discussions about how to 
safely sequester such volumes to be moot.     
 
CCS technology as it stands today requires a liquid storage vehicle (i.e. water) for the 
CO2 (Hefner, 2008). How much liquid is required? If the CO2 generated from all the 
coal-fired power plants in the United States were captured, approximately 50 million 
barrels per day of CO2 infused fluid would be generated (Victor, 2008). This volume 
is four times greater than the daily oil production in the US (Hefner, 2008). In fact, on 
an annual basis, 90 million barrels of oil per day are distributed globally by a network 




that has taken decades to form (Victor, 2008). Accordingly, not only would enormous 
distribution networks be required to transport the effluent associated with CCS 
technology, the potential for environmental disaster caused by injecting so much 
effluent into geological or aquatic storage sites is almost unfathomable. In short, CCS 
technology may be somewhat viable as part of a short-term solution to abate the worst 
effects of global warming; but in its current technological manifestation, it is far from 
a responsible solution to the global GHG management challenge.  
 
1. 3 ELECTRICITY AND THE GLOBAL IMPERATIVE 
 
Over the next 25 years, the world will become increasingly dependent on 
electricity to meet its energy needs. Electricity is expected to remain the fastest 
growing form of end use energy worldwide through 2030, as it has been over 
the past several decades. Nearly 1/2 of the projected increase in energy 
consumption worldwide from 2005 to 2030 is attributed to electricity 
generation. (EIA, 2008b, p. 61) 
 
1.3.1  Electricity Generation Technologies 
Given the dominant role that the electricity generation sector plays in global energy 
consumption, it is insightful to examine the pattern of technological development in 
the sector in order to assess the progress that can be expected in terms of CO2
 








Table 1.1: Global Electricity Use by Source  
(data in trillion kilowatt hours) 2005 2030 Annual growth % 
Liquids and other petroleum 1.0 0.8 -0.9 
Natural Gas 3.4 8.4 3.7 
Coal 7.2 15.4 3.1 
Nuclear 2.6 3.8 1.4 
Renewables 3.2 5.0 1.8 
TOTAL 17.3 33.3 2.6 
Source: (EIA, 2008b) 
 
Table 1.1 tells a bleak tale. It is the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 2030 
global electricity use forecast from 2008 broken down by fuel source. The role of 
renewable energy technologies in global electricity generation is expected to continue 
to be minor despite a consensus that climate change presents an immediate, perilous 
threat to humanity (Stern, 2006), and despite expectations that costs of fossil fuels will 
rise (EIA, 2008b) while the costs of wind power and other renewable power will 
continue to decline (Brown & Escobar, 2007; Celik, Muneer, & Clarke, 2007; 
DeCarolis & Keith, 2006). By 2030, renewable technologies are expected to 
contribute a mere 15% to global electricity generation (down from 18.5% in 2005).  
 
1.3.2  The Dynamics of Electricity Prices 
Historically, the sluggish diffusion of renewable energy has been rationalised in 
economic terms. Until recently, the cost disparity between fossil fuel power options 
(specifically coal and natural gas) and renewable energy alternatives has been 
capacious enough to discourage transition to alternative energy. However, fossil fuel 
prices have edged significantly higher in recent years, substantially eroding this 
historical competitive cost advantage.  
 




High grade US Appalachian Coal exemplifies the volatility of fossil fuel prices. From 
a trading range of US$40-45 per short ton between December 2005 and December 
2007, the cost of this commodity swelled to US$150 per short ton in September 2008. 
Although, the cost retreated to approximately US$60 per ton in response to the fall 
2008 global economic slowdown which quashed demand for coal, the cost is still 




Estimating the kilowatt hour (kWh) cost of energy generated by coal depends 
significantly on the grade of coal used and the generation technology employed; 
however, broadly speaking, the cost of the feedstock for generating 1 kWh can be 
estimated to be approximately US 3.25¢, assuming that i) Northern Appalachian coal 
has a thermal energy content of approximately 6,150 kWh/ton, ii) the coal sells for 
US$80 per short ton, and iii) the combustion technology employed exhibits a 
moderate 40% electricity conversion ratio. When the price was US$150 per short ton 
in September of 2008, the cost of feedstock to generate 1 kWh of electricity would 
have been approximately US 6¢. Note, however, that neither estimate includes 
capitalisation costs or operation costs.  
 
The case for renewable technologies is strengthened when upward price pressure on 
fossil fuel feed-stocks are factored into the decision. For example, the EIA estimates 
that global coal consumption will increase by 65% between 2006 and 2030 (EIA, 
2008b). Many analysts believe that such levels of consumption will dangerously 
deplete already degraded coal reserves. In a study for the European Commission, 
                                                 
4
 Source: The Energy Information Administration, Accessed on January 3, 2010 at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/coalnews/coalmar.html 




Kavalov and Peteves  (2007, pp. 4-5) provide a succinct overview of trends in the coal 
industry:  
  (Due mostly to accelerated consumption), from 2000 to 2005, the world’s 
proven reserves-to-production ratio of coal in fact dropped by almost a third, 
from 277 to 155 years. 
 Coal production costs are steadily rising all over the world due to the need to 
develop new fields, increasingly difficult geological conditions and additional 
infrastructure costs associated with the exploitation of new fields. 
 The USA and China — former large net exporters — are gradually turning 
into large net importers with an enormous potential demand, together with 
India. 
 These trends suggest a likely significant increase of world coal prices in the 
coming decades. 
 
Recently, the costs of other fossil fuel stocks have not fared much better than coal. 
Throughout the 20
th
 century, the price of oil averaged US$24.98 per barrel with major 
price fluctuations occurring only during times of major global economic disruption.
5
  
However, as Figure 1.2 illustrates, since mid-1990, oil prices have sharply escalated, 
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 Source: WTRG Economics web-site: ―Oil Price History and Analysis‖ Accessed on June 27, 2008 at 
http://www.wtrg.com/prices.htm 




Figure 1.2: The Price Trend of Light Sweet Crude Oil 
 
Source of graph: Go-tech Website (http://octane.nmt.edu/gotech/Marketplace/Prices.aspx) 
 
It may be tempting to attempt to draw a parallel between the recent inflation of oil 
prices and the sudden price increases in oil during the 1970s. After all, if the 
circumstances are analogous, the world can expect oil prices to fall back to pre-
inflationary levels as it did between 1985 and 1998. Unfortunately the circumstances 
are not analogous. The escalation of oil prices in the 1970s was due to a supply shock. 
Specifically, oil-producing nations in the Middle East curtailed supplies. The current 
episode of escalating oil prices is caused by demand-side pressure. Simply put, the 
emergence of new economic powerhouses such as China and India along with 
unabated increases in oil consumption in established industrialized countries are 
taxing the ability of oil-producing nations to meet demand (Yergin, 2008). Not only 
are there concerns that oil capacity expansion initiatives will continue to lag demand 
for the next few decades, there are a growing number of experts within the oil industry 
who acknowledge that the global supply of oil may have peaked (Deffeyes, 2005). 
The Japanese government which is a major importer of oil estimates that 
commercially recoverable reserves of oil will be exhausted in 40 years (ANRE, 2006). 




If oil has indeed peaked, it will become increasingly scarce and more costly to procure 
as rampant demand continues to deplete available supplies (EIA, 2008b).  
 
For over 50 years, major oil-producing countries have been in the driver’s seat in 
terms of controlling the price of oil. The Saudis in particular, which still boast over 
one quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves, have played an active role in ensuring 
stable oil prices by controlling supply and pressuring other OPEC nations to follow 
their lead. Leaders in Saudi Arabia have astutely recognized that high oil prices 
provide incentives for nations to consider adopting other energy technologies (Ross, 
2008). The fallout from the oil crisis of the 1970s taught this lesson. In response to 
high oil prices, nations such as the United States adopted more aggressive renewable 
energy promotion policies (Sovacool, 2008a). On the other hand, if oil prices are too 
low, oil producers squander profit opportunities because the demand for oil is 
relatively inelastic between the $30-$60 per barrel range (Deffeyes, 2005). Typically, 
then the oil producing nations have sought to maintain a balance that optimizes 
profitability without precipitating a shift to alternative energy forms. However, the 
demand for oil has escalated over the past decade to the point where oil producers 
have lost control of the market (Yergin, 2008). Opening the supply taps in order to 
maintain low enough oil prices to discourage adoption of alternative energy sources 
has simply accelerated depletion of oil reserves (Deffeyes, 2005).  
 
Robert Hefner, the founder of The GHK Company which specializes in the 
development of natural gas projects sums up the coal and oil situation thusly: 
 




Unfortunately, our existing energy infrastructure and its principal fuels of coal 






 century technologies that have not 
changed that much and can no longer meet our 21
st
 century needs. (Hefner, 
2008, p. 152) 
 
Natural gas is increasingly viewed as an attractive substitute for oil in many energy 
applications due to superior combustion efficiency and lower CO2 emissions. On 
average, in comparison to electricity generated from coal, natural gas emits less than 
half the CO2 for every kilowatt hour generated (Hefner, 2008). Over the next six years, 
the market for liquefied natural gas (LNG) is expected to double (Yergin, 2008). The 
EIA anticipates that by 2030, 35% of the world's total natural gas consumption will be 
utilized in electricity generation.  
 
Unfortunately, the supply of natural gas exhibits the same undesirable characteristics 
as the supply of oil does. For starters, the nations that have rich reserves of natural gas 
are almost as unstable as the oil-producing nations. In fact, in many cases, they are 
one and the same in that natural gas and oil are frequently found in combination with 
one another (Deffeyes, 2005). For example, Russia which is the number one producer 
of oil in the world is also the number one producer of natural gas. It possesses 26% of 
global natural gas reserves and has demonstrated a propensity to use this resource for 
political gain and to exploit periods of high demand to gouge consumers (Stent, 2008). 
For example, a week prior to the conclusion of negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet in 
1993, Russia cut natural gas supplies to the Ukraine by 25%. In 1998, it threatened to 
curtail natural gas provisions to Moldova unless Russia was permitted to retain troops 
in a breakaway region of the country. Moreover, in 2006 and 2008, Russia cut-off gas 




supplies to the Ukraine in the middle of winter when the Ukraine refused to 
renegotiate a favourable contract that they had in place for Russian natural gas. Russia 
exhibited similar behaviour in January 2007 by curtailing delivery of oil to Belarus 
amidst purchase price negotiations (Stent, 2008).  
 
Moreover, like oil and coal, natural gas is a finite resource. Currently, the global 
reserves-to-production ratio of natural gas is estimated at 63 to 66 years (ANRE, 2006; 
EIA, 2008b). Although history has demonstrated that fossil fuel reserves tend to grow 
as exploration activities expand, it is becoming more evident that the projected 
demand boom for natural gas will significantly outpace the expansion of supply 
(Deffeyes, 2005). In short, like the prices of coal and oil, an upward escalation in the 
price of natural gas is likely.  
 
While the costs of fossil fuels are on a decidedly upward trend, the costs of most 
mainstream alternative energy technologies continue to fall significantly as higher 
volumes of installed capacity lead to improved economies of scale and technological 
innovations improve generation efficiency. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the cost 
of electricity per kilowatt hour for the mainstream renewable energy technologies 
contrasted against the cost of electricity per kilowatt hour for the cheapest fossil fuel - 
coal. As the comparison in the 2001 column indicates, most renewable sources – wind 
energy, hydropower, geothermal power, and biomass energy – if produced in the most 
effective manner possible can generate electricity at costs that are already competitive 
with coal-fired power.  
 




Table 1.2: Comparative Prices of Fuel Technologies and Future Trends 
 2001 energy costs Emergent cost trends 
Coal (comparison)
 6
    3-6 ¢/kWh 5-20 ¢/kWh 
Wind    4–8 ¢/kWh 3–10 ¢/kWh 
Solar photovoltaic  25–160 ¢/kWh 5–25 ¢/kWh 
Solar thermal  12–34 ¢/kWh 4–20 ¢/kWh 
Large hydropower    2–10 ¢/kWh 2–10 ¢/kWh 
Small hydropower    2–12 ¢/kWh 2–10 ¢/kWh 
Geothermal 2–10 ¢/kWh 1–8 ¢/kWh 
Biomass 3–12 ¢/kWh 4–10 ¢/kWh 
* All costs are in 2001 US$-cent per kilowatt-hour.  
Source: World Energy Assessment, 2004 update (Johansson & Goldemberg, 2004) 
 
The column on the right estimates an average cost of electricity over the next few 
decades given current trends. As the estimate indicates, the conflation of escalating 
coal costs and declining renewable energy costs has significantly improved the 
commercial competitiveness of all renewable energy technologies. This trend is 
expected to continue in coming decades. 
 
Critics of this assessment could make the argument that maximizing the efficiency of 
coal combustion is largely dependent on the choice of technology; and as such, 
producing electricity at the lower-cost range for coal-fired power (i.e. 3¢/kWh) is 
simply a matter of technology selection while producing electricity at the lower-cost 
range for geothermal, biomass and wind power is largely dependent on geographic 
attributes, which are not a controllable. In other words, although it may be achievable 
for most countries to produce coal-fired electricity at US3¢/kWh, it is more likely that 
for most countries, the cost of generating wind power is closer to US6¢/kWh (the 
median value) because wind power cost is heavily influenced by geographical wind 
conditions. In fact, there are numerous estimates for wind power that either meet or 
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 This range for coal is my estimate based on market trends. All other estimates are from the 2004 
World Energy Assessment (Johansson & Goldemberg, 2004). 




exceed the US6¢/kWh median value (cf. BWEA, 2005; Celik, et al., 2007; Dismukes, 
Miller, Solocha, Jagani, & Bers, 2007; Morthorst & Awerbuch, 2009) 
 
On the other hand, such criticism could be countered with the argument that fossil fuel 
generated electricity has historically enjoyed a significant level of government subsidy 
support. Consequently, historical cost data rarely incorporates the full cost of fossil 
fuel generation. Nor does such criticism take into consideration the prospects of fossil 
fuel costs rising in the future. For the cost of fossil fuel generated electricity to be 
equitably compared to the cost of electricity generated by alternative technologies, it 
is necessary to compare the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). LCOE is calculated 
by summing up all current capital costs, future fuel costs, future operation and 
maintenance costs and decommissioning costs. This total is then divided by the 
number of kilowatt hours of expected production over the lifetime of the equipment. 
When LCOE is used, it yields an interesting profile of costs.  
 
Table 1.3: Nominal LCOE for the United States 
Technology Nominal LCOE,  
US ¢/kWh ($2007) 
Offshore wind    2.6 
Hydroelectric 2.8 
Landfill Gas 4.1 
Advanced Nuclear 4.9 
Onshore wind 5.6 
Geothermal 6.4 
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) 6.7 
Biomass (combustion) 6.9 
Scrubbed Coal 7.2 
Advanced Gas and Oil Combined Cycle (AGOCC) 8.2 
IGCC with Carbon Capture 8.8 
AGOCC with Carbon Capture 12.8 
Solar Photovoltaic 39.0 
Source: Sovacool, 2008 
 




Sovacool, in preparing an LCOE comparison for the United States based on data from 
the IEA, Cornell University, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and the 
Virginia Centre for Coal and Energy Reserve, arrived at the estimates presented in 
Table 1.3 (Sovacool, 2008a). 
 
As Table 1.3 indicates, fossil fuel sources of electricity are no longer the most 
economical options for electricity generation when subsidies are removed and the cost 
of building new plants incorporate best available estimates of future fuel stock costs. 
In fact, Sovacool argues that ―nominal‖ LCOE should just be a starting point for 
electricity cost comparisons. He logically contends that social and environmental costs 
associated with each energy source (i.e. the cost of coal-fired power plant pollution 
abatement) should also be factored into the cost of electricity. Table 1.4 illustrates the 
impact that internalizing these external costs has on electricity source cost profiles 
(refer to the ―adjusted LCOE‖ column) (Sovacool, 2008a).  
 
Table 1.4: Nominal and Adjusted LCOE for the United States 
Technology Nominal LCOE,  
US ¢/kWh 
($2007) 
Adjusted LCOE,  
US ¢/kWh 
($2007) 
Offshore wind    2.6 3.0 
Onshore wind 5.6 6.0 
Geothermal 6.4 7.1 
Hydroelectric 2.8 7.8 
Landfill Gas 4.1 10.8 
Biomass (combustion) 6.9 13.6 
Advanced Nuclear 4.9 16.0 
Advanced Gas and Oil Combined Cycle (AGOCC) 8.2 20.2 
AGOCC with Carbon Capture 12.8 24.8 
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) 6.7 25.9 
Scrubbed Coal 7.2 26.3 
IGCC with Carbon Capture 8.8 27.9 
Solar Photovoltaic 39.0 39.9 
Source: Sovacool, 2008 
 




 As Table 1.4 illustrates, based on Sovacool’s estimates for electricity costs in the 
United States, wind power, geothermal power and hydroelectric power emerge as 
decisively the most economical when all of the external costs are internalized. It 
should be noted that any such comparison of electricity costs comes with inherent 
biases which influence the results. For example, the ―nominal‖ data presented in Table 
1.4 is contingent on assumptions made regarding the future cost of fossil fuel 
resources. Furthermore, the "adjusted" data presented in Table 1.4 is appurtenant to 
assumptions made regarding costing of dominant negative externalities such as CO2 
emissions. 
 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper, the data presented is not intended to 
support definitive quantitative proclamations regarding the comparative cost of 
electricity technologies; rather, it is intended to lend general support to the assertion 
that commercially viable alternative electricity generation technology is available 
today. A bounty of studies investigating the cost of externalities associated with fossil 
fuel electricity generation have all arrived at the same conclusion that even if 
conservative estimates regarding the cost of externalities (i.e. using the current price 
of carbon credits as a proxy for ―all external costs‖) are employed, fossil fuel 
electricity sources become more expensive than hydropower and wind power (cf. 
ATSE, 2009; Morthorst & Awerbuch, 2009; Stern, 2006; Tester, Drake, Driscoll, 
Golay, & Peters, 2005; Wizelius, 2007). While the specific cost data may be at odds, 
the general conclusion is not. 
 
Electricity sector market dynamics are changing due to international concerns over 
global warming and the progressive narrowing of the cost differential between fossil 




fuel electricity generation and alternative generation sources. From a policy 
perspective, a transition away from fossil fuel electricity generation technologies 
presents new opportunities and new threats. Accordingly, the next two sections 
examine the potential impact of such a transition on national interests. Section 1.4 
examines opportunities and threats from the perspective of industrialized nations, 
while Section 1.5 takes a developing nation perspective. As will be demonstrated, 
after weighing the opportunities and threats associated with such a transition, there is a 
strong argument to be made for adopting aggressive policies to expedite such a 
transition.  
 
1.4 ENERGY MARKET CHANGE & INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS 
For industrialized nations, energy has played a largely unheralded role in wealth 
creation and the cultivation of military might. Energy drives the high-tech production 
processes that provide industrialized nations with technological advantage over 
developing nations. It also fuels machines of war and supports military production 
processes that provide industrialized countries with international clout and domestic 
defence capabilities. Accordingly, any changes in energy market dynamics that alter 
the comparative cost structure of the nation's energy mix can potentially undermine 
national competitive advantage and destabilize national security. Overall, there is an 
ineluctable connection between energy policy, environmental policy, economic policy, 
national security policy and foreign-policy (Rothkopf, 2008). As the allure of fossil 
fuel energy technology continues to diminish, the once disparate objectives within 
these policy realms are exhibiting convergence (Biegan, 2008).  
 




1.4.1  Convergence and Alternative Energy 
It can be argued that a common ―created‖ competency exists for all industrialized 
nations – effective strategic management of energy resources for the purposes of 
supporting industrial mechanization (Yergin, 1993). The top economies have learned 
how to create core competencies at different stages in the energy value chain. Canada 
(in oil and natural gas) and Australia (in coal) have exploited abundant reserves of 
fossil fuels to become global suppliers. The United Kingdom (British Petroleum), 
Holland (Shell) and the United States (Exxon) created national competitive 
advantages in wholesaling by nurturing the development of multinational energy firms 
(Yergin, 1993). Singapore established a core competency as an Asian hub for the 
refinement of fossil fuels. Japan leads the world in energy utilization efficiency and 
nuclear technology development (Campbell & Price, 2008b). In short, many countries 
that have achieved economic prosperity have done so by developing strategic 
strengths in one or more links of the energy supply chain.  
 
As a global transition to alternative energy technologies materializes, new 
opportunities will emerge for nations to establish entrenched positions of leadership in 
the stages associated with these new energy value chains. Nations which are 
successful in assuming leadership roles will develop core competencies that will 
facilitate national competitive advantage. Viewed from a defensive perspective, 
industrialized nations that fail to make the transition in a strategic manner, may find 
their historical advantages usurped by developing nations. This is increasingly so in 
recent times, as the technological advantages that have been enjoyed by firms in 
industrialized nations are increasingly eroded. As Wizelius (2007, p. 133) summarizes 
for wind power, ―Even if the economic subsidies for wind power during its early stage 




of development are relatively expensive for the economy, politicians have calculated 
that in the longer run it will generate economic benefits.‖ 
 
In national defence, the strategic disadvantages of fossil fuels are becoming 
increasingly evident. Fossil fuels are largely imported (using tankers, barges, lorries, 
or pipelines that make easy military targets), scarce (thus, increasingly expensive) and 
subject to high degrees of international competition (Campbell & Price, 2008a). As 
Daniel Yergin points out, domestic energy supply limitations restrict a nation’s 
capabilities to sustain lengthy military operations. In fact, insufficient access to oil at 
strategic stages of warfare contributed significantly to the downfall of both the 
German and the Japanese armies during the 1940s (Yergin, 1993). In recent times, the 
world witnessed the perils associated with foreign energy dependency when Russia 
curtailed access to liquid natural gas supplies to the Ukraine (Campbell & Price, 
2008a). Clearly, establishing a national energy portfolio that focuses on encouraging 
the cultivation of domestic energy supplies represents a prudent initiative in the 
context of national security. Although very few countries can boast fossil fuel 
production that exceeds annual demand, all countries can bolster domestic energy 
security to some extent by harnessing alternative energy sources (geothermal, wind, 
hydro, solar PV, biofuels etc.). 
 
This should not be misconstrued to imply that ―complete independence‖ in energy is a 
goal that all nations should strive to achieve (Yergin, 2008). Clearly for many nations, 
there will be resource barriers which inhibit such a goal (Farrell & Bozon, 2008). 
Moreover, the economic theory of comparative advantage suggests that complete 
energy independence may in fact be economically sub-optimal (Mankiw, 1997). 




However, it is clear that for many nations, the current reliance on fossil fuel supplies 
provided by unstable foreign countries subverts national security. 
 
The influence that energy has on other aspects of global stability was summed up 
succinctly by Kurt Campbell and Jonathon Price in the context of US national security: 
 
Every major issue confronting the United States today - including climate 
change, the rise of China and India, jihadist financing, an increasingly 
bellicose Russia, worrisome trends in Latin America, and endemic hostilities 
in the Middle East - is either inextricably linked to or exacerbated by decisions 
associated with energy policy. (Campbell & Price, 2008a, p. 11) 
 
1.4.2  The Need for Speed 
There is strategic value in policies which encourage expedience in regard to 
facilitating a transition to domestically cultivated alternative energy supplies. 
Effective transition policies in deregulated markets enhance market opportunities and 
encourage intensified competition. This expedites competitive ―shakeout‖ whereby 
the most efficient competitors leverage growth opportunities to stimulate growth and 
attain competitive advantage through economies of scale. Eventually the market 
consolidates to a pool of highly proficient market leaders (Porter, 1998). Applied to 
the electricity sector, policies which effectively support alternative electricity 
generation technology development will eventually create a market that produces 
electricity that is economically superior and not subject to fuel stock price fluctuations. 
This ensures that nations can preserve a competitive edge in this important factor 
endowment. 




Another national benefit to be derived from nurturing competitively resilient 
alternative energy firms stems from employment and tax revenue enhancements as the 
firms grow first domestically and then internationally. It is worth exploring how this 
occurs. In order to achieve a dominant position in a given market, a firm must develop 
the core competencies that allow it to produce and deliver goods and services that 
meet market requirements in a competitively superior manner (Porter, 1985). Many of 
these core competencies can only be honed through experience. In short, market 
pioneers can gain a competitive advantage over slow market entrants by learning from 
early experiences and adopting better practices (Grant, 2005). Firms that succeed in 
highly competitive domestic markets often find that lessons learned domestically are 
often transferable to competitive forays into foreign alternative energy markets 
(Bartlett, Ghoshal, & Birkinshaw, 2003).   
 
Firms which establish advanced competencies in competitively critical areas can use 
this competitive edge to establish unassailable market positions in foreign energy 
markets. This is because first-movers can establish defensive beach-heads in markets 
to more effectively counter market entry attempts by competing firms (Bartlett, et al., 
2003). They can establish early brand recognition and early market share leads that 
make it difficult for competitors to usurp (Doyle, 1998). As all this unfolds, 
governments which have helped nurture the development of such industry leaders 
begin to benefit through enhanced tax revenues and job creation. The Dutch firm, 
Vestas, which is the world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer, is a testament to the 
capacity of domestic energy policy to nurture firms that are capable of competing 
successfully in global markets.   
 




It is ironic how reluctant many leaders of industrialized nations have been to provide 
leadership in facilitating a transition away from fossil fuel dependence given the 
increased threats that fossil fuel reliance poses to economic well-being and national 
security. Islamic extremism, unrest in the Middle East, the rise of nationalism in 
countries such as Russia, Venezuela and Iran, global warming, the international drug 
trade and global financial instability all have roots stemming from this global 
addiction to fossil fuel energy (Rothkopf, 2008). The often heard laments espoused by 
leaders of industrialized countries that moving away from fossil fuel energy will 
increase the cost of doing business for domestic firms and impinge upon economic 
growth prospects is a false belief predicated on a misperception that fossil fuel energy 
technology is actually cheaper than other forms of energy. As outlined earlier, 
excluding external costs, wind energy for example is now cost competitive with fossil 
fuels. Including external costs, fossil fuel energy is economically inferior to any 
alternative energy form (Sovacool, 2008a).  
 
1.5 ENERGY MARKET CHANGE & DEVELOPING NATIONS 
Unsurprisingly, strategic energy mix planning has extensive economic, security and 
social repercussions in developing countries also. 
 
1.5.1  Economic Considerations 
For firms from developing nations that compete in international markets, a key 
competitive advantage is the ability to tap into a cost base that is significantly lower 
than that found in industrialized nations (Bartlett, et al., 2003). Accordingly, if the 
energy trends outlined earlier continue and alternative energy become less expensive 
than fossil fuel energy, exporting firms from developing countries will be at a strategic 




disadvantage if they must continue to pay higher prices for electricity produced by 
fossil fuel sources.  
 
1.5.2  Economic Security Considerations 
Volatile electricity costs are of particular concern in developing countries. This is 
because developing countries are frequently characterized by both low per capita rates 
of saving and low levels of government savings (Perkins, Radelet, & Lindauer, 2006). 
Consequently, unanticipated increases in the cost of a resource, that is as important to 
economic well-being as energy is, can significantly influence the economic well-being 
of firms and citizens. Clearly, anything that can be done by policymakers in 
developing countries to encourage price stability should be done.  
 
Alternative energy technology represents an avenue for enhancing electricity price 
stability. As demonstrated earlier, fossil fuel prices have fluctuated considerably while 
inching higher over the past few years and are expected to lurch higher in the decades 
to come (EIA, 2008c). On the other hand, the costs of many alternative sources of 
energy have been declining consistently over the past decade. The only degree of 
volatility that exists for many alternative energy technologies lies in uncertainty over 
the timing and degree to which costs will decline (Neuhoff, 2005). In short, renewable 
energy represents an opportunity to inject a degree of cost stability into a nation’s 
energy mix.  
 
1.5.3  Economic Empowerment 
The technological diversity of alternative energy options allows policymakers in developing 
nations to target and support technologies which mesh most effectively with the existing 




economic infrastructure. Governments in developing nations that attempt to fast track 
economic development by importing advanced technology often experience sub-optimal 
results because the existing economic infrastructure fails to support the technology (Perkins, 
et al., 2006). Todaro and Smith (2003) contend that a more effective national economic 
development strategy is to identify strategies to support the development of forward and 
backward linkages associated with existing  industries. In the alternative energy industry, 
there are biofuel options which can be integrated with agricultural activities, there are solar 
options that can provide electricity to areas where electricity grid infrastructure is 
insufficient and there are biomass energy options that can add-value to industries which 
produce biomass as waste by-products. Clearly, the diversity of technical options in 
alternative energy allows developing countries to match strategic energy mixes with national 
competencies.  
 
1.5.4  Social Considerations 
In developing countries, abatement of climate change is just one benefit associated 
with a transition away from fossil fuel energy. Economic growth overwhelms 
environmental governance in many developing countries. Consequently, lax 
environmental regulations governing electricity generation and transportation 
emissions give rise to significant environmental and social problems. For example, air 
pollution in China is so bad that it is now the leading cause of death in the country 
(Fairley, 2007). Worldwide, 16 of the 20 cities with the worst air pollution are found 
in China (Bader, 2008). If a transition to cleaner forms of energy could be facilitated 
in an economically effective manner, citizens in developing countries could enjoy the 
benefits of enhanced affluence without also having to suffer the negative externalities 
associated with economic growth.  
 




1.5.5  The Need for Speed 
Previously, an assertion was made that industrialized nations that embrace more 
proactive policies for expediting a transition to alternative energy can nurture the 
development of internationally competitive, domestic alternative energy firms. This 
justification for expedience also applies in developing nations. An example of how 
government support for alternative energy in developing nations can also sire 
domestic firms that are capable of competing successfully internationally is the wind 
power firm Suzulon which was formed in 1995 in India and has since grown to 
become the 3
rd
 leading manufacturer of wind power equipment.  
 
There is another benefit to proactive alternative energy development policies that 
applies solely to developing nations. Currently, there are a number of financial 
mechanisms (the Clean Development Mechanism-CDM, the Global Environmental 
Facility, the World Bank Clean Energy Fund, and a number of other Overseas 
Development Assistance funds) that developing nations can tap into to help finance a 
transition away from fossil fuel energy. However, these financial support funds will 
not last forever. As more nations adopt alternative energy expansion policies, 
competition for these funds will heat up. Donor agencies will be faced with difficult 
choices in regard to allocation. If history is any indicator, this in turn will result in 
more conditions being placed on the funds (Perkins, et al., 2006). Furthermore, a stage 
will inevitably be reached where international willingness to finance such energy 
projects will wane. Forebodingly, a number of CDM projects are already being 
rejected for not meeting the CDM condition of ―additionality‖ (that the project would 
not have been carried out without support from the CDM program) (Castro & 
Michaelowa, 2008). It appears that the market for funds is already tightening. 




Developing nations that move quickly to take advantage of these financial 
mechanisms will gain a leg up on their developing country rivals by procuring 
alternative energy generation capacity at subsidized rates.    
 
1.6 WHEN FORCES FOR SPEED MEET THE NEED FOR SPEED 
The analysis presented to this point indicates that energy market dynamics are 
gradually shifting in favour of alternative energy technologies; and indeed, for 
industrialized and developing countries alike, there are strong emergent incentives for 
political leaders to embrace aggressive policies to facilitate expedient transition. 
Fortuitously, the benefits associated with such a transition mesh seamlessly with the 
need to respond assertively to abate global warming. 
 
In the oft quoted economic assessment of climate change known widely as the Stern 
Review, climate change was called, ―the greatest and widest-ranging market failure 
ever seen.‖ The review concluded that ―the benefits of strong, early action (to abate 
global warming) considerably outweigh the costs‖. In emphasizing the importance of 
expedience in facilitating a transition away from fossil fuel dependence, the report 
declared:  
 
 The effects of our actions now on future changes in the climate have long lead 
times. What we do now can have only a limited effect on the climate over the 
next 40 or 50 years. On the other hand, what we do in the next 10 or 20 years 
can have a profound effect on the climate in the second half of this century and 
in the next. (Stern, 2006, pp. i-ii).  
 




The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fourth Assessment Report on 
Climate Change also echoed the appeal made in the Stern Review that expediency in 
developing and implementing mitigation measures is of utmost importance. The report 
stated: 
 
Many impacts can be reduced, delayed or avoided by mitigation. Mitigation 
efforts and investments over the next two to three decades will have a large 
impact on opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels. Delayed emission 
reductions significantly constrain the opportunities to achieve lower 
stabilisation levels and increase the risk of more severe climate change 
impacts (IPCC, 2007a).  
 
It is promising that the forces to justify an expedient transition to alternative energy 
are amassing during a period of time when such an expedient transition is required.  
 
1.7 THE DICHOTOMY OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY 
Despite emergent levelized cost data such as the data presented in Table 1.4 which 
indicate wind power, hydro power, geothermal power and biomass combustion are all 
economically superior to all forms of fossil fuel power (with or without carbon 
capture and sequestration); despite the potential benefits accruing to nations (both 
industrialized and developing) that undertake a transition to these alternative energy 
forms in an expedient manner; and despite the global warming imperative to ensure 
nations cooperate to reduce CO2 emissions, the pace of alternative energy 
development is phlegmatic. 
 




Most certainly the growth rates attributed to some of the more commercially attractive 
alternative energy technologies are impressive when considered in isolation. For 
example, the World Wind Energy Association reports that installed wind power 
capacity has grown more than 10-fold since 1999 (WWEA, 2009). Less impressive 
but still laudable, the International Geothermal Association reports that installed 
geothermal power capacity for electricity generation increased 55% between 1990 and 
2005.
7
  However, in absolute terms, the inroads that these two commercially viable 
energy forms have made into the electricity generation sector have been minor. Total 
global installed wind power capacity at the end of 2008 amounted to approximately 
121,188 MW. Electricity output from these turbines amounted to only 1.5% of global 
electricity consumption (WWEA, 2009). Even less significant was the total amount of 
installed geothermal electricity generation capacity which, as of 2005, totalled only 
9,064 MW.
8
 Overall, it would be accurate to conclude that these two promising forms 
of renewable energy are indeed diffusing but nowhere near the level of penetration 
necessary to make significant contributions to global warming abatement. 
 
This then is the emergent dichotomy involving renewable energy; although strong 
environmental, economic and political justifications exist for nations to adopt 
aggressive programs for supporting a transition to renewable energy, the nations of the 
world remain highly committed to fossil fuel electricity generation. In the lead up to 
the 15
th
 Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (COP15), there were indications that 
the commitments to be undertaken by developed countries would be in the 
neighbourhood of 8-12% below 1990 levels by 2020 after accounting for forestry 
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 International Geothermal Association web-site: http://www.geothermal-
energy.org/226,installed_generating_capacity.html. Accessed on 29 November 2009. 
8
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 This lies in stark contrast to the 25-40% reduction level described as 
necessary by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Yet even these 
modest targets failed to gain acceptance at COP15. Meanwhile, developed countries 
lag far behind the industrialized countries in terms of GHG emission reduction targets 
with most still resisting the concept of making formal commitments (IGES, 2005).  
Clearly a degree of dynamic tension exists within the electricity sectors in all nations. 
On one hand, all of the 192 nations that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol (as of 
December 1, 2009) have introduced initiatives to support the development of 
renewable energy. Many of the top economies of the world now have specific 
renewable energy targets supported by policy instruments such as feed-in tariffs, 
production tax credits, mandatory renewable energy quotas and production subsidies, 
all intended to encourage a greater uptake of renewable energy. Best practices in 
policy development have been internationally disseminated and policymakers that are 
intent on pursuing aggressive renewable energy development strategies can access 
numerous accounts of how countries such as Germany, Spain and Denmark have 
recorded successes in encouraging development of renewable energy through various 
policy instruments (cf. Komor, 2004; Mallon, 2006; Wizelius, 2007). However, with 
the exception of a few smaller nations such as Denmark, Norway, Portugal and the 
Netherlands, the contribution of renewable energy source to the national electricity 
mix is trivial in most advanced nations. Given the justifications outlined to this point 
for supporting renewable energy development and the existence of policies for 
catalyzing such a transition, the phlegmatic results in advanced nations are perplexing. 
                                                 
9
 Climate Tracker web-site: http://www.climateactiontracker.org  accessed on November 30, 2009. This 
site is created to allow members of the general public to keep track of political commitments made by 
nations. 




Simply put, what is preventing a more robust diffusion of renewable energy in the 
electricity sector? 
 
1.8 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH THESIS 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the broader challenge of identifying what is 
preventing a more robust diffusion of renewable energy in the electricity sector by 
better understanding the factors that impact the effectiveness of the policy making 
process and influence the diffusion of wind power in advanced economies.  
A decision was made to focus on one renewable energy technology because each 
technology is characterized by its own set of socio-technical political challenges that 
must be overcome in order for the technology to proliferate (Mallon, 2006). For 
example, concerning social hurdles, there are perceptions that wind power technology 
is noisy and poses a threat to avian communities (Boyle, 2004). Conversely, solar PV 
is not audibly invasive but a transition to solar PV electricity at the household or 
industry level would require a massive conceptual shift in architectural design that 
amplifies the economic barriers solar PV firms face. Similarly, each alternative 
technology faces different technical hurdles. For wind power, a major technical hurdle 
lies in effectively managing the stochastic flow of power generated from wind 
(Ackerman, 2005). For geothermal power, a huge challenge stems from logistical 
complications of delivering power from the geothermal site to where it is needed 
(Boyle, Everett, & Ramage, 2004). Each technology also faces different political and 
economic barriers because each technology has its own profile in terms of generation 
costs, infrastructure requirements and economic impacts. Moreover, the diffusion of 
each technology is influenced by different stakeholder groups all exerting varying 
degrees of influence on the diffusion process. Because each alternative technology 




faces unique challenges, one technology was chosen as the focus to ensure a suitable 
level of depth for the purposes of this study. 
 
When considering which technology to select as the focal technology for this study, 
wind power stood out for a number of reasons; but three are worth highlighting. First 
and foremost, because wind power is a commercially competitive energy source, the 
majority of advanced nations around the world have initiatives in place specifically 
designed to encourage the development of wind power. This attribute was attractive 
from a research perspective because it implies a much larger and richer research 
universe from which to draw research insights. Second, for virtually every advanced 
nation, wind power can, to certain degrees, be incorporated into existing grids without 
any significant physical alterations to the electricity grid structure. The allure of this 
attribute is that research insights to improve the effectiveness of wind power 
development policy could be immediately useful to policymakers worldwide. As 
Whetton (1989) points out in an article clarifying what constitutes a worthy academic 
contribution, choosing topics which are of contemporary interest helps to ensure that 
emerging research provides the ―so what‖ factor that is characteristic of a significant 
contribution to any given field. Third, as was pointed out earlier, the need for an 
expedient transition to carbon-free forms of electricity generation is imperative if 
humanity is to have any chance of avoiding severe ecological impacts associated with 
global warming. As will be detailed later in this thesis, wind power could conceivably 
provide at least 20% of humanity’s electricity demand within months if the political 
will and economic commitment existed. In short, research into how to improve wind 
power development policy in advanced nations represents the type of social 




contribution that applied public policy research should endeavour to achieve 
(O'Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2003). 
 
The study focuses specifically barriers to wind power development in advanced 
economies for three specific reasons. First, it is probable that per capita level of 
affluence has paramount influence over wind power development policy in a given 
nation. When nations reach high levels of per capita affluence, national development 
policies tend to shift from a prevailing emphasis on fostering economic growth to a 
more balanced development portfolio that also incorporates the enhancement of 
environmental and social welfare (Perkins, et al., 2006; Todaro & Smith, 2003). The 
result is a convergence of socio-political economic aspirations. For example, although 
cultural nuances differ, socio-political economic aspirations in Japan and the United 
Kingdom exhibit more similarities than socio-political economic aspirations in Japan 
and Malaysia. Second, with the exception of China, India and Russia, advanced 
economies dominate the list of nations with the highest levels of energy related CO2 
emissions. In 2006, over 40% of all CO2 emissions came from 10 advanced 
economies.
10
 Consequently, an improved understanding of wind power development 
in advanced nations will provide insights into how CO2 emissions can be reduced in 
nations which are having the highest per capita impact on global warming. Third, 
advanced economies have superior financial capacity to support wind power 
development initiatives and as such deserve a degree of prioritization given the global 
imperative to expediently initiate such transition away from carbon-intensive 
                                                 
10
 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006, www.worldbank.org. The 10 advanced 
economies with the most emissions include: USA (21.2%), Japan (4.5%), Germany (2.9%), Canada 
(2.1%), UK (2%), South Korea (1.7%), Italy (1.6%), France (1.4%), Australia (1.3%), and Spain (1.1%). 
Data from Taiwan is not included in WDI data but in 2006, per capita CO2 emissions in Taiwan were 
the third highest in the world which would place Taiwan in the top 5 advanced nations in terms of 
aggregate emissions (Tchii, 2009).  




electricity technologies and the reluctance that developing countries have 
demonstrated toward facilitating such a transition without advanced nations acting 
first (Prins & Rayner, 2007).  
 
The boundaries implied by these conceptual choices produce a refined version of the 
paradox alluded to earlier and gives rise to the predominant research question guiding 
this study: if forces in support of a transition to alternative energy are currently 
amassing and wind energy is currently a viable, readily implementable solution, why 
is the diffusion of wind energy technology plodding along in many advanced nations 
when it should be escalating at breakneck speed? In the next chapter, the 
methodology used to guide the search for answers to this important question is 
explicated. 




CHAPTER 2  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONCEPTUAL LENS 
 
2.1.1  Primary Research Question  
If forces in support of a transition to alternative energy are currently amassing and 
wind energy is a currently viable solution, why is the diffusion of wind energy 
technology plodding along in many advanced nations when it should be escalating at 
breakneck speed? 
 
2.1.2  Theoretical Perspective 
It would be a gross oversimplification of the policy process to contend that successful 
policymaking depends solely on the successful development and implementation of 
appropriate policy instruments. Clearly in regard to wind power development, the 
development and implementation of effective policy instruments can influence market 
behaviour; however, there are a great many exogenous factors which are not typically 
considered part of the traditional policy cycle (cf. Howlett & Ramesh, 1995) which 
have the capacity to undermine the effectiveness of any given policy instrument.  
 
Broadly, exogenous impediments to the policy process can be conceptualized on two 
levels, a micro-level and a macro-level. Micro-level exogenous impediments include 
forces in play at the municipal or project level that can either derail the completion of 
projects or cause projects to be developed in sub-optimal fashion. For example, in the 
UK during the 1990s, the policy instrument for promoting renewable electricity 




capacity development was known as the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) which 
was essentially a supply-side subsidy. One of the problems with the NFFO was that 
wind power development projects were awarded through a national bidding process to 
developers who then faced inflated zoning hurdles erected by municipal governments 
who felt that community development was being impinged upon by the national 
government. Projects without local participation often wound up approved nationally 
but undeveloped locally, a good illustration of micro-level exogenous forces impeding 
the policy process (Komor, 2004). Macro-level exogenous impediments refer to 
elements which influence policy at the national level. For example, James Hansen 
makes the charge that fossil fuel special interest groups in the United States have been 
primarily responsible for undermining development of renewable energy despite 
economic and ecological advantages attributed to some of the mature renewable 
energy technologies (Hansen, 2008).  
 
A key premise of this research study is that micro and macro-level exogenous 
impediments are not well understood; nor have any attempts been made in respect to 
wind power development policy to explicate the nature and characteristics of these 
exogenous obstacles in a manner that would allow policymakers to develop counter-
strategies to minimize these impediments. Therefore, the study seeks to achieve two 
goals: i) contribute to a better understanding of these peripheral influences on the 
policy process, and ii) begin the process of ―bringing order‖ to the study of these 
forces by developing cognitive taxonomies to map these forces (cf. Lowi, 1972). The 
phrase ―socio-political economy‖ has been used in the title of this research project to 
highlight that the study seeks to examine a broad spectrum of social, technical, 
political and economic influences which impede wind power development. 




The study is operationalized on both the micro and macro-levels. The first part of the 
study – the micro-analysis – examines impediments to wind power development at the 
project level. A micro-level analysis serves two functions for this research study. First, 
for policymakers who are tasked with the responsibility of supporting project 
development at the community or regional level, it is essential to understand the types 
of barriers that can cause a well-designed policy instrument to be ineffective at the 
implementation stage. Second, an in-depth examination of concerns faced by wind 
power developers will provide the reader with the background knowledge necessary to 
better understand the social, technical, political and economic forces that impinge on 
effective national wind power development policy, which is the theme of the second 
part of the study – the macro-analysis. Although a lot has been written about us how 
to design effective national wind power development policy, very little research exists 
in regard to exogenous obstacles which tend to either undermine national policy 
design or derail policy diffusion efforts. 
 
2.2 PART 1 METHODOLOGY (MICRO-LEVEL POLICY INSIGHTS) 
There are numerous examples of national wind power development stimulus measures 
being undermined by failed projects due to community resistance, environmental 
concerns or technical issues that result in unexpected financial burdens goals for the 
developer, the utility, the affected community or transmission and distribution (T&D) 
companies (cf. Ackerman, 2005; Firestone & Kempton, 2007; Wizelius, 2007). Many 
of these project level problems occur because of inadequate knowledge on the part of 
policymakers who create policies to oversee such projects. Decisions made by local or 
regional governments in areas such as spatial planning (zoning decisions), regulatory 




control, infrastructure investment and environmental impact governance significantly 
influence the viability of individual wind energy projects (Komor, 2004).  
 
The complexity of wind power technologies combined with the intrusive nature of 
community wind  power projects implies that effective micro-level policy decisions 
must consider issues related to engineering (mechanical, electrical and aeronautical), 
finance, geography, spatial planning, environmental management, meteorology, law 
and industrial ecology, to name but a few (Wizelius, 2007). Very few individuals, in 
government policy roles or otherwise, possess the depth and breadth of knowledge 
necessary to ensure such projects are overseen in economically optimal, 
environmentally sustainable manners. In the policy profession, enlisting specialist 
advice on complex issues is a common approach for improving decision-making 
effectiveness. However, a modicum of discernment is necessary in order to avoid 
making poor decisions through flawed expert judgement. In short, a degree of 
scholastic aptitude must be an acquired in order to evaluate the advice given by 
specialists. 
  
Regrettably, even though there is a great deal of extant literature which could help 
better inform policymakers, it is fragmented and frequently highly specialized. 
Technical knowledge on wind power projects that hold relevance to policymakers 
frequently wind up embedded in engineering journals and trade publications. Insights 
related to environmental impact typically must be unearthed from environmental 
management journals or other ecological publications. Actual experiences from 
project implementation are often embedded in an array of sources ranging from 
textbooks to trade publications to applied energy journals. This puts regional or 




municipal policymakers in the unenviable position of having to vet numerous data 
sources to gain the insights necessary to effectively design wind power project support 
strategies. Policymakers seldom have the time to conduct such research; yet when 
they do, time pressures accentuate the possibility of vital insights being overlooked. 
 
With this in mind, the main goal of Part 1 of this study is to conduct a meta-analysis 
of issues which can influence the success of wind power project implementation and 
to communicate the insights in a manner that is relevant to policymakers who are 
tasked with the responsibility of designing and implementing policies to support 
development of such projects.  
 
The main research question which guides research efforts in Part 1 is: 
What do policymakers need to know about utility-scale wind power projects to 
produce development support strategies that are socially, technically, 
economically and politically effective?  
 
2.2.1  Research and Sampling Approach 
Construction of the research design for Part 1 began with the fundamental premise 
that the task of identifying a comprehensive collection of policy relevant insights in 
regard to wind energy projects would benefit from a formalized approach to searching 
extant literature, extracting insights and cataloguing the insights into categories that 
will be intuitively understandable for policymakers. The basic processes associated 
with this challenge – extracting and ordering insights from scientific observations – 
suggested that an inductive model would be most suitable.  
 




In regard to identifying the research universe from which observations would be 
gathered, the desired objective was to achieve depth and breadth of insights. 
Conducting field research was initially entertained because primary field research 
tends to yield the type of fresh insights that contribute to the advancement of academic 
understanding. However, field research was eventually obviated by a realization that 
with time and budget limitations, conducting the extent of interviews necessary to 
acquire comprehensive knowledge would be infeasible. After rejecting field research 
as a method for operationalizing Part 1, efforts turned to identifying a ―proxy‖ for 
interviews that would yield valuable insights. Extant literature was a logical choice in 
this regard.  
 
There are numerous benefits to using existing research literature to provide insights 
into what policymakers need to know about wind power development. As opposed to 
field interviews where subjects may be less punctilious regarding the quality of 
information given, the peer review process associated with academic journals 
encourages academic rigor and ensures a degree of precision regarding the 
information published (Bryman, 2007). Moreover, the academic research process 
encourages the supplementation or refutation of previous articles (Locke & Golden-
Biddle, 1997). Consequently, the collection of insights found in academic journals 
tend to reflect an emergent consensus of knowledge regarding any one issue or area, 
which is a form of external validation (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Finally, the process 
of drawing insights from extent literature enables the extraction of knowledge from 
disparate research fields and from various cultural contexts. This last benefit is highly 
relevant to the challenge of addressing micro-level wind power development policy 
challenges in different nations. 




2.2.2  Contribution of Part 1: The Microanalysis 
A prime concern related to the decision to rely on extant literature for source data was 
that the conclusions would not represent a significant contribution which is the goal of 
PhD research. However, it is contended that the contribution of this study does not lie 
in the freshness of the data; but rather, the freshness of the interpretative insights. 
Essentially, the goals of Part 1 are to i) gather vital research insights from various 
disciplines related to wind energy development, ii) interpret these insights in terms of 
how they impact the policy process and iii) convey these insights through a cognitive 
framework that policymakers can comprehend. Therefore, much like quantitative 
research that manipulates extant data (i.e. World Bank statistics) in order to identify 
relevant trends or relationships, this research study attempts to do the same thing using 
a pool of extant quantitative and qualitative research data. 
 
2.2.3  The Value of an Interpretative, Qualitative Model  
The dominant processes in Part 1 of this research project (extracting and ordering 
insights from scientific observations) and the diversity of the data pool (both 
quantitative and qualitative sources) render an interpretative, qualitative model 
appropriate. Such a model allows data from disparate sources to be conflated and 
moulded into a cognitive framework.  
 
2.2.4  The Fit with Grounded Theory 
Given these background considerations, grounded theory was identified as a 
promising methodology to apply in Part 1 because it is widely accepted inductive, 
qualitative research methodology (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). However, it is most 
commonly used in ethnographic studies where subjects are observed in field settings 




and inductive conclusions are drawn from these observations (Charmaz, 2006). In 
order to apply grounded theory in the context of Part 1, the methodology needed to be 
adapted to draw observations from extant literature analysis. To the author’s 
knowledge, although there are precedents where grounded theory has been adapted for 
non-ethnographic research (cf. Figueroa, 2008), adopting this methodology to 
facilitate the analysis and coding of insights from extant literature is a new application 
of this methodology.  
 
Four stages were necessary to adopt grounded theory methodology to Part 1. Each 
stage is outlined next. 
 
2.2.5  Stage 1: Orientation 
As Strauss and Corbin (1990) point out, a certain degree of knowledge is necessary in 
regard to a phenomenon being studied in order to guide the ―discovery‖ process of 
grounded theory. Accordingly, the first step in operationalizing Part 1 involved a 
review of foundational literature pertaining to wind power development and energy 
policy. Having a previous background in energy policy research, step one was limited 
to a two-month orientation period focusing on scopic monographs (Including: 
Ackerman, 2005; Boyle, 2004; Boyle, et al., 2004; Campbell & Price, 2008b; 
Deffeyes, 2005; Komor, 2004; Mallon, 2006; Sovacool, 2008a; Tester, et al., 2005; 
Wizelius, 2007; Yergin, 1993)  
 
2.2.6  Stage 2: Defining the Research Universe 
Choices made regarding the boundaries of the research universe greatly influence the 
breadth and depth of research conclusions (Babbie, 2004). The pursuit of internally 




valid, externally applicable research findings requires a balance to be established 
between acquiring sufficient data to validate conclusions and time availability (Cook 
& Campbell, 1979). Choosing research boundaries for Part 1 posed just such a 
challenge. Fortunately, the process of identifying the research pool was aided by the 
background readings undertaken in stage 1. The preparatory readings provided 
insights into the types of multidisciplinary issues that were relevant to researchers in 
wind power development. Knowing the types of issues of relevance helped to define 
the databases that would yield the greatest diversity of relevant literature.  
 
Four academic databases were chosen for the search process – ProQuest, Science 
Direct, EconLit and Engineering Village. These four databases were selected because 
they include coverage of key journals in the fields of public policy, energy policy, 
project management, alternative energy financing, environmental management, 
environmental science, environmental engineering, wind power research and 
development and applied wind energy research. During the preparatory reading, issues 
related to these areas emerged as most prominent. 
 
The terms ―wind power‖ and ―wind energy‖ were used as keywords to conduct a 
search within each database. Returns were limited to articles written after 1999 
because the relevance of issues related to wind energy development is time sensitive. 
Additionally, the search parameters were set to extract full text articles of a 
―scholarly‖ nature (whenever the option was available) in order to benefit from the 
rigor associated with the peer review process. Articles containing the keywords in 
article titles, citations or abstracts were retrieved. 
 




Contrary to concerns that the choice of databases may limit the amount and type of 
research relating to wind power development, hundreds of diverse articles were 
uncovered in the search process. Clearly, it would have posed extreme time 
management challenges to read the hundreds of articles in order to define salient 
issues which impact wind energy development policy. Fortunately, one of the 
cornerstones of qualitative data collection methodology rendered an exhaustive 
analysis of all materials unnecessary. Kathleen Eisenhardt in an analytical piece on 
how to define boundaries in qualitative data collection makes the point that quality of 
insight stems from reaching a ―saturation‖ point in information collected. When 
further observations reveal no further significant insights, that is the time to stop the 
collection process (Eisenhardt, 1989). Eisenhardt’s perspective echoes a fundamental 
tenet of grounded theory which is to record and categorize observations until there are 
no more significant observations left to include (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  
 
Eisenhardt’s principle of knowledge saturation was operationalised in a straight-
forward manner. A determination was made to begin with the database with the 
smallest number of hits and progressively read and extract insights from each full text 
article until reaching a point where three articles read in sequence revealed no further 
insights of significance (―significance‖ was defined for this purpose as ―initiating the 
creation of a new coding category‖). Once a saturation point in one database was 
realised, the analysis moved on to articles from the next database.  
 
2.2.7  Stage 3: Coding 
In grounded theory, ―scoping‖ questions are used to guide the search for insights. A 
scoping question (or questions) is essentially an ontological tool that helps to ensure 




that the research objectives guide how data is interpreted (Charmaz, 2006). For Part 1, 
a compounded scoping question was used: ―What information in this article would be 
considered relevant by policymakers who were charged with designing wind power 
development policy and what do the authors of the article conclude about the issue?‖ 
Insights deemed to be of relevance to this scoping question were extracted from each 
paper in the data set and then transferred to a master coding sheet.  
 
The master coding sheet is a draft document that combines insights from the literature 
review into thematic groups that can be conceptually delineated from each other. In 
grounded theory methodology, coding represents the ―grounding‖ of the emergent 
theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Essentially, coding is a process of seeking out 
similarities and differences in a data set that is being analyzed. Part of the process is 
creative (defining new categories) and part of the process is comparative (establishing 
rationales for differentiating one category from another) (ref. Charmaz, 2006). As 
policy relevant insights from each new article are added to the master coding sheet, 
the number of thematic categories begins to expand and the information contained 
within the categories begins to grow in volume. Periodically, the thematic categories 
are reviewed and attempts are made to consolidate categories if justifiable 
relationships can be identified. At the same time, information within each category is 
reviewed and attempts are made to consolidate these insights if justifiable 
relationships can be identified. In short, throughout the coding process, new thematic 
categories are emerging, existing thematic categories are synthesizing, and 
relationships are continuously being refined.  
 




An illustration of how this methodology was applied in Part 1 of the research serves to 
clarify how this process works. One of the first articles under evaluation presented an 
analysis of variables that influence the cost of wind energy (ref. Ackermann & Soder, 
2002). Many insights were extracted from this paper and assigned to a thematic 
category labelled, ―the current cost of wind power‖. In a subsequent article, different 
authors discussed criteria influencing the future cost of wind energy. Insights relating 
to this theme were extracted and placed into a thematic category entitled, ―future costs 
of wind power‖. Subsequent papers led to the creation of three other thematic 
categories associated with the cost of wind power. These new categories included ―the 
cost of competing alternative energy sources‖, ―the current cost of fossil fuels‖, and 
―the future cost of fossil fuels‖. As the literature review progressed, more and more 
insights were inserted into these categories. However, as research progressed, the 
thematic categories increased in number until it was feared that they were becoming 
unwieldy. At this stage, an analysis of the thematic categories was carried out with the 
aim of identifying categories that could be synthesized based on conceptual synergies. 
As a consequence, it was decided that consolidating the five thematic categories under 
one generic umbrella labelled ―understanding costs of wind power‖ would allow inter-
relationships between the five themes to be better examined.  
 
2.2.8  Stage 4: Identifying Relationships 
The final stage in operationalizing the grounded theory methodology of Part 1 is the 
stage at which structure and theory begin to congeal. As outlined earlier, during the 
data collection process, insights were extracted and coded into thematic categories. 
Within each thematic category, insights accumulate and patterns begin to emerge. 
Moreover, between each thematic category relationships begin to emerge. In 




aggregate, the crystallization of these relationships leads to the emergence of a 
conceptual framework that presents a systematically generated response to the scoping 
question: ―What information in these articles would be considered relevant by 
policymakers who were charged with designing wind power development policy and 
what do the authors of the article conclude about the issue?‖ 
 
The collection of insights from this process provides a response to the research 
question formulated to guide Part 1 research: 
 
What do policymakers need to know about utility-scale wind power projects to 
produce development support strategies that are socially, technically, 
economically and politically effective?  
 
The response to the research question formulated to guide Part 1 research in turn feeds 
into the overarching research question for the study by providing a project level 
(micro) perspective: 
 
If forces in support of a transition to alternative energy are currently amassing 
and wind energy is a currently viable solution, why is the diffusion of wind 
energy technology plodding along in many advanced nations when it should be 
escalating at breakneck speed? 
 
2.3 PART 2 METHODOLOGY (MACRO-LEVEL POLICY INSIGHTS) 
Part 1 of the research study examines impediments that can result in specific wind 
power developments projects failing to meet desired objectives. Part 2 of the research 




study broadens the perspective by aiming to identify socio-political factors which 
adversely impact the effectiveness of national wind power development policy. The 
underlying implication of searching for broader socio-political factors is that policy 
instruments that have worked successfully in other nations are not necessarily 
guaranteed to succeed in a different national context. As Lee Kuan Yew points out, 
albeit in a broader context, policymakers should be cautious to avoid ―foisting (a 
system) indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work‖ (Zakaria, 1994, p. 
110).  
 
A number of laudable publications analyze national experiences with wind 
development policy and extract best practice (cf. Komor, 2004; Mallon, 2006; 
Wizelius, 2007) for future policymakers to refer to when developing indigenous 
renewable energy policy. However, failure to understand the influence that exogenous 
factors have on wind power development policy design and implementation is a recipe 
for disaster, too often exhibited in electricity sectors around the world. Accordingly, 
the unique contribution that the research presented in Part 2 of this paper aims to make 
is to generate insight into the broader spectrum of socio-political obstacles that have 
undermined development programs in select advanced nations. It is hoped that 
identifying common barriers will highlight points of caution that policymakers in 
advanced countries should be attuned to when developing national wind power 
development policy. 
 
The main question which guides research efforts in Part 2 is: 
What elements adversely influence the design and implementation of effective 
national wind power development policy?  




2.3.1  Research Approach 
To the best of the author's knowledge, no consolidated studies exist which investigate 
broader socio-political factors that impinge upon the efficacy of the policy cycle 
associated with wind power development initiatives. Consequently, a decision was 
made to adopt a case study approach under the premise that a case study approach 
represents a highly effective way to achieve richness of understanding when 
investigating phenomenon for which extensive understanding does not yet exist (Yin, 
1984). 
 
Since the goal of Part 2 is to identify factors which adversely impinge upon the 
efficacy of the policy cycle associated with national wind power development 
initiatives in advanced nations, it was decided that the case studies should focus on a 
critical analysis of wind power development policy in advanced nations that up until 
2008 exhibited sub-standard performance in wind power development. In contrast to 
most of the extant literature which focuses on identifying best practice in effective 
policy instrument design and implementation, Part 2 of this research study focuses on 
identifying confounding practices. 
 
2.3.2  Choice of Nations 
It was decided that the case study analysis would be limited to four nations in order to 
facilitate a higher degree of analysis given time constraints associated with this project. 
The nations chosen were Japan, Taiwan, Canada and Australia. For each of these 
nations, there are strong justifications for supporting wind power development and yet, 
wind power development continues to stagnate. In Japan's case, enhancing wind 
power capacity could enhance domestic energy security, facilitate achievement of 




international CO2 emission reduction commitments and insulate the nation from 
adverse effects associated with fossil fuel price fluctuation. Yet, the nation has opted 
to embrace a nuclear power development strategy despite serious concerns over the 
viability of domestic large-scale nuclear waste storage. The benefits associated with 
enhanced wind power capacity in Taiwan are similar to the benefits associated with 
enhanced wind power capacity in Japan. Yet, despite these benefits, the Taiwanese 
government has opted for a strategy that favours enhanced natural gas-fired electricity 
generation capacity and largely neglects wind power development. Canada and 
Australia were chosen for case studies because they are two nations which are rich in 
both fossil fuel energy resources and wind power potential. In both nations, wind 
power capacity falls significantly short of wind power potential. Consequently, 
explicating the rationale for phlegmatic wind power development policies in these two 
nations should provide insight into the factors that support rather apathetic 
government support for wind power development in high potential nations. 
 
The absence of existing theory to explain hurdles to wind power development 
suggested that an inductive approach would be most appropriate for guiding the search 
for commonalities. The ―scoping‖ question guiding the analysis of each nation in 
regard to wind power development policy was: "What factors appear to be 
responsible for sub- performance of wind power development in these nations?" 
 
2.3.3  Research Universe 
The basic approach to investigating wind power development policy in each of the 
nations was to amass as much extant literature as possible and use the insights from 
each of the studies to compile an overall picture of the electricity regime in each 




country. Four academic databases were selected as targets for the search process. The 
databases included ProQuest, Science Direct, EconLit and Engineering Village. These 
four databases were selected because they include coverage of key journals in fields 
that are influential to wind power development: public policy, project management, 
alternative energy financing, environmental management, environmental science, 
environmental engineering, wind power research and development and applied 
alternative energy research. It was felt that such broad coverage would facilitate more 
comprehensive understanding of the hurdles affecting wind power development. In 
preparing each case study, the terms ―wind power‖ and ―wind energy‖ and the nation 
name were used as keywords to conduct the search within each database. Returns 
were limited to articles written after 1999.  
 
2.3.4  Contribution of Part Two, The Macro-analysis 
It is acknowledged that conducting case study analyses with only four nations will not 
yield the level of comprehensive, triangulated data necessary for the development of 
an exhaustive conceptual framework to describe the impediments to national wind 
power development policy efficacy. However, the chosen approach succeeds in 
achieving a level of research introspection necessary to reveal new insights that 
contribute to the cumulative, progressive development of such a conceptual 
framework. In summary, while Part 2 of this study falls short of developing a 
definitive framework to explain impediments to national wind power development 
policy, it does succeed in developing a rough high-level framework that can 
accommodate future contributions from other researchers and eventually lead to the 
emergence of a comprehensive framework. 
 




The collection of insights from this process provides a response to the research 
question formulated to guide Part 2 research: 
 
What elements adversely influence the design and implementation of effective 
national wind power development policy?  
 
The response to the research question formulated to guide Part 2 research also feeds 
into the overarching research question for the study by providing a national level 
(macro) perspective on: 
 
If forces in support of a transition to alternative energy are currently amassing 
and wind energy is a currently viable solution, why is the diffusion of wind 
energy technology plodding along in many advanced nations when it should be 
escalating at breakneck speed? 
 
2.4  DISSERTATION FORMAT 
Figure 2.1 on the next page, provides a graphic conceptualization of this dissertation. 
Part 1 of the study focuses on social, technical, economic and political barriers to 
effective development of wind power projects and this is illustrated in Figure 2.1 by 
the individual wind turbines. The research findings from Part 1 of this research study 
are presented in Chapters 3 to 7. Chapter 3 provides an introduction to global wind 
power trends and provides more detailed information on research design and 
presentation for Part 1 of the research study. Chapter 4 examines impediments to an 
adequate economic analysis of adding wind power to a regional electrical grid. 
Chapter 5 investigates the technical challenges associated with strategic regional wind 




power planning. Chapter 6 explores social hurdles to wind power project development 
and Chapter 7 examines political forces which can render wind power development 
policy ineffective at the regional or project level. Part 2 of this research study is 
presented from Chapter 8 onward. Chapters 8 to 11 present the four case studies 
examining national wind power development hurdles in Australia, Canada, Japan and 
Taiwan respectively. Chapter 12 collates the insights gleaned from the four case 
studies into a STEP (social, technical, economic and political) framework that 
summarised generic hurdles to wind power development at a national policy level, 
which is depicted by the four STEP forces which encircle the illustration in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: STEP Forces at the Project and the National Planning Levels 










PART 1: MICRO-LEVEL POLICY INSIGHTS  
“DEVELOPING WIND ENERGY PROJECTS” 
 






INTRODUCTION TO MICRO-LEVEL POLICY HURDLES 
 
This chapter opens with a summary of global wind power development trends and 
introduces the exigency of enhancing policymaker comfort levels with wind power in 
order to help expedite the pace of wind power development. The chapter concludes 
with a more detailed explanation of the data collection and interpretation approaches 
that yielded the insights presented in Part 1 of this study (Chapters 4-8). Lastly, the 
rationale behind the format chosen for presenting the finding is also discussed. 
 
3.1 WIND ENERGY TRENDS  
 
Figure 3.1: Global Installed Capacity of Wind Energy 
 
Source: World Wind Energy Association (WWEA, 2008) 
 
Currently, the wind energy sector is a rising star within the alternative energy industry. 
As Figure 3.1 indicates, since 1997 installed wind energy capacity around the world 
has grown by over 1600%, topping 120,000 MW in December 2008. Unfortunately, 




the 200 TWh of electricity generated in 2008 by wind turbines amounted to only 1.5% 
of global electricity production (WWEA, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.2: Annual Growth Rate of Global Wind Energy Capacity  
 
Source: World Wind Energy Association (WWEA, 2008) 
 
Promisingly, evidence that wind power capacity continues to grow at a brisk pace 
raises hopes that the role that wind power plays in global electricity markets will 
broaden. Figure 3.2 charts annual growth in the wind energy industry over the past 
decade. As the data indicate, the wind capacity growth rate which accelerated on the 
heels of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, tapered off somewhat between 2001 and 2004 
but remained over 20% per annum. Since 2004, the growth rate of installed wind 
capacity has accelerated; and despite a decade of growth, there are no signs of growth 
abating. However, with wind power accounting for only 1.5% of global electricity 
generation, it would take almost 15 years of 20% compound annual growth just to 
reach 20% electricity supply contribution levels. The potential perils associated with 
global warming warrant a faster rate of transition.  
 




3.2 ENHANCING WIND POWER COMFORT LEVELS 
In terms of utility-scale energy planning, wind energy is somewhat of technological 
wild card and this tends to impede the pace of adoption. Most countries have less than 
thirty year’s experience with wind project developments and integrating wind energy 
into national electricity grids (Komor, 2004). Moreover, over the same 30-year period, 
advances in wind energy technology have rendered early experiences irrelevant. The 
early 1980s can be considered as an ―exploratory technology‖ phase. During that 
period, rated output capacities of wind turbines ranged between 20 - 30 kW. Today, 
rated output capacities range between 5000 - 6000 kW (Dismukes, et al., 2007). In the 
1980’s, incorporating electricity from a wind farm consisting of one hundred 20 kW 
wind turbines posed a minor load management challenge which was compensated for 
by the positive environmental PR these projects garnered. Today, adding one hundred 
5000 kW turbines represents a large-scale infrastructure investment that is highly 
visible in the community and potentially disruptive to electricity grid stability (DONG 
Energy, 2008). In short, both the risks and the rewards associated with wind power 
projects have intensified.  
 
The complexity of modern wind power projects gives rise to an array of project 
challenges (Dismukes, et al., 2007). Managing modern wind power projects requires 
interdisciplinary knowledge and comfort in the face of complexity because each wind 
project exhibits unique social, technical, economic and political challenges 
(Ackermann & Soder, 2002). Policymakers who sponsor such projects either directly 
(through active management) or indirectly (through policy support) need to be able to 
anticipate project disruptions, minimize planning pitfalls, mitigate political opposition 
and avert implementation inefficiencies.  




Policymakers are generally risk-averse (Salamon, 2002). Consequently, in the absence 
of certainty regarding the impact of a given initiative, policymakers will tend to adopt 
an incremental approach to strategic implementation (Pierson, 2004). This is 
particularly salient in regard to changing the dynamics of an industry that has 
widespread impact on national interests, such as energy (Campbell & Price, 2008b)). 
Unfortunately, to reiterate, given the immediacy of the climate change dilemma, an 
incremental transition is highly undesirable (Aitkenhead, 2008). 
 
Given this background, the applied intent of Part 1 of this research project is to help 
policymakers become better acquainted with issues that tend to undermine the 
efficiency of wind power projects and become more comfortable with this promising 
power technology. 
 
3.3  RESEARCH DESIGN AND PRESENTATION 
As outlined in Chapter 2, insights into impediments that impair effective wind power 
project development presented in Part 1 (Chapters 4-8) have been gleaned from extant 
literature employing a systematic grounded theory approach to identify as many 
hurdles as possible. The reader is directed to Chapter 2 for further details on 
fundamental aspects of the methodology.  
 
Abstracts of academic articles listed in popular online databases were searched using 
the keywords ―wind energy‖ and ―wind power‖ to identify relevant research studies. 
This keyword search identified 28 relevant papers in ProQuest, 2,102 papers in 
Science Direct, 1 paper in EconLit and over 40,000 papers in Engineering Village 
(though this included articles that were not available in full text). The review began by 




analyzing all 28 ProQuest papers and the one EconLit paper. It then moved on to the 
Engineering Village papers and finally the Science Direct papers. Insights from each 
article were extracted and coded as the process progressed. In keeping with the 
methodology outlined in the previous chapter, whenever a review of three consecutive 
papers failed to produce new insights, the search process shifted to the next database 
in sequence. In aggregate, well over 100 research studies were reviewed. 
 
Part 1 of the research study essentially sought responses to the following question: 
 
What do policymakers need to know about utility-scale wind power projects to 
produce development support strategies that are socially, technically, 
economically and politically effective?  
 
Insights from the research studies were extracted, coded and categorized into thematic 
areas judged relevant to policymakers. These thematic areas are examined in detail in 
chapters 4 to 8. Chapter 4 begins with an examination of elements related to wind 
power costs that impair economic evaluation. Chapter 5 focuses on the technical 
challenges associated with regional strategic wind power site planning. Chapter 6 
investigates social hurdles related to wind power projects with an emphasis on 
NIMBY opposition and ecosystem impact. Chapter 7 concludes part one by 
examining political elements which can undermine the efficacy of regional or 
municipal wind power project planning. The emphasis of Chapter 7 is on improving 
―request for tender‖ policies and enhancing understanding of the role that wind power 
can play in helping to reduce CO2 emissions. With many municipalities adopting CO2 
emission reduction strategies when national governments fail to do so, understanding 




the potential contribution that wind power can make to a CO2 emission abatement 
strategy is now as much a micro-policy issue as it is a macro-policy issue.  
 
The findings from the grounded theory study are presented in a STEP format wherein 
each thematic category has been assigned to an appropriate chapter dedicated to Social 
(Chapter 6), Technical (Chapter 5), Economic (Chapter 4) and Political (Chapter 7) 
factors that impinge on wind power project development. In strategic management, a 
STEP analysis is a common tool for assessing exogenous influences on market 
development prospects (Grant, 2005); and as such, it was deemed a transferrable tool 
for evaluating wind power project development prospects. As the chapter order 
indicates, the sequential presentation of the STEP categories has been altered (ETSP) 
to provide more fluid transitions between the chapters. 
 





ECONOMIC INSIGHTS FOR BETTER MICRO- LEVEL POLICY 
 
 
Strategic planning of electricity generation technologies is done at a sub-national level 
in most nations. Typically, regional or municipal policymakers who are contemplating 
wind power development initiatives (or other electricity generation technologies) 
begin with a cost-benefit analysis of development under consideration. Unfortunately, 
economic analysis of electricity generation in general and wind power in particular are 
contentious and complicated areas. This chapter endeavours to provide policymakers 
with the knowledge to make better informed decisions on development support 
programs by clarifying the direct and indirect costs associated with wind power and 
the factors which can alter the cost profiles of specific wind power projects.  
 
4.1 AN OVERVIEW OF WIND COSTS 
With the cheapest fossil fuel feedstock (coal) trading at between US$50-$70 per short 
ton (see Chapter 1), the cost divide between wind power and coal-fired power is 
progressively narrowing (McKinsey, 2007; Neuhoff, 2005; L. Thompson, 2006; 
Wizelius, 2007). In fact, some researchers assert that wind power is now cheaper than 
coal-fired or nuclear-powered energy (Wong, 2005); though absolute assertions of this 
kind are hard to defend unless full environmental costing were included in the 
calculation (Sovacool, 2008a).  
 
The cost of wind power is contingent on a number of factors such as wind conditions, 
type of wind power systems used, grid connection costs, access to subsidies and 




geographic features of the site (Komor, 2004). Overall, a review of cost literature (see 
examples in Table 4.1) points to a cost range for wind power of between US4 to 7¢ 
per kWh. By these estimates, wind power indeed appears to be cost competitive with 
coal-fired power (the least expensive fossil fuel) under certain circumstances. 
 
Table 4.1: A Sampling of Wind Cost Studies 





Onshore installations with high winds 6.5-8.5¢ 2009 (Morthorst & Awerbuch, 2009) 
Onshore installations with med. winds 9¢ 2009 (Morthorst & Awerbuch, 2009) 
Onshore installations with low winds 9-13¢ 2009 (Morthorst & Awerbuch, 2009) 
Wind farm in Denmark 4.0¢ 2008 (DONG Energy, 2008) 
Average cost of onshore wind energy in Sweden 5.0¢ 2007 (Wizelius, 2007) 
Average cost of wind power 4.0¢ 2006 (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006) 
Remote wind system 2.6¢ 2006 (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006) 
Onshore wind in general (excluding subsidies)  7.0¢ 2005 (Dismukes, et al., 2007) 
Large scale onshore systems in general 5.5¢ 2005 (Celik, et al., 2007) 
Onshore wind installations in UK 4.7¢ 2005 (British Wind Energy Association, 2005) 
Offshore wind installations 8.1¢ 2005 (British Wind Energy Association, 2005) 
Large scale wind in general 4.0-5.0¢ 2004 (Komor, 2004) 
Large-scale, onshore systems in Japan 9-1-14¢ 2001 (ANRE, 2006) 
Bids for wind energy in UK 3.5-4.5¢ 1998 (Ackermann & Soder, 2002) 
 
4.1.1 Wind Energy Cost Trends 
The cost of wind has declined from US28¢ to US4-7¢ per kWh over the past 30 years 
(Celik, et al., 2007) and both the US Department of Energy and UK government 
authorities project that costs will likely continue to decline over the next 30 years 
(Wizelius, 2007). Advances in generation technology fuel this trend. As Figure 4.1 
indicates, the rated capacities of wind turbines have increased significantly since the 
early 1980s. State of the art 20 kW wind turbines of the 1980s now seem like school 








Figure 4.1: The Progressively Improving State Of Wind Turbine Technology 
 
Source: (DONG Energy, 2008) 
 
The relationship between turbine generation capacity and generation cost stems partly 
from technical economies of scale. The main components of wind systems are the 
nacelle components (blade, gears and generator), the tower, the foundation and the 
balance of plant components (including transformer and transmission cables) 
(Ackermann & Soder, 2002). All of these components have declining cost profiles in 
relation to increased scale. For example, a turbine with twice the power capacity of 
another does not require twice the tower height, nor does it require twice the 
foundation materials or twice the resource inputs for balance of plant components.  
 
However, there are diminishing returns in regard to technical economies of scale. One 
wind expert contends that in the near future, technical economies of scale may be 
obviated by amplified increases in the cost of larger wind turbines (Wizelius, 2007). 
Furthermore, energy generated from wind turbines depends on the size of the area 
swept by the rotor blade. It is believed that the weight of the rotor blade may 
eventually limit the extent to which the size of the swept area can be expanded 




(Wizelius, 2007). Yet, despite these concerns, technical economies of scale continue 
to be realized. Advances in turbine technology, lighter component materials, and 
improvements in wind capture engineering continue to drive down generation costs. 
 
In addition to technical economies of scale, there are production economies of scale 
that reduce the cost of wind power. Ackerman and Soder (2002) estimated that in the 
1990s, wind power cost declined by 20% every time the aggregate amount of global 
installed wind power capacity doubled. DONG Energy (2008) provides a forward 
perspective on this phenomenon estimating that the cost of wind power can be 
expected to decrease by 4-10% each time the aggregate market capacity doubles. 
Although further market growth will likely provide diminishing returns regarding 
production economies of scale, the consensus appears to be that over the next few 
decades, as the wind power market expands, production economies of scale will place 
downward pressure on generation costs and this will fuel further market expansion 
because market growth and cost enjoy a symbiotic relationship. 
 
Overall, progressive cost savings through these economies of scale helps explain why 
many experts believe wind power costs will decrease substantially in coming decades 
(Ackermann & Soder, 2002; Dismukes, et al., 2007; DONG Energy, 2008; Wizelius, 
2007). Some estimate the cost of wind power will fall to approximately US2¢ per 
kWh within the next three decades (Brown & Escobar, 2007; DeCarolis & Keith, 
2006). However, this does not guarantee that a specific wind project will generate 
power at this cost level. The capacity to attain minimal cost levels depends on a 
number of other factors that are worth examining. 
 




4.2 WIND QUALITY AND COST 
There are three characteristics of wind quality that significantly influence wind power 
costs – overall wind speeds, consistency of wind speeds and consistency of wind 
speed direction. Firstly, absolute wind speed affects rotor speed; therefore, wind speed 
dictates the optimal size of wind turbines that can be employed. As a rule of thumb, a 
10% wind speed increase can result in a 30% increase in energy production 
(Ackerman, 2005). This is because ―the power of the wind is proportional to the cube 
of the wind speed‖ (Wizelius, 2007, p. 48). Secondly, actual wind speeds often 
fluctuate significantly around the mean. During some periods there may not be enough 
wind to generate power. At other times, wind speeds may be too high necessitating 
turbine lock down. Wind variances occur annually, seasonally, daily, diurnally (day 
versus night) or even by the second (Ackermann & Soder, 2002). Consequently, 
feasibility studies based on ―average‖ wind speeds in a given area (for example see: 
Markevicius, Katinas, & Marciukaitis, 2007) should be supplemented by studies 
investigating wind speed fluctuations. Lastly, consistency in terms of wind direction 
can also impact the amount of wind power generated. Although most modern wind 
turbine systems have a yaw motor which aligns the nacelle to maximize wind 
collection, the yaw motor is typically set to respond to prolonged directional changes, 
not to sudden directional fluctuations (Wizelius, 2007).  
 
These insights convey an important lesson to policymakers. Whether evaluating the 
feasibility of individual wind power projects or assessing sites for wind energy 
potential, estimates based on ―average wind speeds‖ are inadequate. Reliable wind 
speed estimates should be based on comprehensive temporal analysis of wind patterns 




(yearly, seasonally, daily and diurnally) that incorporate data on both wind speed 
fluctuations and directional variances of wind gusts.  
 
Due to the historical nature of wind speed data, even accurate data will not accurately 
predict future wind patterns. An error margin should always be built into wind quality 
estimates prior to preparing a financial assessment of the viability of a given site. The 
caveat for any policymaker who is making decisions based on such estimates is to 
confirm whether or not an error margin has been built into the calculations; and if so, 
how much of a margin has been included. One wind expert recommends that an error 
margin of 10% be used (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
4.3 LOCATION AND COST 
Given the importance of wind speed for wind power generation, it should come as no 
surprise that offshore wind energy is viewed with significant promise. Offshore winds 
are usually of higher quality. Unfortunately, constructing offshore wind farms is also 
more expensive.  
 
The present consensus appears to be that although there may be some offshore sites 
where the increased power generated offsets higher construction costs (Wizelius, 
2007), offshore wind energy is still more expensive than onshore wind energy on a 
kWh basis (DONG Energy, 2008; Dunlop, 2006). In 2005, the British Wind Energy 
Association (British Wind Energy Association, 2005) estimated that the current cost 
differential was US4.7¢ per kWh for onshore wind power and US8.1¢ per kWh for 
offshore wind power. However, this economic disparity may be reversed in the near 
future. Numerous studies point to costs of offshore wind power declining faster than 




onshore costs as offshore technologies improve (DONG Energy, 2008). As offshore 
costs approach parity with onshore costs, offshore options may become comparably 
attractive because offshore sites do not have to contend with as many competing land 
uses.  
 
4.4 SYSTEM FEATURES AND COST 
Over the past 30 years, a diverse array of wind system innovations have emerged to 
improve performance under varied conditions (Ackerman, 2005). For example, many 
nacelles now house a small motor which automatically adjusts the pitch of the blades 
in response to wind speed variance (Boyle, 2004). In a location which is characterized 
by inconsistent winds, adjustable rotor blades will, ceteris paribus, improve power 
output and generation consistency at a cost that is a fraction of the added revenue 
earned through improved power generation (Ackermann & Soder, 2002). As another 
example, higher towers make it possible for turbines to capture geostrophic wind 
which is less influenced by ground friction; and therefore, a more consistent source of 
wind power (Wizelius, 2007). Similarly, strategic choices made in regard to 
transmission infrastructure (i.e. buried underground vs. erecting transmission cable 
towers) can significantly influence the cost of wind power (Denny & O’Malley, 2006).  
 
Although specific advice concerning how to minimize project costs through optimized 
technical planning is beyond the scope of this chapter, the lesson that policymakers 
should extract from the examples put forth is that each decision made in regard to 
wind power systems have cost implications. Therefore, for policymakers who are 
commissioning wind power projects through public funds, forcing the developers to 




justify the technical choices they have made in preparing a project proposal will 
enhance cost control.  
 
4.5 GRID CONNECTION AND COSTS 
Inauspiciously, wind farms are often sited in remote areas to take advantage of land 
availability and obviate social opposition (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006). The distance 
from the site to the electricity grid influences connection costs in two ways. Firstly, 
spatial separation from power grids means that longer transmission networks and 
access roads need to be built. This can add as much as US$80 per metre to the cost of 
a wind power project (Wizelius, 2007). Secondly, energy dissipates as it travels along 
transmission lines. Power leakage increases as distance to the electricity grid increases.  
 
Although policymakers are frequently aware of the physical costs that arise due to 
distance from electricity grids, the phenomenon of leakage is less widely understood. 
It has been estimated that leakage can reach as high as 10% of energy produced 
(Wizelius, 2007). Two factors have the most influence on leakage – distance and the 
type of electricity conduit used – and knowledge of these two factors will allow 
engineers to estimate leakage (Blakeway & White, 2005).  
 
One other grid connection factor that influences generation cost is the voltage capacity 
of power lines installed to carry power to the grid. The voltage level limits the amount 
of power that can be delivered to the grid (Wizelius, 2007). Consequently, power line 
capacity can influence the size of wind farms or necessitate investment in sub-stations 
to regulate voltage.  
 




4.6 CLIMATE AND WIND ENERGY COSTS 
Adverse climates frequently inflate maintenance costs. Consider for example, wind 
turbines erected in marine environments. Component parts that are made of steel are 
prone to corrosion in such environments and must be replaced more frequently. 
Although less corrosive materials can be substituted for some of these steel parts, 
using substitute materials frequently increases the overall cost of materials. 
 
Adverse climates can also affect power production. For example, ice on wind turbine 
blades jeopardizes system operation. Ice can snap rotor blades and bend rotor drive 
shafts (Ackermann & Soder, 2002). Even a light coating of ice on rotor blades can 
adversely affect aerodynamic properties. There is also a safety risk associated with ice 
detaching from spinning rotor blades. Historically, in icy conditions, wind turbines 
were shut down. Consequently, wind farms in colder climates had fewer productive 
days. Nowadays, wind turbines erected in cold climates typically have blade de-icing 
features. Nevertheless, even with a blade de-icer, turbines frequently need to be shut 
down (albeit for shorter periods) to clear the ice off the blades (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
Projects in regions exhibiting extreme temperatures or extreme wind speeds can also 
exhibit higher cost profiles. For example, siting wind turbines in regions that 
experience prolonged periods with temperatures below -20°C can be problematic 
because lubrication oils become more viscous and steel becomes more brittle. Costly, 
specialized heaters may be required to minimize problems associated with extreme 
cold. Conversely, turbines that are installed in regions characterised by extreme heat 
may require costly cooling systems. Costs may also be higher at sites which are prone 




to extreme wind episodes such as typhoons or hurricanes because specialized wind 
systems are required (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
There are two policy-relevant lessons stemming from research into climatic influence 
on wind power system performance. Firstly, government authorities who are 
overseeing public wind farm developments should ensure that project bids specifically 
address climatic threats. Secondly, as the example concerning ice on the rotor blades 
implied, there may be a need for policymakers to develop safety standards for wind 
power projects.  
 
4.7 CARBON CREDITS AND WIND ENERGY COSTS 
Another climatic influence which significantly influences the cost of wind power is 
the availability and quantity of carbon credits attached to a given project. For example, 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, wind project developers 
can claim certified emission reduction (CER) credits for the CO2
 
that is offset by a 
given wind project (UN, 1998). If a wind energy project offsets a CO2
 
intensive 
technology such as coal-fired power, carbon credits amounting to as much as US2¢ 
per kWh can be secured over a 15-year period (DONG Energy, 2008). The European 
Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) offers similar carbon credit acquisition 
opportunities for wind project developers.  
 
A caveat for policymakers in regard to carbon credit management is to ascertain the 
availability of carbon credits prior to initiating discussions with project developers. In 
this way, responsibility for managing the carbon credit acquisition process and 
ownership over the credits can be explicated in offers to tender. This injects a degree 




of financial certainty into a given project and ensures that misunderstandings over 
ownership of these credits do not arise (Brown & Escobar, 2007).   
 
4.8 INDIRECT WIND ENERGY COSTS AND SAVINGS 
Any cost-benefit analysis related to the siting of a wind power development in a 
community should attempt to estimate the financial impact the development will have 
on the economic fortunes of the community. Research indicates that one source of 
opposition to wind power developments stems from concerns over the potential 
adverse economic impact the development might have on property values and in some 
cases, tourism revenue (Firestone & Kempton, 2007). Financial impact assessments 
can be approximated by using hedonic pricing which is an environmental impact 
estimation technique that uses experience in one community to estimate impact in 
another community (Turner, Pearce, & Bateman, 1994). The scant research that does 
exist in regard to the impact of wind power projects on property prices and tourism 
indicate that any adverse impact that does exist is likely short lived (Firestone & 
Kempton, 2007). Property values have been shown to bounce back after wind farms 
become operational (Wolsink, 1988) and research indicates that wind turbines can 
actually be a boon to tourism in some cases (Maruyama, Nishikido, & Iida, 2007). 
However, the limited amount of research in this area suggest that formal financial 
impact studies might be warranted in sensitive communities. 
 
If indirect costs associated with a wind energy project are to be estimated, indirect 
savings associated with the same project should also be estimated. In fossil fuel 
dominant societies, electricity generated by wind energy projects would otherwise 
likely come from fossil fuel power sources which inflict both health and 




environmental damages on communities. High concentrations of sulphur dioxide 
associated with coal combustion have been linked to the degradation of buildings and 
monuments as well as the acidification of lakes and waterways (Miller, 2004). CO2 
from fossil fuel combustion is the main anthropocentric contributor to global warming 
(IPCC, 2007a). Furthermore, pollution from coal-fired power plants has been linked to 
respiratory diseases. To put the damage into perspective, the Ontario Medical 
Association estimated that health problems in the late 1990’s stemming from pollution 
attributed primarily to fossil fuel-fired power generation annually cost Ontario over 
C$1 billion in health costs and contributed to over 1900 pre-mature deaths (Rowlands, 
2007).  
 
Although health costs averted can be estimated by accessing scientific studies, 
estimating the savings from mitigating the environmental damage caused by fossil 
fuel combustion can be a complicated and contentious exercise. There are a number of 
economic techniques for estimating macro environmental impacts (or in this case, 
environmental enhancements) such as hedonic pricing (using real estate valuation 
techniques), contingent value (assessing societal willingness to pay for a given 
environmental outcome), replacement cost estimates (useful for man-made structures), 
dose-response estimates (useful for mediation of waterways) and opportunity cost 
valuation techniques (Turner, et al., 1994). A detailed review of these methods is 
beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, the interested reader is directed to 
environmental economics texts (Thampapillai, 2002; Tietenberg, 2003).  
 
Although most environmental economists would be quick to point out that all 
environmental valuation methods suffer from method-specific weaknesses, making 




the effort to assign some value to environmental degradation is arguably better than 
not making the effort at all (Costanza, Cumberland, Daly, Goodland, & Norgaard, 
1997). Currently, the norm appears to be to avoid integrating environmental costs (and 
benefits) in energy analysis (Lenzen & Munksgaard, 2002). Unfortunately, continuing 
to ignore environmental costs (and benefits) artificially depresses the cost of fossil 
fuel power (ATSE, 2009). If environmental costs were added to the operational costs 
associated with fossil fuel technologies, these technologies would not be able to 
compete economically with alternative energy technologies (Lenzen & Munksgaard, 
2002; Sovacool, 2008a; Wong, 2005) 
 
4.9 THE ADDED COST OF STOCHASTIC FLOWS 
Even in ideal situations, electricity load management is complicated by demand-side 
variances. Demand for electricity varies by season, by week, by time of day and even 
by the second. An electricity supply system must be able to respond promptly to all 
these demand variations (Wizelius, 2007). The stochastic nature of wind further 
complicates the load management due to supply-side fluctuations because the amount 
of energy generated from a wind turbine can vary significantly from minute to minute, 
hour to hour, day to day, week to week and year to year.  
 
Technically, there are two technological approaches to improving management of 
wind generated electricity and both pose costs that increase the cost of electricity 
generated. The first approach is to store wind energy that has been generated but not 
yet utilized. For utility-scale storage popular current options include advanced battery 
storage, pumped hydro, and compressed air energy storage (Denholm, Kulcinski, & 
Holloway, 2005). Compressed air energy storage systems are purportedly the most 




efficient of the current storage technologies; however, the systems are expensive to 
construct, require fuel to drive the compressor and ―leak‖ energy (only a fraction of 
the energy gets stored) (Denholm, et al., 2005). In short, although storage is a feasible 
solution, it adds to the cost of electricity generated.  
 
The other approach is to increase generation capacity of peak-load support systems 
such as hydropower or natural gas-fired power plants. Ensuring higher capacity in 
highly responsive electricity generation technologies allows load engineers to 
compensate for fluctuations in wind power by altering output of the reserve generators. 
The obvious downside to this solution is that it costs money to purchase back-up 
systems and the investment is not fully exploited due to the downtime (and 
combustion inefficiencies) that is common to reserve generators (Boyle, et al., 2004).  
 
Although the added cost of adding storage or reserve back-up is frequently raised by 
wind critics as a reason to avoid amplified levels of wind power capacity, many of 
these cost concerns are exaggerated. For example, a report by the Australia Institute 
contends that adding approximately 5% wind power to the existing grid would only 
cost consumers AU$15-$25 per year extra  (Macintosh & Downie, 2006). Another 
study, indicates that the additional cost of backup generation (i.e. gas-fired generators) 
necessary to allow wind power to reach high contribution levels (i.e. 40%) in 
Australia would increase the cost of wind power by approximately 25% (Diesendorf, 
2003). This amounts to roughly AU1-2¢ per kWh.  
 
Moreover, insinuations that significant contributions from wind power will unfailingly 
destabilize electricity grids are largely exaggerated. Research indicates that strategic 




site planning, geographic dispersal of wind power facilities and technical decisions 
made when selecting turbines (i.e. adjustable rotors, variable speed gearboxes, 
computerized yaw controls etc.) can significantly attenuate wind power fluctuations 
(Boyle, 2004). Furthermore, there are increasing indications that spare capacity 
already embedded in the average electricity grid is capable to accommodating 
significant amounts of wind power before further back-up is required (Ackerman, 
2005; Karki & Billinton, 2001).   
 
Currently, the consensus appears to be that depending on the electricity grid base-load 
profile, 10% to 40% wind energy can be integrated into an electricity grid without 
having to add storage or additional spare capacity. For grids that are dominated by 
coal-fired power stations, a 10 to 20% contribution from wind power represents the 
norm beyond which additional storage or capacity additions become necessary 
(Denholm, et al., 2005; Holttinen, 2008; Komor, 2004). For grids that are dominated 
by hydropower, a 30 to 40% contribution from wind power may be achievable. There 
are already examples of nations which rely on wind energy for up to 40% of total 
electricity demand (WWEA, 2008). Denmark has set a goal of producing 50% of its 
electrical power through wind energy by 2030 (Wizelius, 2007). In fact, some studies 
go as far as to conclude that even in systems with inflexible base-load energy sources 
such as nuclear power, the potential contribution of wind energy (without incurring 
additional storage or reserve capacity) may reach as high as 50% in coming decades 
through better dispersion of wind resources, improved generation technologies 
(Ackermann & Soder, 2002) and new energy storage technologies (DeCarolis & Keith, 
2006; Denholm, et al., 2005). It remains to be seen whether or not a system that is 




supported by such high levels of wind energy is resilient enough to survive the loss 
the largest generation unit (Karki & Billinton, 2001) 
 
The relevant insight for policymakers in regard to this research is that the intermittent 
property of wind can indeed pose logistical problems for managing regional electricity 
grids but not at the current levels that exist in most countries. At low levels of wind 
power integration (i.e. 5-10%) existing generation capacity may be able to support 
additional wind power contribution without any additional costs. At higher levels (i.e. 
20%+) adding spare capacity or energy storage systems will increase the cost of wind 
power, but only by approximately 25%.  
 
4.10 FRONT-END COSTS 
There has been criticism that high front-end capital costs associated with wind energy 
projects deters the pace of wind power capacity expansion (Dunlop, 2006). Initial 
capital costs are estimated to account for approximately 70% of the total cost of wind 
energy (DONG Energy, 2008). However, such criticism fails to recognise the strategic 
advantage to a front-end heavy capital profile – reduced operational risk. Once the 
front-end investment has been committed, further costs are negligible with wind 
power operating and maintenance costs estimated at approximately US1.2¢ per kWh 
(DONG Energy, 2008). Contrast this to the investment scenario faced by fossil fuel 
power plant developers. The front-end investment for fossil fuel plants may be slightly 
lower compared to wind power facilities of similar output capacity; however, the 
highest cost element (the fossil fuel resource) is still prone to inflationary forces. The 
implication is that guaranteeing capital loans supported by claims on future revenue 




flows may be a viable policy tool to help wind power developers raise the capital 
necessary to accelerate the pace of development.  
 
4.11 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This chapter has conveyed some insights into why private wind power project 
developers make the decisions they do regarding site selection and choice of wind 
power systems. For policymakers who are leading publically funded initiatives to 
expand wind power capacity, these insights can be referenced to guide the 
development of economically optimised wind power projects. Moreover, for 
policymakers who aspire to level the competitive playing field by developing and 
implementing policy instruments to de-carbonize regional electricity mix profiles, the 
two sections which examined ―carbon credits‖ and ―indirect wind energy costs and 
savings‖ highlight important issues to be addressed when designing policy instruments 
to influence market behaviour. Finally, it is worth re-iterating the observation that 
concern over the stochastic nature of wind power is over-exaggerated at low levels of 
wind power contribution. Putting all these insights together, one is left with an 
understanding that well-planned wind power projects carried out in conjunction with 
policies designed to internalise all external costs cultivates the necessary conditions 
for wind power project developments that are economically benign additions to the 
electricity mix. However, economics are but one aspect of successful project 
development. As the next chapter will illustrate, there are numerous examples of wind 
power projects that have been either delayed or derailed due to social opposition.   
   





SOCIAL INSIGHTS FOR BETTER MICRO- LEVEL POLICY 
 
Social opposition can turn an economically beneficial wind power project into a 
political hot potato that can undermine completion of the project in question and 
influence prospects for future developments. Research indicates that social 
impediments to wind power development fall under two broad themes – concerns over 
impairment of existing community endowments and concerns over impairment of 
existing ecosystems. Both will be examined in this chapter.  
 
5.1 IMPAIRMENT OF EXISTING COMMUNITY ENDOWMENTS 
Community opposition to wind power projects is widely known by the acronym 
NIMBY (not in my back yard). Reasons for opposing wind projects are varied. For 
example, in a survey related to a proposed wind energy project in Cape Cod in the 
United States, eight justifications for opposition were uncovered. Respondents were 
concerned about adverse impacts on aesthetics, community harmony, the local fishing 
industry, pleasure boating, property values, bird life, marine life and tourism 
(Firestone & Kempton, 2007).  
 
Accordingly, developing effective mitigation strategies requires awareness of the 
varied motivations for opposition to a given project (Zamot, O'Neill-Carrillo, & 
Irizarry-Rivera, 2005). A starting point for enhanced understanding of community 
concerns is through public outreach initiatives (surveys, town hall meetings etc.).  
 
 




5.1.1 Separating Perception from Fact 
Community concerns regarding wind energy projects have been shown to be based 
more on perception than fact (R. Thompson, 2005). For example, tourist areas, there is 
a misperception that the erection of wind turbines will adversely affect tourism. 
Surveys conducted in tourist areas in Germany, Belgium and Scotland indicate that 
such concerns are unfounded (Wizelius, 2007). Similarly, concerns over turbine noise, 
shadow flicker and threats to birdlife are not supported by actual data (NWCC, 2001; 
Wizelius, 2007; Zamot, et al., 2005). 
 
The trouble is that the general public rarely has ready access to information necessary 
to assess the pros and cons of wind power projects. Media reports tends to emphasize 
storylines that have popular appeal (i.e. famous figures who are opposed to a 
development, accusations of scandalous behaviour etc.) (R. Thompson, 2005). 
Consequently, media coverage often fails to communicate the full information that the 
public needs to effectively evaluate the merits of a project (R. Thompson, 2005). 
Moreover, as one wind expert points out, a great deal of misinformation about wind 
power has been propagated by fossil fuel and nuclear power special interest groups 
(Wizelius, 2007). 
 
The lesson for policymakers is that some types of opposition can be mitigated by 
providing community members with complete information on a given project. In fact, 
not only will a more proactive media management strategy help mitigating opposition, 
it may actually engender enhanced support. 
 
 




5.1.2 Perceptions Improve  
Public perceptions generally improve after wind projects become operational 
(Rodman & Meentemeyer, 2006). Polls conducted with residents from communities 
that host wind energy developments in the UK, Scotland, France, the US and Finland 
have all demonstrated that wind farms which are properly planned and sited can foster 
positive project perceptions (Wizelius, 2007). In fact, completed wind energy projects, 
which have been planned to minimise adverse social and environmental impacts, have 
been shown to positively influence perceptions of wind energy in general (Wolsink, 
1988). From a policy perspective, it is noteworthy that positive perceptions are 
particularly strengthened when community members are offered opportunities to 
invest in the development (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
5.1.3 Aesthetic Concerns Overshadow All Others 
Research indicates that local concerns trump global concerns and aesthetic impacts 
trump ecological impacts when community members evaluate the pros and cons of a 
wind energy project. Research by Thompson (2005) found that a wind energy 
project’s contribution to global warming abatement will fail to mitigate project 
resistance associated with concerns that the project will adversely impact the 
aesthetics of a community. Moreover, a number of studies have found that the cause 
of public disenchantment over a given wind project is frequently centered on concerns 
over erosion of aesthetic values rather than concerns over degradation of ecosystems 
(Komor, 2004; R. Thompson, 2005; Wolsink, 2000). A caveat with these studies is 
that they were done in the US and may not be representative of other advanced nations. 
However, it is highly likely that in any community, the perception that wind turbines 
will be aesthetic eyesores must be addressed either through technical solutions 




(improved siting, camouflaging turbine towers etc.) or through better marketing of the 
community benefits associated with such projects. 
  
5.1.4 Beyond NIMBY Opposition 
Research shows that NIMBY resistance to wind energy projects is not the only type of 
resistance. In attempting to understand opposing factions in greater depth, Wolsink 
(2000, p. 574) identified four types of resistance: 
 Type A: Individuals who support wind energy but are opposed to developing a 
specific site (this is the classic NIMBY group). 
 Type B: Individuals who are generally opposed to all wind power 
developments (NIAMBY - not in any back yard).  
 Type C: Individuals who were initially positive toward a specific project, but 
develop negative feelings as a project develops.  
 Type D: Individuals who are opposed to a specific project due to poor 
planning or other technical reasons.  
 
The importance of delineating opposition across the four typologies stems from the 
observation that each type of opposition demands a different strategic mitigation 
approach. As mentioned earlier, mitigating opposition from NIMBY opponents (Type 
A) involves a process that begins by seeking to understand the nature of the NIMBY 
concerns. Once the sources of concerns are identified, strategies can be developed to i) 
correct misperceptions, ii) negotiate solutions to appease any paramount concerns or 
iii) attempt to dilute opposition by highlighting benefits that offset the areas of 
concern.   
 




On the other hand, it is unlikely that Type B opposition can be fully eliminated 
because such opposition frequently stem from misperception caused by entrenched 
ideologies. Although NIAMBY factions are typically small (Wizelius, 2007), 
involvement in project opposition activities by such factions can fuel opposition from 
other groups (such as Type 3 groups described in the next paragraph). Fortunately, as 
opposed to nuclear energy, NIAMBY opposition to wind power is rarely manifested 
in public protest (Wolsink, 2000). With that said, in some countries there are well-
organized, vocal groups in opposition to wind power, such as the Country Guardians 
in the UK, the Association for Protection of the Landscape in Sweden and 
Windkraftgegner in Germany (Wizelius, 2007). Negotiation is typically the only way 
to mitigate opposition from such groups. 
 
Opposition from Type C factions occurs when new information emerges which alters 
perceptions of a project. In some cases, negative perceptions are based on 
misinformation. Consequently, improved information dissemination may restore 
positive support. In other cases, negative perceptions are based on justifiable concerns 
which have emerged. In these cases, revisions to the project may appease outstanding 
concerns. In yet other cases, the source of negative perception may be both well-
founded and irresolvable. In these cases, mediation efforts may at least help to dilute 
the strength of opposition. Any effective strategy for restoring support from Type C 
opponents is to first identify why negative perceptions have emerged and craft 
solutions accordingly.  
 
Opposition from Type D factions can stem from either real or perceived problems. 
Therefore, mitigating opposition from Type D factions can be approached in a similar 




manner to mitigating opposition from Type C factions: i) correct misperceptions that 
fuel opposition, ii) amend real problems that can be viably resolved, and iii) employ 
mediation to defuse emotions when full resolutions are not possible.  
 
5.1.5 Overall Lessons in Regard to Community Opposition 
Overall, improved communication can temper emotions and attenuate local opposition 
(Wizelius, 2007). Public forums, community mailings, media management strategies 
and opinion surveys present opportunities for creative dialogues to take place. Often 
interaction with stakeholders generates creative solutions (Neely, Adams, & 
Kennerley, 2002). Even when full resolutions are not possible, public interaction 
allows citizens to vent and express their opposition. While this may not fully appease 
dissatisfied factions, research indicates that allowing dissenters to voice concerns 
diminishes the excessive emotional response that often underlies public protest 
(Wizelius, 2007). 
 
In addition to ongoing discourse with community stakeholders, applying five other 
principles can help mitigate opposition to wind energy projects. First, sufficient 
distance between the project site and residential areas should be preserved in order to 
minimize disruption caused by noise and shadow flicker. Second, in inhabited areas, 
turbines with noise dampening devices should be mandated. Third, a project which 
financially benefits the local community garners improved support. Therefore, 
initiatives to encourage project participation from local firms and to entice community 
ownership over wind power projects can help endear projects within communities 
(Komor, 2004). Fourth, if the developer has social ties to the area, the propensity for 
community opposition diminishes. Last, providing avenues for ongoing community 




feedback purportedly diminishes extreme forms of resistance that can cause project 
delays (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
5.1.6 Government Agency Opposition 
One final form of opposition that can derail a proposed wind project comes from 
government agencies that have project veto power. Two illustrative areas of conflict 
are concerns over disruptions to military installation operations and airport 
communications (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
Military agencies, airport authorities and telecommunication authorities may block 
wind power projects due to concerns that wind turbines can adversely influence radar 
surveillance and communication systems. Although studies show that interference is 
negligible, misperceptions can pose intractable barriers for project developers 
(Wizelius, 2007) because often, these bodies have veto power over neighbouring 
developments. With adequate buffer zones, such threats can be entirely negated. For 
planning reference, guidelines regulating minimum distance and maximum heights of 
wind turbines are often available through national civil aviation authorities (Wizelius, 
2007).  
 
Mitigating opposition from government agencies shares the same basic precepts as 
mitigating public opposition. The threat of opposition can be minimized by seeking to 
understand concerns, rectifying misperceptions, working with stakeholders to develop 
agreeable mitigation measures when necessary and engaging proactively with officials 
from government agencies who may be concerned about the impact of a proposed 
wind energy project.  




As wind power projects expand in scale and scope, managing public perception will 
become increasingly important (McKinsey, 2007; Wolsink, 2000). Wind power 
projects will increasingly encroach upon locations that communities value for 
aesthetic or environmental reasons. A degree of public resistance is unavoidable 
because scenic spots such as hill tops, ocean bluffs and wide sweeping plains are often 
ideal locations for wind power projects (Komor, 2004). Accordingly, a degree of re-
education may also be required in many communities in order to entrench 
understanding that a transition away from carbon-based electricity generation requires 
a degree of community commitment to accepting necessary trade-offs. As Dismukes 
and colleagues point out, ―success of radical innovation (such as wide scale wind 
adoption) requires much of the community it affects: resolution of technical debates 
about approach, write-down of existing investments, unlearning and relearning of 
organisational behaviours and practices, creation of new businesses or even 
industries, perhaps even cultural change. These processes can take years‖ (Dismukes, 
et al., 2007, p. 777). 
 
5.2 IMPAIRMENT OF EXISTING ECOSYSTEMS 
Although the concerns over impairment of existing community endowments outlined 
to this point in the chapter are typically the strongest impediment to wind power 
development, there are cases when concerns over impairment of existing ecosystems 
can result in similar high levels of social opposition to wind power developments.  
 
Many attractive wind power sites are located in ecologically sensitive areas (Wolsink, 
2000). Rural sites which are often richer in biodiversity appeal to wind project 
developers thanks to lower land costs and lower risks of public opposition (Firestone 




& Kempton, 2007). Although coastal areas, mountain ridges and mountain passes all 
present attractive siting options due to superior wind quality (Zamot, et al., 2005), 
they are often amongst the most ecologically precious. In many countries, coastal 
areas are extensively developed and few undeveloped sites remain. Erecting wind 
farms in such areas can close off important migration corridors for keystone species 
that bridge coastal and inland habitats (Miller, 2004). Similarly, mountain passes are 
often attractive wind sites due to wind channels found in such passes; unfortunately, 
wind channels also serve as avian flight paths (Zamot, et al., 2005). 
 
5.2.1 Bird Mortality 
Bird mortality is perhaps the most notorious of the ecological threats that wind farms 
pose. It is not uncommon for wind project developers to be confronted with public 
concern or even active protest over threats to the avian population (Firestone & 
Kempton, 2007).  
 
Statistically, as Table 5.1 illustrates, pollution from fossil fuel electricity generation 
and collisions with cars or buildings cause far more bird deaths than do collisions with 
wind turbines (Firestone & Kempton, 2007; McKinsey, 2007). A study in 2001 
conducted by the US National Wind Coordinating Committee estimated that there 
were 6400 bird fatalities associated with 3500 wind turbines covered by the study 
(Wizelius, 2007). Generally, research indicates that it is not the absolute number of 
bird kills; but rather, the rarity or ecological sensitivity of specific avian species that 
fuels the staunchest opposition to wind energy projects. 
 




Table 5.1: Bird Mortality from Anthropocentric Causes in the US 
Object Mortality (birds per year) 
Power Grid 130-174 Million 
Cars and Trucks 60-80 Million 
Buildings 100-1000 Million 
Telecom Towers 40-50 Million 
Pesticides 67 Million 
Wind Turbines 6400 
Source: (Wizelius, 2007) 
 
Despite low avian mortality rates, misperceptions fuelled by planning flaws associated 
with wind farms of the 1970s and 1980s can still fan the flames of protest. Early 
turbine models were erected on lattice towers which provided an ideal nesting ground 
for birds (Boyle, 2004). However, newer turbine models are mounted on pylon-style 
towers which are not conducive to nesting (Wizelius, 2007). Unfortunately, although 
the primary causes of avian fatalities have been technologically mitigated, the stigma 
that wind turbines threaten avian populations remains. Community engagement 
supported by avian impact assessments can help diffuse community dissonance. 
 
5.2.2 The Challenge of Estimating Bird Mortality 
One common method for assessing the impact of a wind energy project on the avian 
population is to estimate ―bird mortality‖ which is often expressed as number of birds 
killed in a given area (i.e. bird kills per square kilometre per year). Separate bird 
mortality estimates are often calculated for any endangered species inhabiting an area.  
 
When evaluating bird mortality studies, policymakers should be aware that data can 
be misleading or altogether inaccurate due to a number of confounding factors. Firstly, 
many bird mortality estimates use data from other ―proxy‖ wind power sites to 
generate rough estimates of bird kills. However, species, migration and scavenging 
behaviour of birds as well as the characteristics of each wind farm differ. Accordingly, 




estimates that are based on benchmark data from other sites will never be directly 
transferrable. Secondly, bird mortality is usually calculated by counting the number of 
bird carcasses found within the proxy site area. However, the number of carcasses 
found is dependent on the number of birds migrating through an area. Studies which 
fail to account for seasonal migration variations are unrepresentative. Thirdly, 
counting bird carcasses found within a site boundary produces underestimates of true 
mortality. Birds that are injured by wind turbines can fly off to other areas where they 
perish. Furthermore, bird carcasses that fall to the ground are frequently carried off by 
scavengers (Miller, 2004). In fact, bird mortality statistics are only truly liable when 
they are conducted at the site in question over at least a full year. Unfortunately, post-
project completion bird mortality studies undermine the value of this tool for planning 
mitigation strategies. 
 
Even when bird mortality estimates are relatively representative, absolute mortality 
numbers tell only part of the story. A thousand birds killed per year within the 
boundary of a wind site represents a significant mortality statistic if ten thousand birds 
pass through the site each year. However, if ten million birds pass through the site 
each year, the mortality rate is less significant. In order to evaluate the bigger picture, 
a statistic known as bird risk is commonly used. Bird risk is defined as the number of 
bird fatalities as a percentage of the total number of birds observed in the area (Zamot, 
et al., 2005).  
 
Unfortunately this metric exhibits all of the potential problems associated with 
estimating bird mortality plus a host of other confounding threats associated with 
estimating the number of birds passing through an area. Firstly, birds migrate into and 




out of habitats. Accordingly, bird numbers are rarely consistent throughout the day, 
month or year. Secondly, some birds are nocturnal. This poses obvious enumeration 
challenges.  Thirdly, different birds fly at different heights and so the threat posed is 
not the same for all species. Finally, as stated earlier, avoiding fatalities of endangered 
birds should take priority. Therefore, enumeration activities should ideally endeavour 
to separate endangered species from commonly found species. In practice, this is hard 
to accomplish (de Lucas, Janss, & Ferrer, 2007).  
 
5.2.3 Lessons for Policymakers 
There are two useful lessons that merit attention. Firstly, mortality studies can provide 
insight into the potential for public opposition from groups that are concerned about 
avian welfare. However, such studies are only useful if they avoid the threats to 
validity outlined earlier. Secondly, policymakers who reference avian mortality 
studies in order to gain insight into the threat that a wind energy project poses to the 
avian population should do so with a critical mindset. The methodology supporting 
the data should be clearly understood in order to ascertain the limitations associated 
with the study’s conclusions.  
 
5.2.4 Degradation of Animal Habitat 
Disruptions to animal habitats associated with construction and operation of a wind 
facility can significantly influence foraging patterns and undermine the continued 
viability of the area to support resident species (Magoha, 2002). As the next few 
paragraphs demonstrate, more effective planning can significantly mitigate threats to 
ecosystem integrity at the site preparation, construction and operation stages.  
 




 Site Preparation Issues 
Ecosystem-friendly site design requires a reassessment of the traditional approach to 
site development, which typically begins by clearing all vegetation from a site and 
levelling the site with bulldozers. Clearing a site in this manner creates ecologically 
barren wastelands that uproot animal habitats, disrupt foraging patterns and fragment 
animal populations (Ackermann & Soder, 2002). This is true even if new vegetation is 
planted once construction is completed. The level of comfort that an animal has with 
its habitat is dependent on the familiarity it establishes with its environs. Changes to 
physical features of the environment or even to scent patterns attached to flora can 
severely disrupt foraging patterns (Begon, Townsend, & Harper, 2006). A better way 
of developing sites is to clear only those areas of land which will be built upon. This 
will leave some of the original flora in place and provide a level of familiarity that will 
induce animals to return to the area after construction is completed. Moreover, careful 
attention should be given to selection of any vegetation to be replanted. Efforts should 
be made to ensure that new vegetation mirrors the type of vegetation lost (Harrop & 
Nixon, 1999). Furthermore, the ecological intrusiveness of wind tower foundations 
can be significantly reduced by recovering foundations with soil and vegetation 
(Wizelius, 2007). 
 
Another flaw with traditional site development concerns fencing which is often 
erected around a site, often in adherence to public safety regulations. However, 
utilizing traditional chain-link fencing prevents larger species from returning to the 
site. Construction standards that require access holes to be installed at various 
intervals along the fence to facilitate animal migration can resolve this problem 
(Harrop & Nixon, 1999).  




It’s worth noting that ecologically sensitive site design should not stop at site 
boundaries. One of the greatest threats associated with wind energy developments 
stems from the clearing of pristine lands for access roads and transmission line towers 
(Denholm, et al., 2005). Not only do such developments potentially hinder animal 
migration, they also facilitate human access to ecologically sensitive areas. Again, the 
process of designing the project with these threats in mind can produce cost effective 
solutions. Migration corridors can facilitate improved animal migration and entry 
gates at the mouth of service roads can help regulate unauthorized access.  
 
 Construction Phase Issues 
Different species of animals respond differently to external commotion. During the 
construction stage, noise and commotion from construction activities can either scare 
off predators or prey; and in doing so, unintentionally upset the ecological balance 
(Begon, et al., 2006). Identifying the types of animals native to a site and developing 
impact assessment and mitigation strategies for the identified species can help 
minimize the disruptive impact of construction activities. It is particularly important in 
the development of ―resident animal profiles‖ that endangered species and keystone 
species are prioritized to ensure a given project does not cause irreparable ecological 
damage (Harrop & Nixon, 1999).  
 
 Operational Phase Issues 
Unfortunately, ecological disruption cause by wind farms does not entirely disappear 
upon completion of construction (Ackermann & Soder, 2002; Ardente, Beccali, 
Cellura, & Brano, 2008). Rotor noise which was a problem with older wind systems 
has been more or less attenuated through technological advances (Magoha, 2002; 




Zamot, et al., 2005). However, the impacts that the continual ―swishing‖ of modern 
rotors and shadow flicker caused by the oscillating blades have on wildlife are not yet 
fully understood. In the absence of better understanding, wind development planners 
should avoid developments in areas that are inhabited by endangered species.  
 
5.2.5 Offshore Wind Farms and Ecological Concerns 
Threats to habitat viability apply to offshore wind power developments as well. 
Moreover, the contention that ecologically sensitive site planning can avert many 
ecological problems is true for offshore wind developments as well (Ardente, et al., 
2008; Magoha, 2002; McKinsey, 2007).  
 
Mitigation measures should be designed to avoid damaging the health of reefs, marine 
breeding grounds and aquatic foraging areas. With that said, the marine habitat can be 
highly resilient. For example, research indicates that although the noise emitted and 
the turbidity caused during the process of tower construction can scare off marine 
mammals; post-construction, mammals tend to return to the area (DONG Energy, 
2008). Research also indicates that the base of wind turbine towers can potentially act 
as artificial reefs for benthic fauna; and as such, positively contribute to the marine 
habitat (DONG Energy, 2008).  
 
Overall, extant research in regard to ecosystem management of offshore wind energy 
developments generally indicates that informed environmental planning can avert 
most threats to the marine habitat. However, as is the case with onshore developments 
and animal habitats, more research still needs to be done on the effect of operational 
noise and vibrations on aquatic creatures. 




5.2.6 The Importance of Environmental Impact Assessments 
Ecological threats and appropriate mitigation measures are site-specific because flora 
and fauna profiles vary. Accordingly, to fully anticipate the impact of wind power 
projects on a given ecosystem, environmental impact assessments (EIAs) should be 
undertaken.  
 
EIAs are detailed assessments of ecological impacts associated with specific projects. 
The first step of an EIA is to establish the baseline. The baseline represents the state of 
the ecosystem prior to any development. The next step is to conflate ecological and 
engineering principles to predict and evaluate impacts that will occur at the site 
preparation, construction and operation stages. Finally, the EIA typically concludes by 
recommending mitigation measures that will minimize the impact of the project on the 
ecosystem (Harrop & Nixon, 1999). In short, EIAs are site-specific blueprints for 
mitigating ecological damage associated with wind energy projects.  
 
If the intention is to ensure ecological damage is minimized, it is imperative for the 
EIA to be a part of the project approval process (Brown & Escobar, 2007). 
Furthermore, the development of standardized EIA templates helps to ensure every 
project site is evaluated according to the same criteria and the same depth of study 
(Magoha, 2002). Almost counter-intuitively, research indicates that regulatory 
standardization of EIA criteria is greatly appreciated by environmental and corporate 
stakeholders alike (McKinsey, 2007). This is because standardization allows 
environmental watchdog groups to influence what goes into an EIA through political 
lobbying and more effectively evaluate EIA submissions from project developers. 




Standardization also insulates project development firms from public criticism that the 
EIAs they carry out lack an acceptable standard of rigor (McKinsey, 2007).   
 
 Caveats Associated With EIA Legislation 
There are three caveats associated with the management of EIA policy. Firstly, 
projects which have been planned in an ecologically sensitive matter should not be 
delayed by red tape associated with an inefficient EIA review process because 
inconsistent processing practices deters investment (McKinsey, 2007). This implies 
that authorities that are responsible for vetting the assessments and granting approval 
must be have the resources, competencies and operational obligation to expediently 
carry out effective, timely evaluation of submissions (Lawrence, 2003).  
 
Secondly, a degree of flexibility should be built into the EIA process in order to allow 
amendments to be made to EIAs as characteristics of projects change, new technology 
emerges and project finances fluctuate (McKinsey, 2007; Wizelius, 2007). 
Mechanisms should exist to allow project developers to make minor amendments to 
project designs and have these amendments approved in a fast track manner without 
the entire EIA being resubmitted. An EIA should be an advisory tool which helps to 
make wind energy projects more environmentally sound; it should not be used to 
delay or derail projects that are beneficial to the community (Lawrence, 2003). In 
order to achieve economic and environmental balance, many nations draw a 
distinction between small and large wind energy developments. Larger developments 
require more detailed EIAs. In Germany, projects involving 20 turbines and more 
require significantly more due diligence and preparation of a mandatory EIA. In 
Sweden, any installation over 25 MW requires a comprehensive EIA (Wizelius, 2007). 





Thirdly, mandatory EIA standards should ensure that EIAs are prepared and 
disseminated for stakeholder evaluation and input well before project approval is 
given (Wizelius, 2007). For wind energy project developers and civic sponsors, one of 
the main purposes of preparing an EIA is to minimize the threat of public protest 
caused by poor planning. Without giving stakeholders a voice, EIAs created with even 
the best intentions may still fuel protest (de Lucas, et al., 2007). This caveat may seem 
like a trite observation; however, all too often EIAs are prepared in isolation from 
stakeholders and appended to projects as afterthoughts (Lawrence, 2003). 
 
5.3 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the realizable potential of wind power 
depends on how well developers manage social and environmental issues (McKinsey, 
2007). As more wind farms are developed, threats to both social and ecological 
endowments will increase (DONG Energy, 2008). As available sites become more 
scarce, the impetus to build wind farms on socially and ecologically sensitive areas 
will also increase (Markevicius, et al., 2007). However, by developing and overseeing 
improved standards for managing threats to social and ecological endowments, 
policymakers can play a role in ensuring that the benefits derived from wind energy 
are not realized at the expense of a community’s natural habitat.  





TECHNICAL INSIGHTS FOR BETTER MICRO- LEVEL POLICY 
 
Chapter 4 outlined how factors such as wind quality, site location, and distance to the 
grid influence the cost profile of wind power and Chapter 5 explained how ineffective 
site management can sire social opposition that can derail even the most economically 
attractive wind power projects. Consequently, it is not a great stretch to conclude that 
site selection is the single most important activity in wind power development. This is 
true at both the regional planning level and the individual project level. Unfortunately, 
the processes of assessing wind power potential in a given planning region and then 
prioritising high potential sites for development are fraught with technical 
complications. This chapter examines some of the more prominent technical 
considerations and endeavours to provide some guidance to policymakers on how to 
prepare effective regional development strategies.  
 
6.1 WIND POWER POTENTIAL INVENTORIES 
A ―Wind Power Potential‖ (WPP) inventory is essentially a catalogue of potential 
wind sites within a planning area. It identifies prospective sites and assesses the sites 
according to wind quality, environmental conditions and social considerations. In 
aggregate, the WPP estimates (recorded in megawatts of potential capacity) together 
represent the maximum ―technical‖ capacity for wind energy in the planning region.  
 
The least contentious way to develop a WPP inventory employs a negative planning 
approach. On a map of the planning area, sites where wind turbines should not be 
erected are blocked off. Prohibited areas can include areas of historical or cultural 




importance, ecologically sensitive sites, sensitive marine habitats, tourist or recreation 
areas, population centres, military installations and sites where strong public 
opposition can be expected (i.e. scenic vistas).  
 
It should be intuitively obvious that a bottom-up approach enlisting public 
participation in identifying prohibited sites minimizes the prospect of future public 
opposition to proposed developments (Zamot, et al., 2005). A bottom-up strategy also 
effectively taps local knowledge. For example, local environmental groups are often 
best equipped with the knowledge necessary to identify ecologically sensitive sites (de 
Lucas, et al., 2007). For an illustration on how negative planning has been used for 
identifying feasible wind energy sites see Wizelius (2007) on Sweden. 
 
Once prohibited areas have been blocked off, a map of possible sites remain. 
Therefore, the next step is to assess the suitability of the remaining sites (Wizelius, 
2007). A suitability analysis typically begins with an assessment of relative wind 
speed and consistency because, as outlined in Chapter 4, these qualities of wind 
influence the economics of wind power. In areas where wind quality is deficient, wind 
turbines may not even be viable. For example, planners who were developing a 
suitability analysis for the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania region of Germany 
rejected areas with average wind speeds below 5 m/s as being economically unviable 
(Wizelius, 2007).  
 
In most nations, national meteorological agencies produce wind resource maps which 
provide a broad overview of the energy content of prevailing winds. The Risoe 
laboratory in Denmark provides links to wind resource maps for over 50 countries 




(www.windatlas.dk). Wind resource maps use wind data gathered from measuring 
masts in various locations to connect points with the same energy content, forming 
isovents (Wizelius, 2007). Isovents are conceptually similar to iso-lines on weather 
maps that illustrate areas of high and low pressure. Although wind resource maps are 
not always detailed enough to allow specific sites to be analyzed, they do provide 
planners with insight into which general locations typically have the highest wind 
energy potential and which should be ruled out (Wizelius, 2007). For example, the use 
of wind resource maps in Taiwan point to the island of Penghu as an attractive area for 
wind power development (Chang, Wu, Hsu, Chu, & Liao, 2003). 
 
Identifying suitable sites within a region of high wind quality requires a detailed 
location analysis examining characteristics such as roughness of terrain, hills and 
obstacles. There are a number of commercial software programs that combine data 
from wind resource maps with data on site characteristics in order to identify the most 
attractive wind energy sites. Examples of software include WAsP, WindPRO, 
WindFarm, WindFarmer and Greenius. In fact, many of these programs boast 
additional features which allow noise, shadow and visual impact to be analyzed for 
each site. Prior to development of such software, developing comprehensive regional 
strategies for wind energy developments would have been extremely time-consuming. 
Now, entire countries can be fully evaluated in terms of wind energy potential within 
a month or two (Wizelius, 2007). The end result is an estimate of technical wind 
potential in a given planning region that incorporates predominant social and 
ecological concerns.  
 




This then allows planners to estimate the maximum role that wind energy could play 
in nation’s electricity portfolio: 
 
 Maximum Role for  =  Aggregate WPP capacity 
    Wind Energy     Total amount of electricity generated 
 
Keeping in mind the earlier discussion on constraints posed by wind intermittency on 
grid integration, defining the maximum role for wind energy in the manner just 
described improves the policy planning process in at least three significant ways. 
Firstly, estimating maximum technical wind power potential gives policymakers 
insight into how much additional storage or reserve generation capacity would be 
needed to fully exploit technical potential. Secondly, by estimating maximum 
technical wind power potential, planners can begin to evaluate which other alternative 
energy technologies need to be supported and to what degree in order to contribute to 
carbon-free electricity generation. Thirdly, the existence of government wind power 
potential studies signifies strategic intent (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989), giving wind 
power developers insight into the level of development that might be politically 
supported in a given region.  
 
Denmark which employs a strategic approach for domestic energy planning 
exemplifies the usefulness of comprehensive strategic planning. The Danish 
government has determined that a domestic wind power target of 50% of electric 
power consumed is achievable by 2030. This target was arrived at by assessing the 
national potential for further wind energy development and considering the logistics 
of feeding such a high proportion of wind energy into Denmark’s electricity grid. 
With overall targets established and desirable locations earmarked for development, 




wind energy project developers in Denmark can shift attention away from site 
selection politics to project development (Wizelius, 2007).  
 
There is one policy caveat associated with the initiation of strategic regional plans for 
wind energy development. Leading up to the implementation of such a plan, new 
project activity typically slows down as municipal planning authorities and wind 
developers alike alter behaviour to mesh with the emergent strategy. Since projects 
can take up to a year for planning approval, a developmental lull can extend from one 
year prior to one year beyond implementation of the strategy. Indeed, this was the case 
in Denmark were development slowed down considerably between 1992 and 1994 as 
a national development strategy was being hammered out. However, post-1994, 
project activities intensified (Wizelius, 2007). A similar phenomenon occurred in the 
Gotland area of Sweden in 2002 (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
6.2 RATIONALIZING DECISIONS WITH THE WPP INVENTORY  
In addition to providing insights on technical wind power potential, WPP inventories 
can also help to ensure that development decisions are based on analytically consistent 
evaluation criteria. Formalized strategic planning of this type helps to uncover flaws 
in ad hoc development proposals. Lee and Tzeng (2008) for example, demonstrated 
through the creation of a WPP inventory how the Taiwanese government will be 
unable to meet announced targets for wind power without initiating costly offshore 
wind projects that it has not budgeted for. In recognition of the benefits of formalized 
strategic planning, the Danish Wind Turbines Act of 1992 requires municipal and 
regional authorities to submit strategic plans for wind turbines siting (Wizelius, 2007). 
 




One caveat to working with WPP inventories is that there is a degree of subjectivity 
involved in their creation (Karki & Billinton, 2001). For example, a common 
approach to estimating the wind quality at a given site is to use historical data to 
estimate wind speeds and variances in a subsequent year. Unfortunately, annual wind 
variances also exist; therefore, even the most detailed historical analysis can be 
unrepresentative (Ackermann & Soder, 2002). The lesson for policymakers is that all 
wind energy estimates associated with a given site should have best case, worse case 
and median estimates. While it is acceptable to use median estimates for budgeting 
purposes, it may be more prudent to rely on worst case output scenarios for regional 
electricity mix planning to ensure enough aggregate capacity is commissioned to fulfil 
anticipated supply requirements.  
 
6.3 PUBLIC VS PRIVATE SITES 
Public and private lands should be clearly demarcated within a WPP inventory 
because land ownership can influence the nature of government involvement in a 
particular project (Ferlie, Lynn (Jr), & Pollitt, 2005), which in turn, shapes the types 
of policy tools adopted to facilitate wind power development. For example, coveted 
sites are on public land, the simplest approach to developing the sites may be for the 
civic authority to adopt a bidding system similar to that undertaken in the UK (Komor, 
2004) wherein wind energy firms that most effectively meet the bid criteria win an 
operating concession. In this type of lease arrangement, private firms do not have to 
assume the risks of purchasing land or leasing land from unreliable private parties.  
 
On the other hand, if sites with the highest wind potential are on privately held land, 
the planning authority may wish to consider adopting policies to encourage 




collaboration between private land owners and wind project developers. Policy 
instruments such as wind power production subsidies, tax rebates or power purchase 
guarantees have been employed globally for such purposes (Komor, 2004). Moreover, 
governments may wish to create regulatory guidelines to ensure that leases made 
between these private parties are structured in a way to ensure that the energy supply 
from the site is not adversely affected by legal disagreements over features of the lease.  
 
Counter-intuitively, the control that government planners have over public land does 
not necessarily make public land a more attractive siting option. Developing public 
land for wind energy can fuel resistance from community groups that feel the 
government does not have the right to tender publicly-held endowments to 
commercial interests (Firestone & Kempton, 2007; R. Thompson, 2005). Conversely, 
privately held land has frequently already undergone a degree of development by 
owners who are seeking financial return on their investment. Consequently, except for 
developments that significantly and adversely affect a neighbouring community, 
developing wind farms on private land can be less contentious because it is seldom 
pristine land that is targeted. This is especially true of privately held agricultural land 
(Rodman & Meentemeyer, 2006). Farm owners are often supportive of hosting wind 
power developments because many view such developments as a way to supplement 
farming income (Komor, 2004).  
 
Regardless of land ownership, careful attention needs to be given to the impact that 
wind power developments might have on neighbouring communities and the 
ecosystems within which they are situated. The next section explores this in further 
detail. 




6.4 PRIORITISING SITES: ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SENSITIVITY  
Sites of equal technical wind power potential are not equal in terms of attractiveness 
of development. As Rodman and Meentemeyer (2006) point out, within WPP 
inventories, technical analyses of potential wind sites need to be supplemented with 
social and environmental impact studies. In their study of potential wind sites in 
California, inclusion of environmental and social impact considerations reduced the 
amount of technically superior wind sites by 61%.  
 
The trouble with environmental and social impact studies is that measurement of 
environmental and social impacts is highly subjective. Determining the monetary 
worth of a bird’s life or a scenic vista is contentious (McKinsey, 2007). As mentioned 
earlier, although there are economic methods for estimating environmental costs, each 
method has its share of critics and supporters (Costanza, et al., 1997; Thampapillai, 
2002; Tietenberg, 2003). In regard to social estimates, objective measurement is 
equally difficult because survey results used to ascertain community support do not 
always mesh with actual community reaction (Babbie, 2004). Zamot and colleagues 
(2005) make the point that when undertaking social assessments of prospective wind 
projects, perhaps rather than inquiring ―What percentage of the community is 
intellectually opposed to the project?‖, a more relevant line of inquiry may be ―What 
percentage would be likely to actively protest such developments?‖.  
 
In addition to the contentious nature of assigning monetary values to environmental or 
social degradation, prioritizing acceptable degrees of degradation can also sire 
controversy. For example, imagine a scenario wherein situating a wind farm at Site A 
will adversely impact a popular scenic vista that is highly valued by the community 




but will have negligible ecological impact on the area. Meanwhile, situating the wind 
farm at Site B will significantly degrade a natural ecosystem but it will not impair 
enjoyment of the cherished vista. Either site option will have supporters and 
opponents.  
 
One way to avoid controversy over methodology used for weighting social or 
ecological endowments is to identify an attractive pool of sites based on generic 
criteria and then allow market forces to decide the sequence of sites to be developed. 
For example, one approach is to list sites as excellent (sites with superior wind 
conditions and no significant adverse ecological or social impacts), good (sites with 
either superior wind conditions and minor ecological-social impacts; or sites with fair 
wind conditions and no significant adverse ecological-social impacts), fair (sites that 
may be problematic due to highly variable wind conditions or ecological or social 
impacts which will have to be mitigated), and poor (sites with significant ecological or 
social impacts) (Rodman & Meentemeyer, 2006). After the sites have been assigned to 
these four categories, the excellent sites become the targets for private developmental 
bids or public development initiatives. 
 
In summary, the discussion to this point has shown that an effective WPP inventory: i) 
decouples public and private sites, ii) includes technical (wind quality), environmental 
and social impact assessments and iii) prioritizes the sites to guide development 
sequencing. However, there is one other element of strategic regional wind planning 
that policymakers should consider geographic dispersion of wind power developments. 




6.5 GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION  
As discussed in Chapter 4, geographically dispersed wind power facilities attenuate 
stochastic wind power flows because frequently when wind is not blowing in one area, 
it is blowing in another (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006). Consequently, prioritising site 
development should ideally seek to encourage dispersed development.  
 
In liberalized electricity markets, geographic dispersal can be encouraged through the 
use of special ―siting subsidies‖ which reward developments that are sited beyond 
minimum pre-established distances from existing wind farms. In centrally planned 
electricity markets, geographic dispersal can be planned by separating a planning 
region into square developmental grids and assigning one project per grid. Although 
this approach arguably results in some projects of lower energy potential being 
developed over more attractive projects, the aggregate result is a more optimally tuned 
wind power supply network. 
 
6.6 SUMMARIZING THE VALUE OF WPP INVENTORIES 
The insights extracted from literature and presented in this chapter, demonstrate how 
policymakers can optimize wind energy development strategies by preparing effective 
WPP inventories. In premise, a WPP inventory is similar to a blueprint that a 
construction company uses for guiding the construction of a building. While one 
would be hard-pressed to find a quality construction company that does not utilize 
blueprints, it is surprising how often strategic planning in regard to electricity 
portfolios is carried out without adequate national, regional or municipal plans. 





POLITICAL INSIGHTS FOR BETTER MICRO- LEVEL POLICY 
 
This chapter concludes Part 1 of this research paper by examining two issues of 
political nature that confront project level policymakers. The first part of the chapter 
explores ways to improve the tendering process for wind power developments in order 
to operationalize regional wind development strategies that have been formulated 
through the activities outlined in Chapter 6. The second part of the chapter examines 
the challenges to estimating CO2 emission reductions associated with wind power 
projects. Although estimating CO2 emissions is an economic issue in the context of 
applying for carbon credits, it is also a political issue because CO2 emission abatement 
can be an important cog in any campaign to generate public support for wind power 
development projects.  
 
7.1 WIND POWER TENDERING POLICY  
7.1.1 An Equitable Tendering Policy  
In most democratic economies, energy planning authorities that adopt deregulation 
strategies (i.e. privatization, PPP relationships etc.) employ a tendering process to 
procure energy for the electricity grid. Unfortunately, rigid tendering requirements 
that seek guarantees of fixed amounts of energy generation each year put wind project 
developers in a disadvantageous competitive position (Blakeway & White, 2005). Due 
to the stochastic nature of wind power, it is costly for wind project developers to 
contractually commit to exact generation targets. In order to meet such a requirement, 
wind project developers must either incorporate over-capacity into the bid to ensure 
that the contracted amount of energy will be delivered, pay to store a portion of the 




electricity generated or risk submitting a competitive bid which will under-perform if 
wind forecasts are overestimated.  
 
One way to ensure technological equity in a tendering system is to create a 
technologically divided tendering system. Under such circumstances, wind power 
providers would compete only with each other for a fixed annual purchase quota. The 
quotas allocated to wind power, solar PV, hydropower, coal-fired power and other 
generation technologies would add up to the total amount of electricity supply 
required. The obvious benefit to such a system is that it allows policymakers to 
micromanage a transition from fossil fuel technology to alternative energy 
technologies, thereby giving planners better control over the pace of development.  
 
On the other hand, controlling market development to the extent implied by a 
technologically divided tendering system may be ideologically unacceptable in some 
national or regional contexts. Free-market purists may wish to ensure that each 
bidding exercise is open to all prospective suppliers. Under such a system, the playing 
field can be levelled by replacing contractual requirements to supply specific 
quantities of energy with requirements to supply energy within a range that 
intermittent energy providers could realistically meet without incurring storage costs.  
 
7.1.2 Using Specialists to Define Criteria and Vet Bids 
A degree of specialized knowledge is needed when i) defining the criteria to include in 
wind power requests for tender and ii) evaluating subsequent bids (Ackermann & 
Soder, 2002). One strategy for addressing the need for specialized knowledge is to 
form expert panels to carry out these duties. Panels should at the very least include a 




wind power engineer, an environmental impact assessment professional, a technical 
representative from the organizational entity that oversees electrical grid load 
management, an urban planner, an energy policy expert and a person representing 
community interests. All these stakeholders bring requisite knowledge to the process 
in order to avert scenarios where wind power development contracts are awarded to 
socially or ecologically undesirable project proposals. To consolidate the planning 
process, the WPP inventory process described in Chapter 6 should define what sites 
should be prioritised for public tender.  
 
7.1.3 Manage Centrally, Consult Locally 
A rule of thumb for managing the tendering process is to manage centrally but consult 
locally. In a UK study of alternative energy projects that were awarded to developers 
but failed to come to fruition, one of the main conclusions was that opposition from 
local interests stymied project implementation (Wong, 2005). While the study 
acknowledged that energy planning needs to be centrally managed in order to ensure 
supply stability, failure to include local stakeholders in a local development was 
identified as a recipe for disaster. Engaging local stakeholders reduces project 
opposition and may produce local economic benefits if local firms become involved in 
support roles (Komor, 2004). It may be worth noting that in Germany, wind farms are 
often owned and operated by farmers and farm cooperatives. Thanks to local 
ownership, German wind farms generally enjoy positive support in the communities in 








7.2 CO2 EMISSIONS ASSESSMENT 
7.2.1 Lifecycle Analysis 
One key motivation for incorporating wind energy into an electricity grid is to reduce 
CO2 emissions associated with fossil fuel combustion. However, contrary to media 
hype, wind energy is not CO2
 
emission-free (Lenzen & Munksgaard, 2002). Although 
CO2
 
emissions are not produced during the operation of wind turbines, CO2
 
emissions 
are produced when manufacturing wind energy components and constructing wind 
farms. Therefore, when evaluating how much CO2 is offset by a given wind project, 
the entire lifecycle of the wind system must be evaluated and compared to the entire 
lifecycle of the system that it is displacing (Graedel & Allenby, 2001). 
 
There are numerous lifecycle studies which attempt to estimate CO2
 
emissions 
associated with both offshore and onshore wind power systems. Schleisner (2000) in a 
lifecycle study for a 9 MW offshore wind facility in Denmark concluded that CO2
 
emissions over the lifecycle translated to 16.5 g of CO2
 
per kWh generated by the 
facility over its lifespan. A more recent German study using technical data describing 
a hypothetical offshore 5 MW system arrived at a slightly higher estimate of 22 g of 
CO2
 
per kWh (Pehnt, Oeser, & Swider, 2008).  
 
Regarding onshore wind facilities, Schleisner (2000) estimated that CO2
 
emissions 
over the lifecycle of a 5 MW onshore wind facility amount to just over half of the 
emissions of a similar sized offshore facility (9.7 g of CO2
 
per kWh generated by the 
facility). Other lifecycle studies have produced estimates which fall on either side of 
Schleisner’s estimates. Notably, Lenzen and Munksgaard (2002) conducted a 
metastudy which summarized research on lifecycle CO2
 
emission estimates for 29 




globally dispersed wind power developments. They found that CO2
 
emission estimates 
on a per kWh basis ranged from 8.1 g per kWh at a German site to 123.7 g per kWh at 
a Japanese site. The average for all sites was 33 g per kWh.  
 
Generally, reputable researchers have arrived at such disparate estimates due to 
differences in critical assumptions made concerning i) project boundaries, ii) wind 
power system components and iii) the nature of production processes. In subsequent 
sections, energy intensive stages along the lifecycle of a wind power system will be 
examined in closer detail to demonstrate the complexities of estimating CO2 emissions. 
Additionally, recommendations will be proffered to help policymakers utilize this 
knowledge to effectively interpret lifecycle data.  
 
7.2.2 Boundary Choices  
Defining the boundary of a system has perhaps the greatest influence on CO2 emission 
estimates (Lenzen & Munksgaard, 2002). For example, many studies begin the 
lifecycle analysis of a wind facility at the component manufacturing stage. This 
implies that the first source of CO2 emissions will likely pertain to materials 
processing (i.e. when ore is converted into the steel moulds) (cf. Pehnt, et al., 2008). 
Choosing this stage to be the starting point implicitly ignores CO2 emissions that are 
emitted when the ores are extracted during the mining process (Sovacool, 2008a). 
Accordingly, policymakers who are presented with lifecycle data on CO2 emissions 








7.2.3 Aggregating Emissions from Disaggregated Processes  
The source of energy generation can be just as important as the amount of energy 
consumed in a process. CO2 emissions associated with wind farm components 
manufactured in a country where hydropower dominates the electricity mix will be 
significantly less than CO2 emissions associated with components manufactured in a 
country where coal-powered electricity dominates. Unfortunately, in today’s global 
economy, component parts of a typical wind turbine are manufactured at plants 
around the world (Bartlett, et al., 2003). Efforts to estimate the amount of CO2 
associated with the electricity used to produce each component part would require 
data on national electricity profiles and data on electricity used to produce each part 
(Schleisner, 2000). Even if this could be accomplished in a cost effective manner, the 
data would only be valid for turbines of the same type. Therefore, policymakers who 
are presented with CO2 emission estimates should regard such estimates with a degree 
of healthy scepticism unless the assumptions underlying these estimates are made 
clear. 
 
7.2.4 Recycled Materials and Carbon Footprints 
Due to the dominance of CO2 emissions associated with component manufacturing, 
employing recycled materials can significantly reduce the carbon footprint associated 
with a wind energy system (Ardente, et al., 2008). Specifically, wind energy systems 
made from recycled materials use up to 80% less energy in the component 
manufacturing stage when compared to systems which use virgin materials (Lenzen & 
Munksgaard, 2002).  
 




This has implications regarding the accuracy of lifecycle analyses. A lifecycle analysis 
which estimates emissions based on an assumption that virgin materials are used could 
derive estimates for the production of component materials that are 5 times greater 
than studies which assume recycled components are used. Accordingly, requests for 
tender that require a certain percentage of the materials to be from recycled sources 
will positively support national CO2 emission reduction plans. 
 
7.2.5 Type of Materials and Carbon Footprints 
The type of material used for the construction of turbine towers can play a significant 
role in terms of energy used in production and erection of components (Lenzen & 
Wachsmann, 2004). If a steel tower is used, up to half the energy attributed to a wind 
project goes into manufacturing the steel for the tower. On the other hand, if concrete 
is used in place of steel for the tower, approximately 50% less energy will go into the 
construction of the tower (Lenzen & Munksgaard, 2002). In short, mandating the use 
of concrete over steel can reduce aggregate CO2 emissions by 25%. 
 
One final research insight related to material choice is that the process of 
manufacturing larger turbines uses less energy and proportionately less CO2 per 
megawatt hour (Lenzen & Munksgaard, 2002). This insight should be intuitively 
obvious given the observation in the last paragraph that 25% - 50% of CO2 emissions 
are attributed to tower construction. A turbine that has twice as much generating 
capacity as another turbine will not require a tower that uses twice as much material to 
construct. Simply put, there is an exponentially declining relationship between tower 
size and turbine size.  
 




7.2.6 Transport Emissions 
One study estimates that liquid fuel combusted during the transportation and 
construction stage of a wind project represents approximately 5% of all energy used 
on project (Lenzen & Munksgaard, 2002). Yet another study points out that 
component parts for some facilities may come from overseas plants which would 
amplify the CO2 emissions associated with transporting components (Ardente, et al., 
2008). Obviously, vehicles and power generators that use biofuel instead of fossil 
fuels can significantly reduce transport-related CO2 emissions. 
 
7.2.7 Life Cycle Analysis in a Nutshell 
The overarching lesson for policymakers is to view lifecycle CO2 emission estimates 
with a sceptical eye and seek to identify the underlying assumptions upon which the 
estimates are founded. For policymakers who are intent on commissioning a 
comprehensive estimate of CO2 emissions associated with a wind energy project, 
attention must be given to ensuring that the estimation process begins with raw 
resource extraction and ends with the disposal of the components after their useful life 
(i.e. delivery to a recycler or salvage yard).  
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PART 2  
OVERVIEW  
 
Part 2 of this research study endeavours to understand and explicate impediments to 
national wind power development policy. It approaches this challenge by first 
presenting case studies which describe wind power development in four advanced 
nations that are characterised by phlegmatic track records in wind power 
development – Australia (Chapter 8), Canada (Chapter 9), Japan (Chapter 10) and 
Taiwan (Chapter 11). Chapter 12 then draws the insights from the four case studies 
into a STEP (social, technical, economic and political) framework to help 
policymakers better conceptualise macro-level challenges to improved wind power 
development policy.  




 CHAPTER 8 
 WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Abstract 
This chapter provides a critical evaluation of Australia’s new Renewable Energy 
Target (RET) program in respect to its capacity to support wind power development. 
Five structural flaws associated with the RET which undermine its effectiveness as a 
catalyst for technological change in the electricity sector are discussed: i)  failure to 
prioritise technologies which sires diffused, less effective financial support, ii) the 
inclusion of waste coal mine gas (WCMG) as an eligible fuel source which acts as an 
indirect coal industry subsidy, iii) program duration which is too short and ill-
structured, iv) a multiplier that is well-intended to support small-scale renewable 
technologies but which creates ―phantom capacity‖, and v) the capped target of 45,000 
GW hours which will stymie long-term wind power market investment. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations which stress the importance of passing the Carbon 
Pollution Renewable Scheme (CPRS) legislation to offset the weaknesses associated 
with the RET. If the CPRS cannot be implemented, the chapter recommends that 
amendments be made to the RET to i) remove WCMG from the list of approved 






December 3, 2007 was a watershed day for Australian politics; a new government was 
sworn into power under the Labor Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd. One of the regime’s 
first acts was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and in so doing, committed Australia to 
meeting a greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement target amounting to 8% above 1990 
levels for the period 2008-2012. Although Australia will likely meet this liberal target 
for the first Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction period thanks to favourable changes 
in land-use and forestry, any subsequent reductions will require radical structural 
changes to how the nation uses energy, which even the government realises is of a 
magnitude that few other industrialised nations face (Government of Australia, 2009h). 




Given that nearly 50% of the GHG emitted in Australia comes from power generation 
(Government of Australia, 2008a), it should come as no surprise that one of the first 
policy initiatives directed at mitigating GHG emissions was a fortified program to 
encourage enhanced development of renewable energy capacity in the electricity 
generation sector.  
 
The flagship program of these enhanced efforts is the Renewable Energy Target (RET) 
which consolidates all state-level Renewable Energy Target programs and legally 
requires Australia's electricity utilities to ensure that 45,000 GWh of electricity 
purchases (approximately 20% of total electricity generated) will be from renewable 
energy technologies by 2020. On the surface, the new RET brings Australia's 
renewable energy development program in line with EU targets (Hindmarsh & 
Matthews, 2008) and gives Australian renewable energy development firms the 
requisite market window to establish stronger market presence, thereby enhancing 
economies of scale and reducing the cost of renewable-sourced electricity.  
  
For wind power developers in particular, the RET potentially represents an 
opportunity to establish a strategic beachhead in Australia’s electricity sector by 
capturing the economies of scale necessary to close the commercially corrosive cost 
gap that exists between wind power and fossil fuel-powered electricity. Actual cost 
differentials are hard to pin down for electricity sources due to technological, 
operational and regional factors which cause costs to vary; and peer reviewed sources 
on this topic for Australia are somewhat dated. However, as a general indicator of the 
current cost disparity, data from the Australia Institute in 2006 estimated that the cost 
range of coal-fired power was AU$31-40 per MWh (megawatt hour) while the wind 




power cost range was AU$60-80 per MWh (Macintosh & Downie, 2006). As of 
December 2009, the cost of coal had increased by over 25% from December 2005 
levels
11
. Moreover, wind power generation costs, which improved 4-7 fold from 1981 
to 2006 (Celik, et al., 2007), are widely expected to continue to improve (DONG 
Energy, 2008; Wizelius, 2007). Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the cost 
disparity has narrowed in the three years since this report was released. Moreover, a 
recent study by the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering 
(ATSE) estimates externalities associated with coal range between AU$42 and AU$52 
per MWh while the cost of externalities associated with wind power amount to only 
$1.5 per MWh (ATSE, 2009). Taking into account these externalities, the cost of wind 
power is actually much closer to the cost of coal-fired power than market prices 
indicate and might in some cases be less expensive. As the RET commences in 2010, 
wind power prospects are positive because wind power has the advantage of being 
close to commercially competitive and capable of immediate adoption (Kann, 2009).
    
Of other promising alternative energy technologies, engineered geothermal, solar PV 
and solar thermal technologies hold promise given Australia’s abundance of these 
resources; however, these technologies are not yet commercially viable for wide-scale 
application (Hindmarsh & Matthews, 2008). Geothermal hot rock technology 
possesses massive appeal in terms of scale potential. Geoscience Australia contends 
that tapping just one percent of the energy from hot rocks located within five 
kilometres of the earth's surface would be enough to supply 26,000 times Australia's 
annual power consumption on a perpetual basis for 2.6 million years (Clean Energy 
Council, 2009). However, it is still at an early developmental stage with only one 
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operational site as of 2009 (Government of Australia, 2009c). Overall, geothermal is 
not anticipated to contribute to Australia's electricity supply until at least 2015 and 
even then only at a marginal level due to cost (Government of Australia, 2009f). Solar 
PV technology is still 3-4 times the cost of gas-fired electricity (Gurney et al., 2007). 
Consequently, recent projections optimistically estimate solar PV reaching a 
maximum capacity of only 30MW by 2020 (CME, 2009). Utility-scale solar thermal 
technology is also at a developmental stage, albeit closer to commercialisation with a 
10 MW demonstration plant planned in Queensland for 2010 (Government of 
Australia, 2009c). As a stand-alone technology, large-scale solar thermal remains an 
expensive proposition thereby limiting commercial diffusion to subsidised programs 
such as the Solar Flagships program which earmarks AU$1.6 billion over 6-years to 
support construction and demonstration of large-scale solar power stations, with an 
ultimate target of 1000 MW (Government of Australia, 2009a).  
  
Other prominent alternative energy technologies face non-commercial barriers that are 
equally as formidable. Waste to energy biomass is currently cost effective but growth 
is limited by the capacity of Australia's sparse population to generate and more 
effectively manage waste. Although on the surface, agricultural biomass and 
combustible materials (i.e. wood and wood by-products) appear promising thanks to 
surplus land to support such initiatives, wide-scale adoption of these technologies is 
impeded by environmental factors which include extreme water shortages, 
environmental impacts associated with wide-scale harvesting of energy crops, 
seasonal harvests which produce a feast-famine supply profile and competing 
agricultural interests (Gerardi, Nsair, Falcon, & Ott, 2007; IEA, 2005; MacGill, 
Outhred, & Nolles, 2006). Growth potential for hydropower is limited by a dwindling 




number of exploitable water sources and severe regulation of water utilization 
(Government of Australia, 2009f; Hindmarsh & Matthews, 2008).  
  
Meanwhile, research into carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology to 
render fossil fuel technologies as alternative ―clean‖ energy sources is still at the 
developmental stage (Gurney, et al., 2007). As of April 2009, no functional CCS and 
power plant integration exists at an industrial scale anywhere in the world 
(Government of Australia, 2009h). Furthermore, it was estimated as recently as 2007 
that utility-scale implementation of CCS technology would increase generation costs 
by 38-44% for new natural gas combined cycle plants and 44-65% for new pulverised 
coal plants, thereby rendering both technologies competitively uneconomical (Gurney, 
et al., 2007).    
  
Finally, despite indications of increasing pressure to revisit existing nuclear policy, 
Australia is a nation in staunch opposition to the development of nuclear power. Any 
policy changes in support of nuclear power will likely face vociferous opposition. 
Moreover, there is evidence that the cost of nuclear power in Australia would exceed 
the cost of wind power and even if the cost disparity were negligible, further evidence 
indicates that CO2 associated with the entire nuclear fuel cycle is comparative in 
volume to emissions from gas-fired power stations (Saddler, Diesendorf, & Denniss, 
2007; Sovacool, 2008b).   
 
In summary, although all of the alternative energy technologies listed can and likely 
will have a role to play in Australia’s transition away from carbon-intensive electricity 
generation, wind power developers in Australia face an unprecedented opportunity to 




snap up the majority of business generated by the January 1, 2010 commencement of 
the RET, provided the RET is structured in a way to support progressive wind power 
development. 
 
In order to effectively support progressive development of wind power, two elements 
must be integrated into a policy instrument. The first element is that support policies 
must be designed to simultaneously encourage utilities to make the investments 
necessary to operationally support enhanced levels of wind power. For example, in 
Japan, despite the existence of government subsidies to encourage wind power 
development, utilities purportedly place undue storage demands on wind power 
developers due to concerns that the existing grid will be destabilized due to the 
fluctuating nature of wind power (Englander, 2008). Although wind developers are 
keen to take advantage of government inducements to sell wind power into the 
existing system, Japanese utilities are not making the investments necessary to support 
a progressive presence of wind power (Valentine, 2009). The second element is that 
any support policies must encourage wind power developers to commit the investment 
necessary to render wind power commercially competitive when the support policy is 
removed. For example, in Taiwan, the feed-in subsidies provided to wind power 
developers are viewed as insufficient for encouraging in-land wind farm development; 
and as a result, a situation is emerging wherein wind power developers are exploiting 
only the most financially attractive sites in Taiwan before moving on to other 
countries. Once all the financially attractive sites have been exploited, it is highly 
likely that wind power development in Taiwan will stall (Valentine, 2010b). 
   




This chapter first aims to evaluate Australia's new RET on the basis of these two 
elements in order to evaluate the efficacy of this new program to support progressive 
wind power development. The analysis highlights a number of flaws in the RET 
which may significantly undermine progressive development of wind power; therefore, 
this chapter also seeks to put forth recommendations on how to improve the RET. 
  
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 presents a profile of the Australian 
electricity industry and discusses recent developments and trends in regard to wind 
power development. Section 8.3 evaluates the new RET in the context of supporting 
progressive wind power development. Section 8.4 provides some concluding thoughts 
on how to improve effectiveness of the RET. 
 
8.2  WIND POWER & AUSTRALIA’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY  
With the exception of the Northern Territory and Western Australia, Australia boasts 
an integrated national energy market (NEM) which was established in 1998 to 
enhance electricity grid security and provide a more competitive market for the supply 
of electricity (NEMMCO, 2005). The NEM which serves about 90% of Australia’s 
population (MacGill, et al., 2006) is a "compulsory gross pool market" in which bids 
to sell electricity are collected en masse and electricity dispatches are sequenced 
according to the price (Owen, 2009). Australia is the only major economy to have 
introduced and maintained this type of mandatory wholesale electricity trading market 
(Chester, 2007). 
  
Australia is blessed with massive stores of coal, laying claim to 24.1% of the world's 
economic demonstrated reserves of brown coal and 5.4% of the world’s economic 




demonstrated reserves of black coal (ABARE, 2009). Consequently, it should come as 
no surprise that coal plays a dominant role in the Australian electricity generation 
industry. Table 8.1 provides an overview of fuel inputs into electricity generation from 
2003 to 2007. In 2006-07, brown and black coal accounted for 83.8% of Australia's 
electricity generation. 
 
Table 8.1: Australia's Fuel Inputs into Electricity Generation 
(in Petajoules- PJ) 2003-04 % 2004-05 % 2005-06 % 2006-07 %
Thermal
Black coal 1296 56% 1297 55% 1357 56% 1379 56%
Brown coal 674 29% 683 29% 701 29% 671 27%
Oil 22 1% 25 1% 26 1% 25 1%
Gas 264 11% 267 11% 263 11% 284 12%
Total thermal 2256 97% 2272 97% 2347 97% 2359 96%
Renewables
Hydro 58 2% 56 2% 58 2% 52 2%
Wind 0 0% 3 0% 6 0% 23 1%
Biomass 5 0% 5 0% 5 0% 5 0%
Biogas 8 0% 7 0% 7 0% 7 0%
Total renewables 71 3% 71 3% 76 3% 87 4%
TOTAL ELECTRICITY 2327 100% 2343 100% 2423 100% 2446 100%  
Source: ABARE, 2009 
  
One energy technology that is conspicuously absent from Australia's electricity 
generation mix is nuclear power. Although national uranium reserves account for 40% 
of total economically accessible uranium stocks (Wesley, 2007), Australia does not 
produce any electricity through nuclear power. Although there is considerable public 
opposition to the prospects of nuclear power (Falk, Green, & Mudd, 2006), there has 
been renewed political discussion over nuclear power development as a possible 
solution to CO2 emission abatement (Schlapfer, 2009). 
 
Table 8.1 also highlights how important it is for the Australian government to 
facilitate a transition away from coal. Per capita emissions of CO2 from fuel 




combustion in Australia are amongst the highest in the world and 43% above the 
average for International Energy Agency countries (IEA, 2005). Of the 576 Mt (CO2 
equivalent) of GHG that Australia emitted in 2006, 47% was from electricity 
generation (Government of Australia, 2008a) and the vast majority of that was from 
coal combustion (IEA, 2005). Moreover, under ―business as usual‖ practices, 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation are expected to 
increase 37% between 2004 and 2050 (Gurney, et al., 2007). Clearly if the new Labor 
government is to achieve marked progress in reducing domestic CO2 emissions, a 
radical realignment of Australia's electricity industry will be required. The trouble is 
that the low price of coal in Australia along with the apparent security that huge stores 
of this resource provide portends a rocky road for a transition to renewable energy. 
  
Wind energy, as the most commercially viable utility-scale renewable technology, is 
expected to be the largest contributor to Australia's new RET targets (Government of 
Australia, 2009f). As Table 8.1 confirms, wind power is rapidly expanding in 
Australia thanks in large part to former national and state-level initiatives to encourage 
enhanced uptake of renewable energy by Australia's utilities. According to the World 
Wind Energy Association, Australia possessed 1494 MW of installed wind power 
capacity at the end of 2008, which represents the 14th highest level of installed 
capacity in the world. In 2008, Australia's installed wind power capacity grew by 83% 
which was the third-highest growth rate in the world (WWEA, 2009). A study 
commissioned by the Australian government in 2005 projected an increase in installed 
wind power capacity in Australia of at least 7360 MW by 2029/30 (Akmal & Riwoe, 
2005). This would represent a five-fold increase over current levels. However, 
statistics pointing to the success of wind power development in Australia can be 




misleading because when Australia's total installed wind power capacity is compared 
to the wind power potential which exists in the country, it becomes evident that a 
significant opportunity to abate the national dependency on coal is being missed. 
  
With the exception of Australia's northern coast, coastal areas throughout Australia 
boast average annual wind speeds in excess of 8 m/s (at 10 metres) and are considered 
to be excellent locations for wind turbine placement (Coppin, Ayotte, & Steggel, 
2003). Furthermore, there are huge tracts of land in the southern portion of Western 
Australia and throughout the states of Southern Australia and Victoria with average 
annual wind speeds in excess of 7 m/s (at 10 metres) which would constitute ―good‖ 
wind conditions for wind turbine sites (Coppin, et al., 2003). Mark Diesendorf  
estimates that long-term wind power potential in Australia may be as high as 20,000 
MW (Diesendorf, 2003, , 2007). Assuming a capacity factor of 35%, harnessing this 
potential would generate 60,000 GWh of electricity annually, which represents about 
28% of Australia’s projected supply of electricity in 2020.   
  
Although the theoretical potential of wind power in Australia is sufficient to provide 
all of Australia's current electricity requirements, there are technical constraints that 
dampen the prospects of a virtually carbon-free electricity system. The stochastic 
nature of wind power makes it necessary at higher levels of electricity grid integration 
for wind power to be integrated with storage or back-up reserve in order to avoid 
destabilizing electricity grid operational security (Ackerman, 2005). As Saddler and 
colleagues (2007, p. 1254) point out, ―currently, the limitation is not the wind resource, 
but rather the transmission infrastructure, which has evolved for large centralised 
power stations‖. Nevertheless, the Australia Institute, drawing from international 




experience with wind power integration into electricity grids, has estimated that spare 
capacity in Australia's existing electricity grid can accommodate up to 20% wind 
power before the stochastic nature of wind power begins to pose a technical threat to 
grid security (Macintosh & Downie, 2006).  
  
It might be tempting for critics to argue that the Australia Institute’s estimate may be 
overly optimistic given the dominant role that coal plays in the national energy mix 
and the relatively low levels of installed capacity in hydropower and gas-fired power 
plants which are essential technologies for responding effectively to the type of load 
fluctuations associated with wind power. However, there is also a counter-argument to 
such criticism that the addition of electricity storage technologies or enhanced reserve 
peak-load generation capacity could enable the integration of wind power levels that 
extend well-beyond the 20% benchmark (Diesendorf, 2007). As a testament to the 
technological feasibility of incorporating high levels of wind power with enhanced 
back-up support, electricity grids in two towns in Western Australia (Denham and 
Hopetoun) incorporate as much as 70% electricity from wind energy (supported by 
diesel generation), with an average wind power contribution of approximately 40%.  
  
Enhancing reserve capacity comes at a cost. One study estimates that the additional 
cost of backup generation (i.e. gas fired power plants) necessary to allow wind power 
to reach high contribution levels (i.e. 40%) in Australia would increase the cost of 
wind generated power by approximately 25% on top of existing wind power 
generation costs (Diesendorf, 2003), constituting a premium of only 1-2¢ per kilowatt 
hour. Aside from these technical costs of supporting high levels of installed wind 
power capacity, there are grid connection costs that need to be considered in order for 




Australia’s wind power potential to be better exploited. In many cases, grid 
connections would need to be extended into remote areas where the absence of 
competing land uses enhances the commercial viability of wind farms. One estimate 
of the cost of new transmission and distribution infrastructure is at least AU$50 per 
meter for laying the cabling and AU$35 per meter for any necessary access roads 
(Wizelius, 2007). This can amount to a 10% or higher premium on wind power project 
costs (Wizelius, 2007).  
  
Although in aggregate the economic costs associated with additional reserve capacity 
and grid connection significantly increase wind power generation costs at high levels 
of installed capacity, there are also economic savings associated with CO2 reductions 
that offset these additional costs. The external costs referred to earlier (AU$42 to 
AU$52 per MWh (ATSE, 2009)) represent real costs that the government is currently 
paying for, albeit in an unreconciled manner.   
  
Irrespective of the barriers to full exploitation of Australia's technical wind power 
potential, evidence presented to this point in the chapter suggests that achieving a 
target of 20% or greater contribution from wind power is both technically feasible and 
less economically damaging than critics contend. A study by the Australia Institute 
estimates that adding approximately 5% of wind power to the existing grid by 2010 
would only cost consumers AU$15-$25 per year extra  (Macintosh & Downie, 2006). 
The study further points out that if the costs of pollution associated with fossil fuel 
power generation were fully internalized, the additional costs (including generation 
cost disparity) to the homeowner would be fully offset (Macintosh & Downie, 2006). 




These conclusions are supported by the ATSE study into the externalities associated 
with coal, referred to earlier (ATSE, 2009). 
 
In terms of assessing the impact that a 20% or greater electricity supply contribution 
from wind power would make to CO2 abatement in Australia, the New South Wales 
government estimates that each MWh of power produced by wind farms can displace 
0.929 tons of CO2 which would otherwise be generated through coal-fired generators 
(Macintosh & Downie, 2006). Employing this metric, if wind were to supply the 
45,000 GWh of electricity which is projected to account for 20% of the electricity 
supply in 2020, wind power would displace approximately 42 million tonnes of CO2, 
which represents a 16% percent reduction of 2006 national CO2 emissions attributed 
to electricity generation. 
 
In symbiotic fashion, three notable developments have appeared in the policy sphere 
to indicate that a path is being created for encouraging greater uptake of wind power 
in Australia. First, over the past decade, Australia's state-owned electricity grids have 
been integrated to form a national grid (the NEM). Now, all regions except for the 
state of Western Australia and the Northern Territory have interconnected electricity 
grids (Owen, 2009). For wind energy, grid inter-connectivity delivers a number of 
notable benefits. For example, an interconnected electricity grid allows states to 
integrate higher levels of wind power without the risk of stochastic flows destabilizing 
the grid (Ackerman, 2005). It also allows wind farms to be geographically dispersed 
which further dampens the adverse effect of wind intermittency (Coppin, et al., 2003). 
Second, the market liberalization initiatives that accompanied grid inter-connection 
have significantly improved the prospects for wind energy developers to sell energy 




into the grid (Owen, 2009). Third, the RET artificially enhances market prospects by 
mandating enhanced purchases of electricity generated from renewable technologies. 
Given that a bill for a new CO2 emission trading scheme – the CPRS (Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme) – which the government sought to implement in 
conjunction with the RET was defeated in Parliament, the RET is currently the 
centerpiece of the government strategy to facilitate a transition to renewable energy. 
Accordingly, assessing the pros and cons of this legislation warrants further attention. 
 
8.3 EVALUATING THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET 
The Renewable Energy Target (RET) announced in August 2009 builds on the 
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) program of 2001 which aimed to 
encourage 9,500 GWh of electricity generation from renewable energy sources by 
2010 (Government of Australia, 2009e). This MRET target was pre-maturely achieved 
in 2006 (Kann, 2009). As mentioned earlier, the new RET aims to encourage 45,000 
GWh of electricity generation from renewable sources by 2020 and consolidates all 
existing state and territory renewable energy schemes into a single national scheme 
which significantly simplifies the planning process for renewable energy developers 
(COAG, 2009). Moreover, the 2009 amendment increases the penalty levied on 
electricity retailers who fail to reach their 20% quota of renewable electricity sales 
from AU$40 to AU$65 per MWh (Government of Australia, 2009g). This penalty is 
not tax deductible (Gerardi, et al., 2007); therefore, the punitive value of this penalty 
to the firm is approximately AU$90 per MWh (Government of Australia, 2009d), 
which serves as a robust incentive for electricity providers to meet their quotas. On the 
surface, the RET appears to be a bold initiative that places Australia’s climate change 
response efforts on equal footing as that of the EU, both aiming to ensure that 20% of 




electricity generated will be delivered via renewable energy technologies by 2020 
(Hindmarsh & Matthews, 2008). However, there are five specific features of the RET 
that indicate it may under-deliver both in terms of meeting its intended goal of 
facilitating 45,000 GWh of renewable energy generation and encouraging enhanced 
commercial viability of wind power.  
  
The first feature of concern is that the Electricity Act of 2000, upon which the RET is 
based, identifies hydro, wave, tidal, solar, geothermal, all forms of biomass and 
biofuels, landfill gas and "any other energy source prescribed by the regulations" as 
permissible sources of alternative energy (Government of Australia, 2000). The main 
reason why this is a problem for wind power developers relates to diminished 
opportunities for government support. The penultimate goal for wind power 
developers is to achieve wind power cost reductions of a magnitude that will render 
wind power to be an economically viable alternative when compared to coal-fired 
power. Although meeting this challenge will partly depend on R&D investments made 
by wind power systems manufacturers and operational improvements made by project 
developers, some of the requisite improvements involve innovations that can be 
considered to be public goods and should be supported by government funding. One 
prominent example is storage technology which, if improved, could eliminate 
concerns associated with stochastic wind power flows. Unfortunately, the formal 
process of listing so many permitted renewable energy technologies portends 
government intent to financially support all these technologies to a certain extent and 
with relatively fixed budgets this consequently implies diffused, less effective support 
programs. As a testament to the verity of this assertion, consider the AU$465 million 
in funding announced in 2009 under ―Renewables Australia‖ as part of the 




government’s Clean Energy Initiative. The stated focus of the program is on 
supporting emergent large-scale technologies, geothermal drilling and second 
generation biofuels R&D (Government of Australia, 2009a). Electricity storage 
research will likely receive very little support under this program. Meanwhile, carbon 
capture and sequestration research received commitments for AU$2 billion in new 
funding beginning in 2009 (Government of Australia, 2009a). When one considers 
that coal-fired power is the main technology that wind power needs to displace to 
enhance market presence and the funding disparity is approximately AU$2 billion 
between these two technologies, it is pretty clear which technology stands the best 
chance to post the greatest gains in technological innovation. If the RET prioritised 
two or three main utility-scale technologies, it is likely that funding support for wind 
power would be significantly higher than it is under the current RET scheme.   
  
A second feature of concern relates to the treatment of waste coal mine gas. When the 
government was designing the RET program, it did so under the assumption that the 
CPRS would also be passed and the RET would gradually be phased out. Under this 
assumption, the government agreed to a political concession to allow waste coal mine 
gas (WCMG) to be included in the RET as an ―eligible energy source‖ to differentiate 
it from the ―renewable energy sources‖. The concession allows WCMG-fired power 
plants to apply to obtain renewable energy credits (REC) for electricity generated 
using this fuel source. The government capped the number of RECs available to 
WCMG projects (at 425 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 2011 and 850 GWh every year 
from 2012-2020) and increased the aggregate RET by these amounts to avoid eroding 
the market for RECs attached to renewable energy projects (Government of Australia, 
2009b). Unfortunately, there is a flaw with this treatment of WCMG in the absence of 




a CPRS. WCMG is a by-product of the coal mining process. Accordingly, any 
wholesale price of captured WCMG that is above the marginal cost of capture 
represents additional profits to coal mining firms. In short, the policy as it now stands 
is a form of subsidy to coal mining firms which if passed on through the coal value 
chain represents an added incentive to enhance coal-fired power generation over 
another fuel source. It also incentivizes the commercialization of a technology that is 
far from a clean energy source because methane combusted for electricity generation 
produces CO2 emissions. This subsidy to WCMG power facilities along with a 
proposed AU$270 million ―Coal Sector Adjustment Fund‖ which the government 
proposes establishing within the Climate Change Action Fund to provide funding for 
coal sector abatement projects and capital grants (Government of Australia, 2009a), 
represents a level of financial assistant to a dirty energy source that should be taxed 
not subsidised.  
 
A third feature of concern related to the RET involves the duration of the program. As 
it stands now, the program is designed to expire in 2030 with annual targets fixed in 
the manner outlined in Table 8.2 (Government of Australia, 2009g). 
 
Table 8.2: Annual Generation Targets under Australia’s Renewable Energy Target 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021-2030
Annual Target 
(gigawatts hours) 12,500 14,400 16,300 18,200 20,100 22,000 26,600 31,200 35,800 40,400 45,000 45,000  
Source: Council of Australian Governments, 2009 
  
The renewable energy targets increase steadily over the first decade to reflect a 
cumulative increase in installed capacity. To illustrate, the annual target of 14,400 
GWh in 2011 conceptually consists of 12,500 GWh of pre-existing renewable energy 
generation and 1900 GWh of new generation to be added in 2011. Accommodation is 




made for adding annual generation up to 2020 when the annual target of 45,000 GWh 
of total generation is slated to be met. No additional generation has been targeted 
beyond 2020 because the CPRS was expected to be enacted at the same time as the 
RET and it was felt that emissions trading under the CPRS would become robust 
enough to level the technological playing field and render the RET moot (COAG, 
2008; Government of Australia, 2008b). Unfortunately the CPRS Bill was defeated in 
Parliament and this has significantly weakened the efficacy of the RET as originally 
planned. As it now stands, in the final 10 years of the RET program, there will be 
diminished incentive for electricity retailers to add additional renewable energy 
capacity beyond that which was established in the first ten-year period. Barring any 
post-2020 amendments to this target or the implementation of CO2 emission reduction 
policies, one can expect a significant drop-off in renewable energy growth once the 
target of 45,000 GWh of total generation is reached (cf. IEA, 2005). An additional 
complication arising from the manner in which the targets have been laid out over the 
20-year period is that there will likely be heavy competition amongst renewable 
energy developers in the first five years of the scheme because establishing renewable 
technology capacity in the early years of the program guarantees renewable energy 
developers a 15 to 20 year revenue flow. Such revenue certainty is irresistible to 
renewable energy developers who typically extend debt financing and amortize 
investments over 15-year periods (Gerardi, et al., 2007; Wizelius, 2007). Conversely, 
renewable energy developers bidding for the 4600 GWh of new electricity supply 
between 2019-2020 will only have 10 years of guaranteed revenue before the program 
expires. Consequently, assuming there is no emergent policy to regulate CO2 
emissions, one can anticipate reduced competition for renewable energy sales in the 
latter part of the program and; therefore, comparatively higher renewable sales prices. 




In short, the current structure of the RET works counter to the goal of encouraging an 
acceleration of renewable energy demand to support the economies of scale to 
facilitate further reductions in renewable energy prices. It supports the process half 
way and then allows the market to drop out. 
  
A fourth feature of concern relates to a multiplier scheme established to support small 
electricity generators. Essentially under this mechanism, renewable electricity credits 
produced by small-scale (rated output under 1500 KW) solar PV, solar thermal 
(water), wind and hydro electricity systems will be multiplied by a pre-established 
"multiplier" for electricity output as outlined in Table 8.3 (Government of Australia, 
2009g). Under this system, 10 MWh of electricity generated by an approved small-
scale technology will receive REC credit for 50 MWh of generation, thereby reducing 
the RET pool by that inflated amount. In short, the program creates ―phantom credits‖ 
that exaggerate the real amount of renewable electricity generated. Moreover, 
although this will catalyze robust sales in early years for solar thermal heaters and 
household-scale electricity generators, the added competition from small generators 
might be significant enough to impair the development of utility-scale renewable 
electricity projects during the 2010-2015 period, which is specifically when wind 
power and other larger utility-scale developments need to be initialized in order to 
provide 10 to 15-years of revenue to allow developers to profitably amortize 
investments.  
 
Table 8.3: Australia’s Multiplier System for Small Generation Units 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Onwards
Multiplier 5 5 5 4 3 2 No multiplier  
Source: Council of Australian Governments, 2009 




Finally, as a fifth feature of concern, the strategic decision to design a capped target 
system for renewable energy as opposed to offering renewable energy developers a 
feed-in subsidy or production tax credit for unlimited amounts of electricity generated 
is a questionable strategy if the goal is to nurture the emergence of a commercially-
viable domestic renewable energy industry. For wind power developers to be 
successful in any given market over a sustained period, two things must exist. First, 
the wind power developers must be able to make a profit in order to support the type 
of investment (i.e. capital investment, R&D initiatives, capacity expansion etc.) that is 
essential for reducing future costs and enhancing the long-term commercial viability 
of wind power. Second, revenue flows need to be cumulative, the current year’s 
revenues building on past years. This provides wind power developers with increasing 
economies of scale which further help reduce costs and further enhance the long-term 
commercial viability of wind power. Under a capped target system, especially one 
with relatively mild targets at the front end such as that exhibited by the RET, neither 
of these two criteria are likely to be met. First, wind power developers will see profits 
squeezed by heated competition in the early years (with small-scale solar thermal 
water heaters complicating the competitive mix); and therefore, wind developers will 
have diminished capacity to finance capital expenditures and other investments to 
stimulate cost reduction. Second, the capped target system disrupts revenue flow 
predictability and undermines strategic planning. Under the RET, unless there is a 
drastic change in market economies or additional policies to support a transition to 
renewable energy, it is likely that market demand for new renewable energy capacity 
will diminish in 2020. This means that established wind power firms that have gained 
momentum over 10 years of progressive revenue increases will suddenly find 




themselves mired in a contracting market with the bulk of revenue being provided by 
an asset base is gradually aging toward obsolescence. 
  
8.4 IMPROVING THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET 
Methods for improving the RET will differ depending on whether or not the CPRS is 
eventually enacted.  
 
If the CPRS which the Australian government proposed at the same time as the RET 
is eventually passed, the five weaknesses of the current RET which were outlined 
earlier would be offset by the benefits that a robust cap and trade regime could 
provide. First, the financial benefits to the coal industry that the waste coal mine gas 
(WCMG) subsidy provides would be significantly minimised if the WCMG project 
developers had to purchase CO2 emission permits and still generate WCMG-fired 
power at competitive rates. Second, the CPRS would level the competitive playing 
field between coal-fired power and wind power and enhance long-term revenue 
prospects for wind power that extend beyond the duration of the RET. Third, the small 
generator multiplier intended to give a boost to small-scale technologies would be less 
of a threat to wind power market development because the business lost to small-scale 
generators in early years would be compensated for through business taken away from 
carbon-intensive power plants in ensuing years as the electricity industry evolves in 
response to the positive market signals that a CPRS would convey. Finally, the cap of 
45,000 GWh would no longer be an issue of concern regarding progressive wind 
power market growth because the once the CPRS begins to reflect international values 
for CO2 emissions credits, wind power would become cost competitive and render the 




RET cap moot. In summary, under a scenario which includes enactment of the CPRS, 
the RET as it now stands is sufficient for supporting wind power development. 
  
Obviously, this presupposes that the CPRS would set annual emission ceilings at a 
level that would significantly alter the comparative costs of electricity sources. A 
weak cap and trade system would do little to level the competitive playing field in the 
manner necessary to provide wind developers with long-term market growth prospects. 
Indications are that the proposed CPRS is designed to be an aggressive program under 
which annual permits would be restricted over time to achieve the national 60% GHG 
reduction target (based on 2000 levels) by 2050 (Government of Australia, 2008b). A 
robust program of this type would substantially increase the overall cost of fossil fuel-
based electricity and significantly alter market dynamics. 
  
In a ―business as usual‖ scenario where the CPRS is not enacted, the RET is not 
currently sufficient to improve commercial viability of wind power. As such, all five 
of the weaknesses identified earlier need to be amended.  
 
First, if the goal is to wean the nation off a dependence on coal-fired electricity, the 
WCMG should not be eligible for RECs. Any part of the coal value chain that is 
subsidised in this way strengthens the economic case for continued reliance on coal-
fired power and makes it harder for utility-scale alternative electricity sources (such as 
wind power) to compete on a level basis. Already, alternative energy technologies 
face an uphill battle when competing against coal-fired electricity providers due to 
disproportional government support. For example, the coal sector benefits from two 
programs - COAL21 which is a 10-year, AU$1 billion public-private partnership 




program to finance research into reducing emissions from coal (Government of 
Australia, 2009d) and the CCS Flagship program which is a 9-year AU$2.4 billion 
program to support carbons capture and sequestration research (Government of 
Australia, 2009a) – while the main renewable energy support program under the Clean 
Energy Initiative provides just AU$465 million to be shared across numerous 
renewable energy technology platforms. If the release of methane from coal mines is a 
concern, flaring or capture for energy use should be regulated, not subsidized.  
  
Second, the government should consider formally extending the RET program to 
facilitate a measured expansion of installed renewable energy capacity from 2020 
onward in order to encourage the scale of transformation necessary to meet the 
government’s 2050 target of 60% GHG reduction (based on 2000 levels). Table 8.4 
provides a quantified recommendation in this context. If the targets outlined in Table 
8.4 were adopted, renewable power developers would have a high degree of financial 
certainly past the 2020 period and would be incentivized to make the investments 
necessary to aim for an entrenched market position beyond 2040. Although it can be 
argued that such long-term security can inadvertently encourage commercial apathy 
(Komor, 2004), Australia’s unique system of pooled bids for electricity ensures that 
even amongst renewable energy providers, a high degree of cost competition will 
ensue as firms vie for long-term market share leadership. The final target of 120,000 
GWh recommended in Table 8.4 would represent approximately 50% of Australia’s 
electricity supply and as such the dynamics of load balancing would very likely 
catalyze coordinated initiatives to expand wind power (the most commercially viable 
renewable technology) and geothermal power (the renewable technology that holds 
the most potential for providing peak load supply). Not only would the extension of 




the RET encourage the development of two technologies that are key to a carbon-free 
electricity sector, the achievement of the targets outlined in table 8.4 would place 
Australia firmly on track to achieving the 60% reduction on GHG emissions levels 
(based on 2000 emission levels) by 2050 (Government of Australia, 2008b) and 
position Australia to achieve the type of aggregate deep emission reductions (in the 
range of 80% from 1990 levels) that each nation will have to make to offset the worst 
impacts associated with global warming (IPCC, 2007a; Stern, 2006). Obviously, 
setting such bold wind power targets would benefit from advances in storage 
technology. Therefore, the government should consider ramping up funding support 
for storage technology research. This is arguably more sustainable use of the AU$2 
billion in government funding that has been earmarked for carbon capture and 
sequestration research (Government of Australia, 2009a) 
 
 
Table 8.4: Proposed Extended Renewable Energy Capacity Targets Post-2020 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Annual Target 
(GW hours) 12,500 14,400 16,300 18,200 20,100 22,000 26,600 31,200 35,800 40,400 45,000
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 - 2040
Extended Target 
(GW hours) 50,000 55,500 61,500 68,000 75,000 82,500 90,500 99,000 108,000 120,000 120,000
  
An additional benefit of extending renewable energy generation targets beyond the 
2020 period is that the new targets would mitigate the threat posed by the multiplier 
system for small-scale generators and negate the fourth concern associated with the 
current RET that a capped target system does not encourage long-term market 
investment. Although, under the proposed target extensions in Table 8.4 a cap is still 
in place, the cap comes into play far enough into the future to provide the long-term 
revenue guarantees (15 years +) necessary to entice wind power developments (after 
the incentivization of solar water heaters runs its course) and provides more time to 




allow research in renewable energy technology to yield the cost-saving innovations 
needed to compete without market support. 
  
In summary, the best approach for the government is to push for the enactment of the 
CPRS regime because this approach gives market mechanisms a chance to facilitate 
optimal market outcomes. However, in lieu of a CPRS, eliminating WCMG from the 
RET list of eligible energy sources and extending the RET targets to a 2040 target of 
120,000 GWh will enable wind power developers and other renewable energy 
developers to achieve the scale of activity necessary to support the type of radical 
transition that the nation acknowledges is necessary in the face of the threats posed by 
global warming (Government of Australia, 2009h) 
  
At the end of the day, it comes down to the political will and capacity of the new 
Labor government to fight the battles necessary to infuse the RET with the 
transformational impact it was intended to exhibit. In the absence of such political will, 
like so many other national governments in states where wind power is 
underperforming, it ends up being the governing party in Australia that is responsible 
for ―braking wind‖ in Australia. 





WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the impact that a federal government structure has on 
strategic selection of renewable energy policy instruments. The context for this study 
centres on wind power development in Canada. Canada is a nation that is blessed by 
all the attributes necessary to catalyze global leadership in installed wind power 
capacity. Unfortunately, the constitutional separation of powers that underpins 
Canada’s federal system impedes the creation of a national wind power development 
strategy because Canada’s provinces have constitutional authority over electricity 
governance. The insights gleaned from the case study are used to develop a conceptual 
framework for understanding the impact that federal structure has on policy 
instrument selection and efficacy under areas of federal, regional and concurrent 
policy jurisdiction. Finally, this framework is re-applied to identify specific 
approaches the Canadian federal government could take to resolve what currently 





Should policymakers facilitate renewable energy capacity development through 
distributive policies (i.e. subsidies), regulatory policies (i.e. CO2 emission caps), 
redistributive policies (i.e. carbon taxes) or constituent policies (i.e. green energy 
campaigns) (Lowi, 1972)? A preponderance of research has gone into addressing this 
question from various conceptual perspectives which include popular themes such as 
comparing the efficacy of various policy instruments (cf. Blakeway & White, 2005; 
EWEA, 2005; Lipp, 2007; Menza & Vachona, 2006), championing the efficacy of one 
specific instrument (cf. Mathews, 2008; Sorrell & Sijm, 2003), assessing the impact 
that socio-economic dynamics have on the selection or design of policy instruments 
(cf. Huang & Wu, 2009; Maruyama, et al., 2007), investigating policy instrument 




selection in stakeholder networks (cf. Mander, 2008; Rowlands, 2007), investigating 
hurdles to effective policy instruments implementation (cf. Alvarez-Farizo & Hanley, 
2002), and examining challenges associated with evaluating policy instrument 
efficacy (cf. Mallon, 2006; Vine, 2008).  
 
Despite the proliferation of studies on policy instruments in the renewable energy 
policy field, there are no prominent examples of studies which investigate the impact 
that the federal form of government has on strategic selection of policy instruments. 
Federal government systems are characterized by power-sharing between the central 
authority and the regions comprising the federation. For federal policymakers, the 
manner in which power is divided can pose significant policymaking problems 
(Thorlakson, 2003). Specifically, federal attempts to apply coercive policy instruments 
in policy areas of regional or concurrent (shared) authority can generate political, legal 
or operational resistance by regional authorities. Even when developing policy for 
areas under federal jurisdiction, regional authorities have to their avail various ―thrust 
and riposte‖ tactics to undermine the efficacy of disagreeable federal policies (Braun, 
Bullinger, & Walti, 2002). Given that there are 24 nations with a federal government 
structure (including the major economies of the United States, Germany, Canada, 
Australia, Russia, India, Spain, Brazil and Mexico), a formal enquiry into the impact 
that federal structure has on renewable energy policy instrument development is 
merited. 
 
This case study seeks to contribute to such enquiry by investigating the hurdles that 
one federal nation – Canada – faces in trying to propel wind power development 
through federal policies and provincial cooperation. The study will demonstrate why 




the application of policy instruments that are popularly used for facilitating renewable 
energy development such as carbon taxes, CO2 emission regulations, CO2 emission 
cap and trade systems, and renewable portfolio standards is tenuous under Canada’s 
federal structure. The insights gleaned from the case study will then be used to 
develop a conceptual framework for understanding the impact that federal structure 
has on policy instrument selection and efficacy. Lastly, this framework will be re-
applied to identify specific approaches the Canadian federal government could take to 
resolve what currently amounts to be a fragmented, ineffective approach to wind 
power development planning in order to demonstrate how such knowledge can be 
applied in a contextual setting.  
   
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 9.2 presents Canada's electricity 
profile and enumerates the importance of wind power development in Canada. Section 
9.3 provides data on installed wind power capacity in Canada and presents an 
argument that Canada is uniquely endowed with the assets necessary to achieve global 
leadership in wind power development, while Section 9.4 explains why such a goal 
would be desirable. Section 9.5 addresses some of the prominent but resolvable 
challenges to wind power development in Canada. Section 9.6 examines Canada's 
federal political structure and related obstacles in developing a national wind power 
development strategy. Section 9.7 draws the insights gleaned from Section 9.6 into a 
framework for conceptualizing the efficacy of different types of renewable energy 
policy instruments under the various jurisdictions of authority commonly found in a 
federal system (federal, regional and concurrent) and applies these insights to the 
search for a solution to facilitating a collaborative approach to optimize wind power 
development in Canada. Section 9.8 provides some concluding thoughts on the 




contribution this paper makes to better understanding the nexus between federal 
political structure and policy instrument design and implementation.  
 
9.2  CANADA’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
With the world’s 14th largest economy (CIA, 2009) and severe winter conditions in 
much of the country, it should come as no surprise that overall electricity consumption 
in Canada consistently ranks amongst the highest in the world. On a per capita basis, 
Canada’s highly affluent population (US$39,300 in per capita GNP (PPP) in 2008) of 
33 million people consumed on average 1,910 watts of electricity per hour (W/h), 
ranking 4
th
 highest in the world behind only Iceland (3,152 W/h), Norway (2,812 W/h) 
and Finland (1,918 W/h) (CIA, 2009). 
 
Canada's electricity grid is the sixth largest in the world, supported by 124,240 MW of 
total installed generation capacity, incorporating six generation technologies 
(Statistics Canada, 2009a).  As Table 9.1 indicates, Canada abounds in hydropower 
resources. In 2008, only China consumed more hydropower than Canada (BP, 2009).  
 
Table 9.1: Electrical Generation Capacity by Source in Canada in 2007 
  2007 % of total 
Hydro 73,435,687 59% 
Wind and tidal 1,600,399 1% 
Steam (mainly coal) 27,211,548 22% 
Nuclear 13,345,000 11% 
Internal combustion 593,480 0% 
Combustion turbine 8,054,193 6% 
TOTALS 124,242,314 100% 
(capacity in kilowatts)   
Data source: (Statistics Canada, 2009b) 
 




Despite an abundance of hydropower, Canada’s electricity carbon footprint is sizable 
due in large part to heavy reliance on fossil fuels for steam and combustion turbine 
electricity systems. Canada has a legal obligation under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce 
aggregate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 6% below 1990 levels. Yet, between 
1990 and 2006, Canada’s GHG emissions increased by 54.8% and CO2 emissions 
increased by 68.3% (including land use, land change and forestry) (UNFCCC, 2008). 
Since CO2 emissions represent a little over 70% of Canada’s GHG emissions 
(UNFCCC, 2008) and electricity generation represents the largest source of CO2 
emissions in Canada, reducing CO2 emissions in the electricity sector is an imperative 
element of Canada's climate change mitigation strategy.  
 
Ominously, as Table 9.2 portends, Canada’s CO2 emissions from electricity 
generation are not expected to improve much in the next 20-30 years. Although 
electricity generated from renewable sources (which includes hydropower) is expected 
to increase significantly, so is the amount of electricity generated by natural gas. 
Meanwhile, the amount of coal-fired electricity will remain virtually unchanged (EIA, 
2008b). If these projections are accurate, CO2 emissions associated with electricity 
generation will inevitably increase. 
 
Table 9.2: Electricity Consumption Projections in Canada by Fuel, 2005-2030 
(data in Quadrillion Btu) Projections  
Fuel source 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Avg. annual % 
change 
Liquids 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -2.8 
Natural gas 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.5 
Coal 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 0 
Nuclear 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 
Renewables 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.9 5.2 5.5 1.6 
Total 6.6 7.3 7.8 8.2 8.7 9.1 1.3 
Source: (EIA, 2008b). 




As Table 9.2 indicates, expansion of renewable and nuclear energy capacities by 
approximately 50% is expected by 2030. Although the growth estimate for renewable 
energy represents the progression of a growth trend that will likely continue for 
decades, expansion prospects for nuclear power in Canada face diminishing potential 
due to public opposition. A public opinion survey conducted in 2006 found that 3 of 4 
Canadians were opposed to nuclear power (Saint Consulting, 2007). Although Canada 
is a major supplier of uranium and Canada's CANDU nuclear reactor technology is 
marketed around the world, only three Canadian provinces – Ontario, New Brunswick 
and Québec (to a lesser extent) – have managed to sufficiently dispel public 
opposition to facilitate nuclear power plant development. Consequently, if Canada is 
to significantly reduce CO2 emissions associated with electricity generation, it will 
need to do so primarily by: 1) improving both supply and demand side electricity 
efficiency, 2) facilitating the transition from "dirty" fossil fuels (i.e. coal) to "cleaner" 
fossil fuels (i.e. natural gas, carbon capture and sequestration etc.), and 3) fostering 
expansion of non-fossil fuel electricity generation capacity. 
 
This study addresses the third policy challenge of fostering expansion of alternative 
energy capacity. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the challenge of enhancing wind 
power development in Canada due to the emergent commercial viability of wind 
power. Given the high cost of competing renewable energy technologies (such as solar 
PV, utility-scale solar thermal, and tidal energy), widespread opposition to nuclear 
power (Saint Consulting, 2007) and the increasing difficulty of establishing large-
scale hydropower projects due to opposition based on environmental concerns (IEA, 
2004b; Islam, Fartaj, & Ting, 2004), wind power exhibits the highest potential of all 




renewable energy sources to abate CO2 emissions associated with electricity 
generation over the short to medium terms. 
 
9.3  WIND POWER IN CANADA 
As Table 9.3 illustrates, the last five years has been a banner period in Canada for 
wind power developers. Since 2004, installed wind power capacity has increased 
nearly sevenfold. As of the end of 2008, Canada occupies 11
th
 position in the world in 
total installed wind power capacity (WWEA, 2009).  
 
Table 9.3: Canada`s Installed Wind Power Capacity 
Year Capacity (MW) Annual Growth 
2000 137 
 2001 198 45% 
2002 236 19% 
2003 322 36% 
2004 444 38% 
2005 684 54% 
2006 1460 113% 
2007 1770 21% 
2008 2369 34% 
2009 3022 28% 
Data source: Canada Wind Energy Association (www.canwea.ca) 
 
With only 10 other nations possessing higher installed wind power capacity than 
Canada, wind power development in Canada appears from a statistical perspective to 
be comparatively successful. However, comparing Canada's wind power potential to 
most other nations in the world is like comparing a Ferrari to a herd of horses in a 
street race. Canada is blessed by four unique attributes that position the nation to 
become the undisputed world leader in wind power capacity.  
 




First, Canada's huge tracts of undeveloped land could easily accommodate tens of 
thousands of wind turbines. It has been estimated that harnessing the wind potential of 
0.25% of Canada's landmass would generate enough electricity to meet Canada's total 
electrical demand (CanWEA, 2008b). As an illustration of its unbridled potential, 
Canada is 28 times larger than Germany, yet in 2008, Germany currently had 10 times 
more installed wind capacity than Canada which is a notable disparity in performance 
even after factoring in the higher population base in Germany (Pembina Institute, 
2008).  
 
Second, from east to west Canada stretches nearly 6,000 kms. This allows wind farms 
to be geographically dispersed to mitigate the threats posed by wind intermittency (Gil, 
Joos, DesLauriers, & Dignard-Bailey, 2006). Intermittency refers to the disruptive 
influence that sporadic lulls and gusts of wind have on the consistent generation of 
electricity (Ackerman, 2005). Geographic dispersal smoothes the aggregate power 
fluctuations from wind turbines because when wind is not blowing in one province, it 
is blowing in another (Wizelius, 2007).  
 
Third, as outlined earlier, 59% of all electricity generated in Canada comes from 
hydropower. Hydropower is an ideal complement to wind power because it can 
expediently compensate for power fluctuations arising from the intermittency of wind 
(Boyle, et al., 2004; Gil, et al., 2006).  
 
Fourth, Canada's only land-connected neighbor, the United States, is also the world's 
largest consumer of electricity, with demand for electricity expected to increase by 
39% between 2005 and 2030 (IEA, 2008c). Canada is already the United States’ 




foremost supplier of electricity. In 2007, exports of electricity to the United States via 
established cross-border transmission conduits amounted to 25,310 GW worth over 
C$3.2 billion (Statistics Canada, 2009a). Given that the US faces enormous costs just 
to upgrade existing transmission and distribution networks and replace aging 
generation facilities (Sovacool, 2008a), the likelihood that the US will seek increased 
imports of Canadian electricity in the future is high. For Canadian wind power 
generators, the US electricity market provides nearly exclusive access to an expanding 
market opportunity.  
 
The combination of these four factors gives Canada an incomparable national 
competitive advantage in harnessing wind power. In fact, it is conceivable that if the 
Canadian authorities were to adopt an aggressive approach to developing wind power, 
as much as 40% of Canada's electricity needs could be provided by wind power. 
Denmark, which has considerably less hydropower capacity than Canada, has already 
proven that wind penetration levels of up to 40% of total system demand can be cost-
effectively managed (Gil, et al., 2006) and is aiming for 50% wind power penetration 
by 2030 (Ackermann & Soder, 2002). The implication of targeting a 40% contribution 
from wind power is that in conjunction with Canada’s high capacity in hydropower 
(currently 59% of total generation capacity) and initiatives intended to improve 
electricity utilization efficiency, Canada could conceivably eliminate virtually all CO2 
emissions from the electricity generation process.    
 




To meet a 40% target by 2040, approximately 130,000 MW of installed wind power 
capacity would be required
12
. This represents a many fold increase over the current 
installed capacity of 2,775 MW. Assuming that the rated capacity of the average 
installed wind turbine were 2 MW, meeting the 40% target would require the 
installation of approximately 65,000 turbines.  
 
Although 65,000 turbines seems a vast amount, it is useful to recall that at the turn of 
the 20th century, it is purported that at least 600,000 were used for farm irrigation 
across North America (Ackermann & Soder, 2002; CanWEA, 2008a). Obviously a 
modern-day utility scale wind turbine is significantly more complicated and more 
aesthetically invasive than the windmills that were built in the 1900s. However, the 
amount of land required to accommodate a modern turbine is not significantly greater 
than that required for 20th-century windmills. The challenge would be daunting but it 
would not be unprecedented. 
 
9.4  THE MERITS OF LEADERSHIP IN WIND POWER  
For every reason why Canada could attain global leadership in wind power 
development, there is an equally salient incentive to do so. First, in response to the 
increasing certitude of missing its original Kyoto Protocol emission reduction target, 
the Canadian government has recently announced revised targets. It now aims to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 20% below 2006 levels by 2020 (which equates to 
                                                 
12
 This estimate is based on the following calculation: The Energy Information Administration in the 
US estimates that Canadian electricity demand will increase by 40% by 2040, given current trends (EIA, 
2008b). Therefore, total electricity demand will be 617,469 GWh (2007 electricity production 
according to Statistics Canada) x 1.4 = 864,457 GWh. A 40% contribution from wind power amounts 
to 864,457 GWh x 0.4 = 345,782 GWh. To find the amount of installed wind power capacity required 
given a 30% capacity load factor the calculation is: (((Yearly Demand / Days in a Year) / Hours in a 
Day) / capacity load factor) = (((345,782 GWh / 365) / 24) / 0.3) = 131,576 MW of installed wind 
power capacity required. 




24% above 1990 levels) and 60-70% below 2006 levels by 2050 (which equates to 39-
54% below 1990 levels) (Government of Canada, 2009). Without significantly 
reducing CO2 emissions associated with the electricity sector, achieving even these 
more lenient targets will be very unlikely, especially since trends indicate that the 
demand for electricity will increase by over 40% between now and 2040.  
 
Second, employment and economic opportunities in the wind power sector eclipse 
similar opportunities attributed to the traditional power sector. Currently, a little over 
75,000 people are employed by Canada's electricity utilities (Statistics Canada, 2009a). 
This represents 0.60 jobs per MW of installed capacity. Conversely, extrapolating 
from estimates based on global wind power industry employment statistics, if 20% of 
Canada's electricity were produced by wind power, at least 52,000 new jobs would be 
created (CanWEA, 2008b). This equates with 2.09 jobs per MW of installed capacity; 
over twice the rate of employment in the traditional power sector. In terms of 
economic opportunities, evidence from countries such as Germany, Denmark and 
Spain indicate that large-scale development of wind power catalyze business 
opportunities in the manufacture of turbines, turbine towers, rotor blades, castings, 
forgings, nacelle assemblies and nacelle covers. Furthermore many of these 
employment opportunities are in value-added production (CanWEA, 2008b).  
 
Third, the North America power grid represents an underutilized market opportunity. 
The combination of blossoming demand in the US for clean energy, a dearth of 
alternative energy capacity in the US (Sovacool, 2008a), a favourable trade agreement 
(NAFTA) and a shared border that extends 6,416 km (CIA, 2009), positions Canada to 
establish a whole new service industry of generating and distributing "clean" energy to 




the US. Economic benefits alluded to in the previous paragraph could be significantly 
accentuated by exploiting this market opportunity. 
 
Fourth, although Canada is rich in fossil fuel and uranium energy resources, these 
resources are finite and have the potential to contribute significantly to global 
warming. Canada’s proven oil reserves are estimated to be 179 billion barrels 
(including 173 billion barrels of oil sands), which places Canada second only to Saudi 
Arabia in terms of total oil reserves (Alberta Provincial Government, 2008). However, 
extraction and utilization of oil from tar sands emits levels of CO2 which compare 
closer to coal than oil on a kWh basis. Liming and colleagues estimate (2008) that at 
current rates of production, oil reserves excluding tar sands will be depleted in 158 
years. Natural gas reserves which amounted to 56.1 trillion cubic feet in 2005 will be 
depleted in less than a decade at current rates of production (Liming, et al., 2008). In 
coal, Canada has an estimated 7.3 billion short tons of recoverable reserves, enough to 
last 100 years at current production rates (Liming, et al., 2008). For the Canadian 
government to assert that it also has the interests of future generations of Canadians in 
mind, the current pace at which fossil fuel reserves are being drawn down needs to be 
attenuated. When an opportunity exists to produce similar quantities of energy through 
wind power, the current pace of fossil fuel resource utilization is both myopic and 
irresponsible.  
 
Fifth, the extensive environmental and health costs associated with fossil fuel 
combustion can be largely mitigated by a wide-scale transition to carbon-free 
electricity generation. The Ontario Medical Association estimated that health 
problems in the late 1990s stemming from pollution attributed primarily to power 




generation annually cost Ontario C$1 billion and contribute to over 1900 deaths 
(Rowlands, 2007).  
 
Sixth, significantly enhancing wind power capacity represents one way for Canada's 
government to mitigate a mounting nuclear waste storage dilemma. Given that nuclear 
power is one of the only utility-scale, carbon-reduced alternatives to wind power, 
there will be increasing pressure to build more nuclear power plants in order to abate 
CO2 emissions. Unfortunately, this would be a mistake that shifts the burden of 
nuclear waste management to future generations of Canadians. Currently, in the 
absence of long-term storage facilities, over two million 24-kilogram bundles of 
highly-radioactive used fuel (enough to fit into 6 ice hockey rinks) generated since the 
1950s by Canada's nuclear power plants are stored on an ―interim basis‖ at six nuclear 
facilities (NWMO, 2008). Although Canada is a geographically sizable nation, the 
safe management and storage of nuclear waste poses tremendous technological and 
economic challenges (Winfield, Jamison, Wong, & Czajkowski, 2006).  
 
In summary, not only does Canada exhibit tremendous potential for large-scale wind 
power development, there are significant international, political, economic and 
environmental reasons to exploit this potential. Given these observations, the salient 
question is: What is impeding wind power development in Canada? 
 
9.5  WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN CANADA 
In Canada, as in most countries, cost is the critical element that stymies wind power 
expansion because external costs associated with fossil fuel generation are not 
internalized. In 2005, the average cost of electricity generated ranged between C$47 




and C$70 per MWh (Canadian Electricity Association, 2006). Conversely, the 
Canadian Wind Energy Association (2006) estimated that the cost of generating wind 
power in 2006 ranged between C$70 and C$100 per MWh. Until wind power 
generation costs decline or externalities associated with fossil fuel combustion are 
internalized, government subsidies and support becomes essential for wind power 
expansion. Unfortunately, the most significant federal subsidy has been a production 
subsidy of C$10 per MWh (Guha, Soloumah, & Kar, 2005), which is too low to 
bridge the cost differential. By and large, due to this low federal subsidy, wind power 
expansion in Canada has been driven notably by provincial government mandated 
renewable energy purchase initiatives which are both temporally and provincially 
inconsistent (Guha, et al., 2005). 
 
If legislative authority over electricity governance in Canada were centralized, a 
number of widely-heralded policy instruments could be applied to facilitate wind 
power development. For example, carbon taxes could be levied to bridge the cost 
differential between fossil fuel-generated power and wind power. Alternatively, 
utilities could be compelled to gradually increase the amount of electricity generated 
by renewable technologies through regulatory policy and/or cap and trade systems (cf. 
Komor, 2004). Provinces that have high levels of hydropower could be forced to inter-
connect with other provinces that do not have an abundance of hydropower in order to 
provide inexpensive, clean electricity back-up to compensate for power intermittency 
issues associated with wind. Unfortunately, as the next section will explain, Canada’s 
legislative authority over electricity governance is not centralized.  
 




9.6  POLITICAL POWER AND ELECTRICITY GENERATION  
9.6.1 Who Holds the Power? 
Canada is a federation of 10 provinces and three territories. Historically, the need for a 
federal system of government in Canada stemmed from the challenge of unifying the 
culturally disparate regions of Anglophone-dominated Ontario and Francophone-
dominated Québec. A federal system fit the challenge because it provides citizens of 
disparate regions with more autonomous representation while at the same time 
providing centralized government services which help to tie the regions together 
(Thorlakson, 2003). To this day, many political experts in Canada would agree with 
the contention that Canada's "separation of powers" has played a vital role in 
preventing national breakup (Wimmer, 2007). 
 
Canada's Constitution, which consists of the Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982, 
divides political power between the federal government and provincial legislatures. In 
total, provincial legislatures were granted exclusive authority over 16 areas (Baier, 
2005) including natural resources and electricity generation, which is explicated in 
Table 9.4. As a result, Canada does not have a national electricity generation strategy 
(Liming, et al., 2008); rather, Canada's electricity generation strategy is an 
amalgamation of strategic decisions made at the provincial level. 
 
Table 9.4: Section 92A(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 
In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to 
a)  exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province; 
b)  development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources 
and forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation to the rate of 
primary production therefrom; and 
c)  development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province 
for the generation and production of electrical energy. 
Source: Canada Constitution Act 1867 / 1982 




9.6.2 Impediments to Collaborative Wind Power Development Strategy 
The aggregate national data on electricity generation in Canada presented earlier, fails 
to convey just how disparate the provincial approaches are to electricity generation 
and how complicated the task of developing a collaborative wind power development 
strategy would be. Table 9.5 summarizes the sources of electricity employed in each 
province.  
 
Table 9.5: Sources of Electricity Generation by Canadian Utilities and Industry and 
Percentage of Provincial Electricity Mix in 2007 (dominant sources in boxes) 
Total Megawatt 





Newfoundland & Labrador 41,583,313             96% 0% 3% 0% 0% 1%
Prince Edward Island 44,732                      0% 89% 12% 0% 0% -1%
Nova Scotia 12,574,042             7% 1% 89% 0% 0% 2%
New Brunswick 17,638,847             16% 0% 49% 23% 0% 12%
Quebec 191,962,098           94% 0% 1% 2% 0% 2%
Ontario 158,234,410           22% 0% 22% 50% 2% 4%
Manitoba 34,402,502             97% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0%
Saskatchewan 20,574,449             21% 3% 69% 0% 0% 6%
Alberta 67,432,359             3% 1% 74% 0% 1% 21%
British Columbia 71,833,012             89% 0% 7% 0% 0% 3%
Yukon 354,694                   93% 0% 0% 0% 7% 0%
Northwest Territories 686,252                   36% 0% 0% 0% 43% 20%
Nunavut 148,881                   0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0%  
Data source: (Statistics Canada, 2009a) 
 
As Table 9.5 implies, the compulsion to embrace wind power to mitigate CO2 
emissions associated with electricity generation will vary greatly from province to 
province. Four provinces and one territory derive the vast majority of electricity from 
hydropower while another province (Prince Edward Island-PEI) generates most of its 
electricity from wind and tidal power. The carbon footprint of electricity generation in 
these regions is low. Conversely, four provinces generate most electricity through 
coal-fired steam power plants and two territories generate the majority of their power 
from fossil fuel internal combustion systems. These six regions – Alberta in 
particular – exert a disproportionately high carbon footprint. Finally, Ontario, which is 
Canada's most populated province, generates half of its electricity through nuclear 
power. Although it has plans to phase out coal-fired power (partly through a more 




aggressive approach toward supporting wind power), it currently exhibits a high 
carbon footprint due to extensive use of coal-fired power.  
 
Table 9.5 also shows that some provinces are in a technologically superior position to 
adopt high levels of wind power. Labrador, Québec, Manitoba and British Columbia 
have high levels of installed hydropower capacity which is conducive to supporting 
high levels of wind power. The other provinces which predominantly utilize either 
high levels of coal-fired power or nuclear power would likely need to either rely on 
inter-provincial grid connections or bolster reserve capacity to incorporate levels of 
wind power in excess of 20% (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006). Fortuitously, these six 
provinces all have established transmission line connections with other provinces 
(National Energy Board, 2004). The challenge lays in encouraging hydropower rich 
provinces to share their back-up capacity and bolster inter-provincial connections to 
create a more resilient power grid. 
 

















Data source: (Statistics Canada, 2009a) 
 




Disparate provincial electricity market structures and on-going liberalization programs 
also complicate collaboration. As Figure 9.1 illustrates, electricity sectors in three 
Canadian provinces (PEI, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Alberta) are dominated by private 
suppliers while electricity sectors in the remaining provinces and territories are 
dominated by public utilities. Collaboration would require private ―profit seeking‖ 
firms to work with public utilities that are often guided by a broader set of priorities 
(National Energy Board, 2004).  
 
To compound the challenge, all 10 of Canada's provinces now have initiatives to 
encourage electricity market liberalization (Table 9.6). Not only are markets in flux 
very difficult to coordinate; market fragmentation, which is often ineluctably bound to 
market liberalization, increases the number of stakeholders that must be consulted 
when forming a collaborative strategy. Achieving consensus becomes more difficult 
with a greater number of stakeholders (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
 
Table 9.6: Electricity Market Liberalization Status by Canadian Province 
Province Market Status Regulator Interconnections 
Alberta Wholesale and retail open 
access; Functional separation  
Energy and Utilities 









Alberta, Washington state 
Manitoba Wholesale open access; 
Functional separation  
Province of Manitoba 
and Public Utilities 
Board 
Saskatchewan, Ontario, 
North Dakota, Minnesota 
New 
Brunswick 
2003 Transmission wholesale 
& industrial retail open access  
Provincial 
Government 




Energy policies under review Commissioners of 
Public Utilities 
Québec 
Nova Scotia New energy policy imminent 
in 2002 
Utility Review Board New Brunswick 
Ontario Wholesale and retail open 
access; Corporate separation 
of generation, transmission 
and system control functions 
Ontario Energy 
Board 
Québec, Manitoba, New 
York, Michigan, 
Minnesota 
Prince Edward Distribution network only PEI Regulatory & New Brunswick 




Island Appeals Commission  
Québec Wholesale open access; 
Functional separation 
Régie de l’énergie Newfoundland, New 
Brunswick, Ontario, New 
England, New York 




Alberta, Manitoba, North 
Dakota 
Sources: Canadian Electric Association (www.canelect.ca) and National Energy Board (2004) 
 
As the list of transmission interconnections in Table 9.6 implies, the importance of 
electricity as a trade commodity also differs by province. Some provinces earn 
substantial export revenues from inter-provincial and cross-border trade in electricity. 
As Table 9.7 details, inter-provincial export of electricity is of significant economic 
importance to the province of Newfoundland & Labrador. Similarly, New Brunswick, 
Québec, Ontario, and Manitoba posted sizable trade surpluses with the United States 
in electricity in 2007. These five provinces would exhibit considerable sensitivity in 
response to any attempt by federal authorities to restrict or redirect electricity trade. 
On the other hand, all provinces have inter-provincial electricity connections and six 
of the 10 provinces have cross-border electricity connections with states in the US 
(National Energy Board, 2004) which implies that initiatives to bolster trade in 
electricity would be generally well-received.  





Other Provinces Imported from US Exported to US
Newfoundland and Labrador 16,947 30,096,817 0 0
Prince Edward Island 1,160,935 0 0 0
Nova Scotia 280,597 27,303 62,917 30,634
New Brunswick 1,466,014 1,556,758 641,755 1,780,259
Quebec 33,966,926 3,558,708 3,355,838 15,711,988
Ontario 3,711,520 4,501,487 7,070,359 11,089,756
Manitoba 173,568 1,782,187 534,285 11,092,806
Saskatchewan 1,031,828 840,178 203,343 391,579
Alberta 1,781,495 1,208,616 222,902 154,748
British Columbia 1,101,312 1,119,088 7,288,705 4,438,820
Yukon 0 0 0 0
Northwest Territories 0 0 0 0
Nunavut 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 44,691,142 44,691,142 19,380,104 44,690,590  
Data source: (Statistics Canada, 2009a) 




Overall, this analysis of provincial electricity markets should make it abundantly clear 
that provinces view electricity strategies from widely varying perspectives. This 
implies that seeking voluntary provincial collaboration on wind power development 
would likely be fraught with disagreement over strategic objectives of such 
collaboration. At the very least, this analysis tells us that voluntary collaboration based 
on an appeal to one shared strategic vision (i.e. reduction of CO2 emissions, expansion 
of electricity exports etc.) will likely be unsuccessful.  
  
9.6.3 Wind Power Development in the Provinces 
It should come as no surprise given the varied nature of the electricity profiles in each 
province that installed wind power capacity also varies significantly by province (see 
Table 9.8). Intriguingly, three provinces - Ontario, Québec and Alberta - currently 
boast 80% of Canada’s total installed wind power capacity.  
 
Table 9.8: Canadian Wind Power Capacity by Province 
(in MW as of June 2009)
Installed Capacity % of Canada Total
Newfoundland and Labrador 54.40 2.0%
Prince Edward Island 72.40 2.6%
Nova Scotia 59.30 2.1%






British Columbia 0.00 0.0%
Yukon 0.81 0.0%
Northwest Territories 0.00 0.0%
Nunavut 0.00 0.0%
TOTALS 2,775 100.0%  
Data source: Canada Wind Energy Association (www.canwea.ca) 
 




Wind power success in Ontario, Québec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan highlights a 
historical affinity for request for proposal (RFP) and other mandatory purchase 
initiatives as the prime instrument for driving growth. Ontario's mandatory purchase 
initiatives were the most ambitious of the bunch, driven by severe public pressure to 
mitigate reliance on coal-fired and nuclear powered energy (Rowlands, 2007). The 
main drawback to mandatory purchase initiatives is that development depends on the 
willingness of provincial authorities to mandate wind power purchases. Overall, this 
approach fails to optimize wind power development because investment decisions are 
influenced more by the financial capacity of the provincial government or provincial 
electricity consumers to support such investment, rather than basing investment 
decisions on strategic investment criteria.
13
 Moreover, with each province pursuing 
standalone RFP wind power procurement programs, synergies from inter-provincial 
cooperation are often sub-optimized. 
 
It is worth noting that of the four provinces that have the capacity to foster the highest 
levels of wind power due to dominant hydropower capacities (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Québec, Manitoba and British Columbia), only Québec has made 
significant inroads in this regard - although initiatives are currently unfolding in 
British Columbia and to a lesser extent in Manitoba (see Table 9.9). The slow uptake 
of wind power in these three high-potential provinces can arguably be attributed in 
part to hydropower induced Dutch Disease displayed by the respective provincial 
electricity planning authorities that understandably are less motivated to add higher 
                                                 
13
 Given these concerns, it is noteworthy that Ontario's RFP program has recently been replaced by a 
new feed-in tariff (FIT) program, which is North America's first guaranteed pricing program for 
renewable energy development. The FIT program substantively offers between C$130-$190 per MWh 
for electricity generated by wind power (NUS Consulting, 2009). Barring further policy developments 
in other provinces, this program will very likely widen Ontario's lead in wind power development. 




priced wind power to electricity grids that already exhibit comparatively low carbon 
footprints.   
 
The points put forth in the previous two paragraphs highlight an unsettling truth about 
electricity planning in Canada. The provinces are akin to electricity fiefdoms. As such, 
success or failure of wind power development programs is dependent on malleable 
provincial government renewable energy policies.  
 
Table 9.9: Canadian Provincial Initiatives on Wind Energy 
(Updated June 2009) 




Government aims to achieve energy 
self-sufficiency by 2016. 50% of 
new generation to come from clean 
energy sources (no specific wind 
energy target). 
325 MW of wind energy contracts in place. 
BC Hydro Call for Clean Power in 2008 
sought 5,000 GWh and received 17,000 GWh 
in bids. 
Awarding of contracts expected by July 2009 
Alberta  
 
No provincial target. Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO) 
has applied to build new transmission 
infrastructure to accommodate up to 3000 
MW of wind generation in Southern Alberta.  
Saskatchewan  Provincial energy plan seeks to 
have 300 MW of wind energy in 
Saskatchewan by 2011. 
171 MW currently in place. Preliminary 
results of wind integration study by 
SaskPower expected early summer 2009. 
Manitoba  
 
Manitoba Government seeking 
1000 MW of wind energy by 2016. 
 
Currently 104 MW in place. In 2007, 
Manitoba Hydro launched a RFP process for 
an additional 300 MW of wind. Resulting 
contracts have yet to be finalized. 
Ontario  
 
The Ontario Power Authority’s 
Integrated Power System Plan 
called for 4,600 MW of wind 
energy by 2020. IPSP is currently 
being reviewed, following a 
Ministerial directive. 
New Green Energy Act was 
announced in March 2009. The Act 
was passed on May 14 2009, and is 
awaiting proclamation (expected in 
summer 2009). 
 
964 MW currently in place, with almost 400 
MW of additional wind energy projects 
currently under construction. In January 
2009, OPA announced contracts for six new 
wind energy projects in Ontario totaling 492 
MW. The Green Energy Act puts in place a 
new feed-in tariff procurement process, and a 
streamlined environmental assessment 
process. The intent of the GEA is to create 
certainty & stability for wind energy 
development in Ontario. 
Quebec  
 
Quebec Government seeking 4,000 
MW of wind energy by 2015. 
531 MW currently in place and nearly 3,500 
MW contracted. 500 MW of new Requests 
for Proposals for First Nations / Municipal 
wind projects was issued April 30, 2009. 







NB Power seeking 400 MW of 
wind energy by 2016. 
96 MW currently in place. 300 MW of 
additional contracts announced in 2008. 
Source: Canada Wind Energy Association (www.canwea.ca) 
 
Table 9.9 summarizes the different levels of commitment to developing wind power in 
the major provinces. Ontario and Québec are on track to fortify the leadership 
positions they've established in wind power capacity installation, British Columbia has 
unveiled more aggressive policies to support wind power development, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba and New Brunswick have adopted rather flaccid mandatory purchase 
programs and Alberta is set to experience an amplified level of wind power 
installation, driven by private interests attracted to Alberta’s liberal electricity sector. 
 
In terms of federal support for wind power development, it is worth noting that 
initiatives to date have been largely peripheral. In 2002, the federal government 
launched a Wind Power Production Initiative (WPPI) which offers a comparatively 
minor financial subsidy to wind power developers (guaranteed over 10 years of the 
approved project) of C$12 per MWh for projects approved between 1 April 2002 and 
31 March 2003, C$10 per MWh for projects approved between 1 April 2003 and 31 
March 2006 and C$8 per MWh for projects approved between 1 April 2006 and 31 
March 2007. However, funding for this program was terminated prematurely in 2006 
to give way to the C$1.5 Billion ecoENERGY for Renewable Power program which 
provides a similar productive incentive of C$10 per MWh over a ten-year period for 
all eligible renewable energy projects commissioned between April 1, 2007 and 
March 31, 2011 (IEA Global Renewable Energy Database, 2009).
14
 Additionally, 
special tax regulations allow wind power developers to accelerate write-offs of capital 
                                                 
14
 International Energy Agency Global Renewable Database, Accessed on 22 November 2009 at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/?mode=re&action=detail&id=3829 




equipment (Liming, et al., 2008). Overall, given the average electricity cost data 
outlined earlier, one can conclude that the federal subsidies have been too small to 
make wind power a commercially attractive investment in most parts of Canada. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the mandatory purchase initiatives of the provincial 
governments have had the strongest influence in catalyzing wind power development. 
 
If all of the provincial plans come to fruition, Canada will have approximately 16,000 
MW of installed wind power capacity (4,800 MW of average output capacity, 
assuming a 30% capacity load factor) by 2015/16. Based on total installed electricity 
generation capacity in 2007 of 124,242 MW, this would represent approximately 3.8% 
of total output capacity. Although this would be an improvement over the current 
situation, it falls well short of the high levels of wind power output capacity that 
Canada should be targeting. 
 
In order to optimize the country’s wind power potential, a much higher degree of 
inter-provincial coordination will be necessary for three key reasons. First, a high 
degree of spatial coordination is required in order to optimize geographic dispersion of 
wind farms for the purpose of reducing the disruptive influence of wind intermittency. 
Second, electricity transmission and distribution needs to be more actively integrated 
to enhance national grid stability. Integration allows provinces that lack hydropower 
capacity to install higher levels of wind power by tapping into the hydropower 
peaking reserves of neighbouring provinces. Third, by more effectively coordinating 
transmission and distribution between Canadian and American electricity grids, 
Canadian power authorities could further stabilize grid operation despite incorporating 
high levels of wind power.  




9.6.4 What is Impeding Provincial Collaboration? 
Consider for a moment what a transition from fossil fuel electricity generation to wind 
power means for a province like Alberta which currently derives 95% of its electricity 
from locally extracted fossil fuels. By tapping into cheap domestic fossil fuel supplies, 
residents and industries in the province enjoy electricity prices that are amongst the 
lowest in the world (NUS Consulting, 2007). If the provincial government were 
somehow compelled to incorporate 40% wind power into the electricity mix, the 
average cost of electricity would increase due to the comparably high cost of wind 
power. This would displease voters and make it more expensive for electricity-
intensive industries to operate in Alberta. The only way the Albertan government 
could offset higher energy costs is by providing a subsidy to the utilities. In short, a 
shift to wind power would contribute to the federal goal of reducing CO2 emissions 
but from the perspective of the Albertan government (and other fossil fuel rich 
provincial governments), it would adversely impact economic conditions. Under such 
circumstances, a savvy Albertan government would likely demand some sort of 
federal transfer payment to accept such an economically disadvantageous policy. 
 
In Canada, without the authority to force provinces to collaborate to optimize wind 
power development, the federal government would be compelled to offer coercive 
incentives to Alberta (or any other fossil fuel rich province) to engender cooperation. 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that Canada's federal government, which is already 
wrestling with a deficit of over C$50 billion, could muster the public support for a 
policy of compensating fossil fuel rich provinces for playing a role in abating national 
CO2 emissions (Curren, 2009). This dilemma, therefore, raises a critical question: Is 
there anything the federal government can do to force provincial collaboration? 




9.6.5 Influencing Provincial Energy Policy (in Theory) 
Constitutionally, there are at least four strategies that the federal government could 
attempt to apply in order to coerce provinces to collaborate on the development of a 
unified wind power development strategy. For starters, under Section 92A(3) of the 
Constitution Act of 1867, the authority granted to the provinces over the exportation 
of electricity is constitutionally subject to federal approval (Government of Canada, 
1867 / 1982). Moreover, Section 91(2) of the Constitution gives the federal 
government authority over the regulation of trade and commerce (Government of 
Canada, 1867 / 1982). Together, these two authorities give the federal government a 
theoretical right to bar provinces from exporting electricity pending provincial 
cooperation. As a second alternative, the federal government could theoretically 
establish export quotas or levy taxes on electricity exports in any manner it sees fit 
because the Constitution also gives the federal government authority to raise funds 
through taxation of any form  (Section 91(3)) (Government of Canada, 1867 / 1982).  
 
Third, Section 132 of the Constitution bestows the federal government of Canada with 
―all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any 
Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising 
under Treaties‖ (Government of Canada, 1867 / 1982). The implication of this power 
is that the federal government has authority to compel provincial legislatures to 
comply with programs designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as per Canada's 
obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Finally, Section 91 of the Constitution bestows the federal government with all 
authorities which are not expressly allocated to the provinces (residual powers) 




(Government of Canada, 1867 / 1982). One highly relevant residual power is the 
federal government's authority over trans-provincial environmental governance. The 
federal government has a right to pass legislation which regulates trans-boundary 
pollution. Presumably, this includes passage of laws to regulate harmful emissions 
associated with electricity generation.  
 
The current legislation that governs trans-boundary environmental issues is known as 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (CEPA). CEPA authorizes the 
government to regulate products controlling toxic substances and prevent the release 
of potentially dangerous substances. Given the perilous nature of global warming, 
CO2 emissions should theoretically fall into the category of ―dangerous substances‖. 
However, as of 2007, neither authority has been exercised. CEPA also authorizes the 
government to require industries to submit pollution prevention plans; but as of 2007, 
only seven such notices have been issued (Government of Canada, 2007). This then 
begs the question: Given the theoretical powers that the federal government has to 
coerce provinces to collaborate on a unified energy policy, what is preventing this 
from happening? 
 
9.6.6 Influencing Provincial Energy Policy (in Practice) 
In practice, any federal government attempt to use its constitutional powers to 
influence provincial behaviour can be thwarted by provincial counter-strategies. Four 
illustrative counter-strategies will be examined in this section.  
 
First and foremost, the courts would likely overturn federal policies that can be shown 
to infringe on constitutionally-granted provincial authorizes (Baier, 2005), such as 




section 92A(1) of the Constitution which grants authority to provinces to exclusively 
make laws in relation to… development, conservation and management of sites and 
facilities in the province for the generation and production of electrical energy. This 
implies that policy tools that are commonly used to facilitate development of 
renewable energy – taxing CO2 emissions, taxing electricity generated by fossil fuel 
sources, requiring utilities to incorporate specified amounts of renewable energy, 
placing regulatory limits on CO2 emissions – could all be subject to legal challenges 
by provincial authorities as constituting an infringement on provincial sovereignty 
over electricity generation.  
 
Second, even if legal attempts to demonstrate an infringement on provincial authority 
were unsuccessful, Part 3, Section 36 of the Constitution Act of 1982 provides other 
avenues of provincial recourse (Table 9.10) 
 
Table 9.10: Part 3, Section 36 of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982 
Commitment to promote equal opportunities: 
36. (1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial 
legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative 
authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada 
and the provincial governments, are committed to  
(a)  promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; 
(b)  furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and 
(c)  providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians. 
 
Commitment respecting public services: 
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of 
making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient 
revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably 
comparable levels of taxation. 
Source: Canada Constitution Act 1867 / 1982 
 




The two provisions embedded within Section 36 provide at least two potential 
constitutional grounds for challenging federal policy instruments aimed at influencing 
provincial energy policy. Section 36(1) compels the federal government to ensure 
"equal opportunities" and to "reduce disparity in opportunities". Provinces that are 
dependent on fossil fuel generated electricity could argue that any federal policies 
which increase the comparative cost of fossil fuel electricity generation increase the 
cost of doing business in the province and enhance "disparity in opportunities" when 
compared with provinces which are for example, blessed by abundant access to 
hydropower. Authorities from provinces dependent on fossil fuel generated electricity 
could also argue that federal policies which inflate fossil fuel electricity costs impair 
the promotion of ―equal opportunities for the well-being (which presumably includes 
economic well-being) of Canadians‖.  
 
Section 36(2) requires the federal government to provide "equalization payments" to 
provinces which are adversely affected by circumstances that result in comparatively 
higher costs for public services. In response to any federal policy which increases the 
cost of fossil fuel electricity, authorities from provinces that are dependent on fossil 
fuel electricity could argue that electricity is a public service, the policy resulted in an 
inequitable provision of this public service and therefore, "equalization payments" are 
necessary. If successful, such a claim could render policy implementation financially 
untenable. 
 
Third, even if provinces failed in legal actions to overturn federal policies which 
infringe on provincial constitutional sovereignty over electricity governance, there is 
also a political avenue to derail intrusive federal policies. In accordance with Section 




53 of the Constitution, federal policies which seek to tax goods or services must be 
approved by the House of Commons which (in accordance with Section 49) requires a 
simple majority (Government of Canada, 1867 / 1982). The trouble is that the five 
Canadian provinces that are highly dependent on fossil fuel electricity (Ontario, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) hold 160 of the 295 seats in 
Canada's House of Commons. In short, members of the House from these provinces 
could conceivably block passage of such a policy. 
 
Fourth, if all legal challenges and all political resistance failed to derail federal efforts 
to pass policies that would force provincial cooperation in developing a unified wind 
power development strategy, the efficacy of the policy could still be undermined by 
political gamesmanship. For example, a jaded provincial authority could counter a 
national carbon tax with provincial counter-subsidies to fossil fuel electricity 
generators in order to dilute the coercive efficacy of the federal policy. Alternatively, 
a provincial authority could discourage federal authorities from adopting provincially 
unpopular policies by threatening to withhold cooperation in other areas (i.e. the 
collection of federal income taxes) in order to place pressure on federal authorities to 
negotiate less coercive energy policies. Given the need for cooperation in areas such 
as social security, agricultural policy and education, it does not serve the federal 
government to alienate the provinces. 
 
In summary, the Constitutional authorities outlined earlier theoretically provide the 
federal government with coercive mechanisms for compelling provincial governments 
to collaborate on a national wind energy development strategy; however, in practice, 
coercive federal strategies can be rendered ineffective due to legal, political or 




administrative resistance by the provinces. Braun and colleagues referred to these 
resistance tactics as ―thrust and riposte‖ (Braun, et al., 2002, p. 117). In fact, even the 
threat of challenging a federal policy on any of these grounds could serve as a 
deterrent to implementation. 
 
The threat of thrust and riposte strategies applied at both federal and provincial levels 
prompted the International Energy Agency to conclude, "the only viable approach in 
addressing the most important energy policy challenges seems to be a process of 
intensive dialogue and consultation to achieve a national consensus on the goals and 
needs of energy policies, but this process takes time" (IEA, 2004b, p. 255). As the 
chairman of the Canadian Electricity Association summarized, "the debate is not 
about the merits of long-term reductions in greenhouse gases or air emissions, but 
over how quickly we can get there, at what cost and who pays" (Canadian Electricity 
Association, 2008, p. 1).  
 
In the next section, this analysis of the complexities inherent in Canada's federal 
system will be drawn upon to create a conceptual framework to understand how 
different assignations of authority influence the viability of renewable energy policy 
instruments. By creating such a framework, the list of feasible policy instruments for 
facilitating a collaborative approach to wind power development in Canada will 









9.7  POLICY INSTRUMENT SELECTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 
9.7.1 Developing the Framework 
Prior to examining the policy instrument options open to the Canadian federal 
government for facilitating a more aggressive, provincially collaborative approach to 
wind power development, it serves to first review the types of policy instruments that 
are popularly employed for supporting development of renewable energy. Theodore 
Lowi’s taxonomy for classifying policy instruments is employed for this review (Lowi, 
1972) in part because of the clarity with which it enables classification of renewable 
energy development policy tools. 
 
Table 9.11: Lowi’s Taxonomy and Renewable Energy Policy Instruments 
Instrument 
Classification 
Examples of Renewable Energy Policy Instruments 
Distributive policy 
 
Feed-in subsidy, production subsidies, subsidies for 
technology development, land grants for siting renewable 
energy facilities, R&D funding 
Regulatory policy 
 
CO2 emission regulations, CO2 emission cap and trade 
systems, mandatory utility purchase of renewable energy 
(renewable portfolio standards) 
Redistributive policy 
 




Establishing an agency for unifying national energy 
strategy, media campaigns emphasizing the imperative for 
CO2 emission reduction 
 
It should be evident from Table 9.11 that Canada's constitutional separation of powers 
renders application of regulatory or redistributive policies problematic in regard to 
supporting wind power development. Any regulatory or redistributive policies which 
adversely affect the fortunes of some provinces over others (contravening section 132 
of the Constitution Act, 1982) or infringe on the constitutional authority granted to the 
provinces over electricity generation (contravening section 92 of the Constitution Act, 




1867) could be challenged by the provinces in the courts. As mentioned earlier, even 
if legal recourse is unsuccessful in nullifying adverse regulatory or redistributive 
policies, there are other "thrust and riposte" techniques that provinces can employ to 
stymie federal incursion into provincial sovereignty.  
 
Insights from the earlier analysis pertaining to the viability and efficacy of different 
policy instruments in encouraging enhanced wind power development in Canada can 
be used to guide the construction of a rough framework that attempts to summarize the 
influence that a federal form of government has on policy instrument design and 
implementation. Although admittedly done at a high level of abstraction and 
generalization, Table 9.12 summarizes the efficacy of different policy instruments in 
areas which are subject to federal, regional (provincial) or shared (concurrent) 
authority. The stars convey a loose ranking (see legend of Table 9.12) of the viability 
and efficacy of federally employing each instrument under the various delegations of 
authority. Generalizations of this sort assume that there are no extant socio-cultural, 
political, bureaucratic or economic conditions that justify the use of one policy 
instrument over others. In short, Table 9.12 answers the question "ceteris paribus, 
which policy tools can be effective in a federal environment?" 
 
Table 9.12: A Framework for Policy Tool Implementation in a Federal System 
 Authorities Presiding over Relevant Policy Field 




Regulatory policies    
Redistributive policies    
Distributive policies    
Constituent policies    
 = highly effective          = effective          = marginally effective  
= largely ineffective           = unworkable 
 




National regulatory policies can be effective in policy fields over which the federal 
government has constitutional authority; however, even in areas of federal jurisdiction, 
there is always the possibility that regions which are disadvantaged by the policy will 
provide active resistance through political gamesmanship. Conversely, in policy areas 
over which the regional government has constitutional authority, direct regulatory 
policies are not generally workable. A more viable regulatory approach in such 
circumstances is to try to identify peripheral areas over which the federal government 
has sovereignty to enact regulatory policies. For example, rather than placing 
regulations on CO2 emissions from electric utilities (over which the provincial 
government has authority), a peripheral regulation would be to regulate national CO2 
emissions by allocating quotas to the provinces (which would be justified by the 
federal government's authority over inter-provincial environmental governance). In 
general, federal attempts to regulate areas under regional authority increase the 
propensity for federal-regional conflict, which rarely results in a win-win outcome. 
Lastly, in policy areas where concurrent authority exists, federally designed regulatory 
policy is an option; however, negotiation between the federal and regional authorities 
that share concurrent authority typically leads to the design of regulations which have 
been diluted through the negotiation process (Braun, et al., 2002). Canada's failed 
Clean Air Act, 2006 is illustrative of an ineffective regulatory policy which attempted 
to federally regulate activities over which the federal and provincial governments have 
concurrent authority.  
 
Redistributive policies share many similarities with regulatory policy in terms of 
feasibility and efficacy of application within federal systems. If a redistribution policy 
is implemented in a policy area under federal jurisdiction, it can be effective provided 




it does not induce opposition by regional authorities or voters. In policy areas under 
concurrent authority, redistributive policies suffer the same weakness as regulatory 
policies - compromises frequently dilute the efficacy of the measure (Braun, et al., 
2002). Lastly, redistributive policies are largely ineffective in policy areas under 
regional jurisdiction because regions which are adversely affected will resist federal 
intrusions on regional authority. With that said, redistribution policy may be viable in 
spite of regional resistance if there is strong enough public (voter) support for such a 
policy. For example, 20 years ago, there was not enough public support in Canada for 
wind power to justify federal taxes on carbon emissions. However, 84% of all 
Canadians now support further development of wind power, while 42% are opposed 
to further expansion of fossil fuel power plants (Saint Consulting, 2007). The viability 
of redistributive policies in areas of regional jurisdiction depends on the creation of 
policies that are not unfairly biased to punish one region and reward another (Bird & 
Vaillancourt, 2001).  
 
Distributive policies are usually the most well-received policy instruments from a 
regional perspective because federal distributions are perceived as "free money" for 
the regions, despite the fact that distributive policy funding comes from tax payers 
(Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 2003). In Canada, many of Canada's federal 
policies are distributive in nature (Wimmer, 2007). The obvious weakness associated 
with a distributive policy is that such policies must be federally financed by either 
further taxation or fiscal cuts in other areas. This is a particular weakness in relation to 
supporting wind power development because financial requirements for subsidizing 
wind power development could amount to tens of billions of dollars (to be discussed 




in Section 9.7.2). Due to the financial imposition of distributive policies on national 
budgets, they have been allocated three instead of four stars in the matrix (Table 9.12). 
 
Finally, the value of constituent policies for supporting other policy instruments 
should not be overlooked. Constituent policies policy are frequently less expensive to 
implement than distributive or regulatory policies (Bemelmans-Videc, et al., 2003) 
and can typically be customized to fit any power-sharing scenario. The drawback to 
constituent policies is that they are frequently less influential in altering behaviour; 
and as a result, when they are applied alone, they rarely achieve the impact associated 
with the other three types of policy instruments (Hood, 1986). 
 
In summary, under a federal government system, distributive, redistributive or 
regulatory policy instruments are more or less equally feasible and effective when 
dealing with policy areas that fall under the constitutional authority of the federal 
government. However, in dealing with policy areas that fall under the constitutional 
authority of regional governments, policy instruments vary in terms of viability and 
efficacy. Regulatory and redistributive policies can be particularly problematic under 
such circumstances if regional authorities perceive the federal policies to infringe on 
regional sovereignty. As for areas of concurrent authority, all policy instruments are 
feasible; however, they vary in degree of efficacy. Under concurrent authority, the 
efficacy of regulatory and redistribution policies tends to be diluted by compromise. 
Consequently, distribution policies (despite their high costs) and constituent policies 
(despite lower levels of impact) tend to be more effective. 
 
 




9.7.2 Applying the Framework to the Canadian Wind Power Development  
Given these initial observations, it is possible to link the emergent framework back to 
the challenge faced by the Canadian federal government in facilitating a national wind 
power development policy. Table 9.13 integrates the analysis of the challenge that the 
Canadian government faces in facilitating a more effective wind power development 
strategy back to the framework presented in the previous section and qualitatively 
attempts to approximate the efficacy of various policy instruments.  
 
Table 9.13: Efficacy of Different Wind Power Development Policy Tools in Canada  
 Regional 
authority 
Examples of Instruments 
Regulatory policies  CO2 emission regulations, CO2 emission cap 
and trade systems, mandatory utility purchase of 




 Carbon taxes, CO2 emission taxes, taxes on 
fossil fuel resources 
Distributive policies  Feed-in subsidy, production subsidies, subsidies 
for technology development, land grants for 
siting renewable energy facilities, R&D funding 
Constituent policies  Establishing an agency for unifying national 
energy strategy, media campaigns emphasizing 
the imperative for CO2 emission reduction 
 = highly effective          = effective          = marginally effective  
= largely ineffective           = unworkable 
 
As Table 9.13 suggests, some form of enhanced distributive policy may be the most 
effective approach for encouraging more aggressive provincial wind power 
development strategies. Interestingly, in the federation with the greatest success in 
wind power development (Germany), a feed-in subsidy and land lease grants played 
major roles in catalyzing development (Komor, 2004; Wizelius, 2007). Similarly, 
production subsidies were instrumental in supporting wind power development in two 
other federations, the United States (Production Tax Credit) and Spain (Mallon, 2006). 




In Canada’s case, introducing a production tax credit is perhaps the least contentious 
alternative.  
 
The main hurdle to implementing a federal production tax credit as a distributive 
policy to promote wind power development comes down to program cost (or rather 
revenue foregone). To illustrate, assume that federal policymakers wanted to introduce 
a production tax credit program of 15-year duration (to provide financial certainty to 
developers) at C$60 per MWh (which would make wind power projects attractive 
even in provinces with the lowest electricity prices), valid to a total capacity of 20% of 
total national electricity generation capacity. Once the program reaches full capacity, 
the federal government would be foregoing approximately C$8.6 billion per year in 
tax revenue.
15
 For a government that is currently wrestling to bring down a federal 
deficit of C$50 billion, foregoing tax revenue of this magnitude would be politically 
untenable.  
 
9.7.3 The Value of Combined Policy Instruments  
The general consensus amongst policy instrument scholars is that cobbling together a 
program employing various policy instruments often delivers enhanced results (cf. 
Bemelmans-Videc, et al., 2003; Hood, 1986; Salamon, 2002). There is anecdotal 
evidence that this tenet extends to federal systems. For example, in support of 
regulatory activities associated with the Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 
1999, the federal government undertook an extensive public relations campaign to 
                                                 
15
 In 2007, electricity production in Canada was 617,469 GWh (Statistics Canada, 2009). Assuming a 
yearly increase in production of 1.3% (EIA, 2008), by 2012 electricity production will have increased 
to 715,815 GWh. Accordingly, assuming that all wind turbines were in place by 2012, the annual total 
payments required to provide a subsidy of C$60 per MWh would amount to C$8,589,789,641 for 
143,163 GWh (20% of 715,815).  




explain its impact. Moreover, a Council of Ministers of the Environment (which 
includes all 13 regional Environment Ministers and the federal Environment Minister) 
meets bi-annually to ―develop national strategies, norms, and guidelines that each 
environment ministry across the country can use‖ (www.ccme.ca). The combination 
of these policy instruments allowed a federal regulatory act to be implemented even 
though it intrudes on areas of provincial authority. 
 
Combining policy instruments to improve policy program efficacy presents some 
intriguing possibilities in regard to developing a collaborative wind power 
development program in Canada. For example, although electricity policy falls under 
provincial sovereignty, could the federal government succeed in implementing a 
carbon tax (a redistributive policy) or cap and trade system (a regulatory policy) if it 
supplemented the program with an enhanced production tax credit policy (distributive 
policy), initiated a campaign to engender public support (constitutive policy) and 
delegated program design to the Council of Energy Ministers to minimize provincial 
opposition through collaborative policy setting (constitutive policy)? If so, a combined 
approach to policy setting could significantly spread-out the burden of subsidizing 
wind power development initiatives when compared to the distributive policy outlined 
earlier.  
 
Regardless of the ultimate policy package, delegating the development of a policy 
program to the Council of Energy Ministers (or some other unified body) represents 
sound judgment. Currently, this Council of the 13 regional (provincial and territory) 
Energy Ministers plus the Federal Energy Minister meets annually to discuss 
provincial collaboration and share information. In Canada, where policy decisions are 




best designed and operationalised through consultation with the provinces (IEA, 
2004b), it seems logical to task this group with the responsibility to cobble together a 
unified policy approach. Failure to enlist provincial support in developing a 
collaborative strategy increases the possibility that provincial authorities will consider 
emergent strategies to be unwarranted intrusions on provincial sovereignty over 
electricity governance.   
 
Considering financial feasibility, a combination of policies may represent a way for 
the federal government to enact a collaborative approach to wind power development 
without having to foot the entire bill associated with an enhanced federal production 
subsidy program. Unfortunately, an absence of empirical research comparing the 
efficacy of different combinations of renewable policy tools in a federal environment 
stymies identification of an optimal policy mix for Canadian policymakers. 
Accordingly, it is hoped that the conceptual cornerstones established in this chapter 
will encourage more extensive research into the efficacy of combined policies in a 
federal setting. All 24 of the world’s federal nations would benefit from further 
research in this regard. 
 
9.8  CONCLUSION 
Research into the nexus between federal political structure and policy implementation 
has tended to focus on pieces of the puzzle. Some have endeavoured to examine the 
efficacy of different federal structures in specific contexts such as industrial relations 
(Patmore, 2009), domestic peace (Wimmer, 2007) or inter-governmental relations 
(Baier, 2005). Others have explored the inner-workings of the federal-state (province) 
interface (Erk, 2006). Still others have undertaken comparative studies to better 




understand the influence that a federal structure has on policy making by examining 
either broad differences between federal nations (Braun, et al., 2002; Thorlakson, 
2003) or more detail comparative analysis between nations (; Rich, 2004). However, 
all have approached such inquiry in an ad hoc manner, pursuing specific themes of 
interest rather than focusing on a macro analysis of how federal structure influences 
policy instrument choice and efficacy.  
 
Conversely, this study which uses the challenge of unifying national energy policy for 
supporting wind power development in Canada has attempted to employ critical 
analysis to better understand the nexus between policy instruments and federal 
political structures from a macro-level. To the best of the author’s knowledge the 
framework put forth in Table 9.12 and subsequently applied to a specific context 
(wind power development policy) in Table 9.13, represents the first attempt of its kind 
to explicate the relationship between the various manifestations of power found in 
federal systems and the types of policy instruments that in theory should be more 
effective. As an emergent taxonomy, the author does not claim that the framework 
represents the final word on understanding this nexus; however, it does represent the 
establishment of a conceptual starting point around which empirical testing can be 
devised.  
 
Clearly there are exceptions which will challenge the predictive and applied efficacy 
of the framework outlined in Table 9.12. In fact, this discussion has already touched 
upon two such exceptions. Firstly, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 
1999 was a federal regulatory policy which infringed on areas of provincial 
sovereignty, yet it succeeded. Although part of the success stems from the 




collaborative approach taken through the Ministers of the Environment to implement 
the Act, its success reminds us that policy approaches that may be problematic if 
applied in isolation can be effectively applied by combining different policy 
approaches to offset negatives with positives. In focusing on policies applied in an 
isolated manner, the framework put forth in this paper does not yet address this 
important area of policy making strategy. Secondly, it was earlier suggested that a 
regulatory policy (a mandatory feed-in requirement) might be effective in facilitating 
enhanced development of wind power despite provincial authority over electricity 
generation if supplemented by a distributive policy (a production tax credit). This tells 
us that portfolios of policy instruments might elicit different degrees of efficacy. 
Accordingly, much more research is needed to highlight the nuances of combining 
different types of policy instruments to achieve end goals.  
  
In conclusion then, the framework put forth in this chapter is admittedly raw, but it is 
a step forward and fills an important gap in understanding the nexus between policy 
instrument efficacy and federal political structure. As the Chinese are fond of saying, 
―a journey of a thousand miles begins with one step‖. But at least this journey will 
have the wind at our backs. 





WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN 
Abstract 
This chapter analyzes Japan’s national power generation strategy with a view to 
explaining Japan’s phlegmatic approach to wind energy development. The analysis 
concludes that Japan’s current power generation strategy is not optimized to achieve 
the government’s three strategic energy objectives of simultaneously enhancing 
economic security, national energy security and environmental security (3Es). To 
achieve long-run energy sustainability, Japan needs to strive to phase out nuclear 
power which is the centrepiece of its current power generation strategy. The analysis 
concludes by offering four suggestions for a sustainable 3E power generation strategy: 
1) internalize all external costs associated with power generation technologies in order 
to level the economic playing field, 2) increase feed-in mandates for renewable energy 
to 20%, 3) fully liberalize the power generation industry and, 4) intensify R&D in 
energy storage technologies to support intermittent renewable technologies. 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a historical reverence for wind in Japan. Twice, in 1274 and 1281, the 
Mongol leader Kubilai Khan dispatched massive military forces to invade Japan. Both 
times, the invasions were thwarted by great storms which unexpectedly arose, 
breaking up the invasion fleets. The Japanese characterised these storms as ―divine 
winds‖, or in Japanese kamikaze. Although the term is better-known internationally to 
describe Japan’s suicide bombers during the World War II, etymologically, the origins 
date back to the Mongol invasions. 
 
Popular accounts of the defeat of the Mongol fleets tend to aggrandize the role of the 
divine winds and downplay the contributions of Japanese strategy. After repelling the 
smaller first invasion (40,000 Mongol troops), the crippled Japanese military enlisted 
community support to construct and safeguard a long defensive wall along the coast of 
Hakata Bay in Kyushu. The fortification was a ruse intended to fool the Mongol 




leadership into thinking that Japanese forces were vigilant and anticipating an 
impending attack. The reality was, if the ruse did not deter a Mongol landing, defeat 
of the depleted Japanese forces would be inevitable. Fortunately for the Japanese, the 
fortifications served their purpose when the Mongol armada of 140,000 troops arrived 
in Kyushu. Mongol leaders delayed the intended landing in order to assess the 
situation. Reportedly, the invasion fleet stayed afloat for over a month while waiting 
for scouts to sneak ashore in order to assess the situation and identify a less fortified 
landing spot for the troops. It was during the interim that a huge tropical storm hit the 
fleet. The Mongol boats were ill-prepared to withstand the pounding caused by high 
waves driven by gale-force winds (Hall, 1990). 
 
Today, in the energy world, the omnipotent properties of wind are once again being 
felt. Increasingly, energy policymakers are coming to understand that once all the 
environmental and social costs associated with the various energy technologies have 
been fully internalized, wind energy represents an economically appealing option (see 
figure 10.1). Moreover, the CO2 lifecycle footprint of wind energy is amongst the 
lowest of all renewable energy technologies (Sovacool, 2008b). 
 
Figure 10.1: Full Social Cost Comparison of Electricity Generation Technologies 
 
Source of data: (Sovacool, 2008a) 




Alternatively, for readers who are uncomfortable with the use of social cost 
projections to argue a case for the economic merits of wind energy, figure 10.2 
presents more straightforward cost projections incorporating only direct costs 
associated with three power generation technologies. The insight that both graphics 
attempt to convey is that national energy policymakers would be remiss to ignore 
wind energy as an economically viable component of any low-carbon energy strategy. 
 
Figure 10.2: Projected Electricity Costs in the EU in 2015 and 2030 
 
Source: (IEA World Energy Outlook, 2008) 
 
The observation that wind energy can help national energy planners facilitate a 
transition away from CO2 emitting technologies has not been lost on energy planners 
in many nations. As a result, installed global wind capacity has increased from 7,636 
MW in 1997 to 94,122 MW in 2007 – a 12-fold increase. Accordingly, one might 
surmise that Japan which boasts an envious record for spearheading technological 
trends would be one of the vanguard nations in respect to the diffusion of wind energy. 
However, as this case study will illustrate, this is not the case. Wind energy is clearly 
relegated to a subsidiary role in Japan’s national energy strategy. 
 




The intent of this chapter is to analyze Japan’s national power generation strategy in 
order to explicate why wind energy is failing to achieve the diffusion rates found in 
vanguard nations. Specifically, this case study attempts to establish whether Japan’s 
phlegmatic commitment to wind energy development is because a grander power 
generation strategy exists which incorporates better options or because Japan’s energy 
policy network lacks the sufficient diversity to avoid misguided strategic decisions.  
As the analysis will demonstrate, there are indications that the latter is a more 
plausible interpretation.  
 
In addition to providing a thorough analysis of the energy strategy of the world’s 
second largest economy, this case study hopes to contribute to the growing body of 
knowledge on effective and ineffective elements of applied energy policy. Specifically, 
this study demonstrates the need for proactive government intervention in energy 
markets that are dominated by large, vertically-integrated utilities if a shift from status 
quo is desired.   
 
The knowledge foundation of the study stems from a series of interviews and 
academic conferences attended during a one-year attachment to the University of 
Tokyo’s Graduate School of Public Policy. Where possible, government publications 
or existing research have been referenced to support assertions or verify data gleaned 
through discussions with energy experts in Japan. 
 
This chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 10.2 launches the journey 
by briefly examining the overall energy profile in Japan. Section 10.3 then describes 
the principles upon which Japanese energy strategy is founded. This includes an 




analysis of the core policy programs within Japan’s national power generation strategy. 
Section 10.4 examines the impact that Japan’s power generation strategy has had on 
wind energy diffusion and Section 10.5 attempts to explain the factors that discourage 
Japan’s energy utilities from purchasing greater quantities of wind power. Section 
10.6 summarizes the short-comings Japan’s power generation strategy and Section 
10.7 offers recommendations for redressing these short-comings.   
 
10.2 JAPAN’S ENERGY SITUATION 
Figure 10.3 contrasts Japan’s power generation mix with the average power 
generation mix found in OECD countries (IEA, 2008c). Comparing the differences 
provides useful insight into Japan’s power industry. Firstly, it is apparent that Japan 
has a comparatively heavy reliance on oil. In fact, in 2007, nearly 5 million barrels of 
oil were consumed daily in Japan. In absolute terms, Japan has become the third-
largest largest national consumer of oil in the world behind the United States and 
China. Secondly, the dominant source of electricity in Japan is nuclear power. In 
quantitative terms, Japan is the third largest national consumer of nuclear power in the 
world after the United States and France. Thirdly, renewable energy plays an 
inconsequential role in Japan’s electricity mix. 
 
Figure 10.3: Power Generation in Japan and the OECD 
 
Source of data: (IEA, 2008c) 




One other critical element of Japan’s power generation mix is not conveyed in Figure 
10.3 - Japan imports 59% of its power generation feed-stocks. Virtually all coal, oil 
and gas feed-stocks are imported (EIA, 2008b). Moreover, it imports these feed-stocks 
in vast quantities. In 2005, Japan consumed 226 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) 
energy for power generation (IEA, 2008c). Japan’s 127 million people (1.9% of the 
global population) consume 5.3% of the energy used for power generation in the 
world. 
  
Japan’s dependence on imported energy has a pervasive influence on strategic energy 
planning. As figure 10.4 indicates, with the exception of Italy (which is securely 
linked into the EU energy network), no other industrialized nation has such a 
precarious dependence on other nations for energy supply.  
 
Figure 10.4: Japan’s Energy Self-Sufficiency Compared to Other OECD Nations 
 
Source of data: (FEPC, 2008) 
 
Any global disruption to energy supplies would have a greater impact on Japan than 
any other nation (ANRE, 2006). Consequently, in order to safeguard supply, Japan 
maintains massive strategic oil and gas reserve inventories. To illustrate, at the end of 
April 2008, Japan held 328 million barrels of oil in strategic reserves (EIA, 2008a). 




Assuming a cost of $60 US per barrel, this amounts to approximately US$16 billion in 
sunken investment. Cognizant of the risks that high levels of energy imports pose, a 
consistent tenet of Japan’s national energy planners has been to wean itself from this 
high level of dependence on foreign energy.  
 
Before turning to the specifics of Japanese energy policy, the structure of Japan’s 
electric utility industry merits description because, as will be seen in section 10.5, how 
the industry is structured influences the diffusion of renewable energy technologies. 
Up until World War II, a state run monopoly was responsible for the generation and 
transmission of power in Japan and nine private firms were responsible for 
distribution. At the end of the war, the industry was privatized and nine private 
companies were given regional monopolies to generate, transmit and distribute 
electricity within their assigned territories (FEPC, 2008).
16
 As will be demonstrated 
later in the paper, the vertical integration of Japan’s utilities into all levels of the 
electricity supply chain is a key hurdle to the diffusion of wind energy.  
 
10.3  JAPANESE ENERGY POLICY 
10.3.1 Setting the Agenda 
Japan is a risk-averse society. Mechanisms for mitigating risk are embedded in many 
of the nation’s most distinctive cultural artefacts. A rigid vertical hierarchy (in 
Japanese tateshakai) based primarily around seniority adds a degree of stability to 
interpersonal relationships. Japan’s famous lifetime employment contracts mitigate 
career risk. Even the infamous inscrutable nature of the Japanese can be considered to 
be a manifestation of risk-aversion. Candour is discouraged in Japanese society 
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 There are now 10 private regional electric utilities in Japan. The 10
th
 region was created in 1972 
when Okinawa rejoined Japan. (FEPC, 2008) 




because conflicting opinions run the risk of disrupting group harmony. A unique 
Japanese expression conveys this sentiment- ―the nail that sticks up, gets hammered 
down‖. 
 
Given the Japanese aversion to risk, it should come as no surprise that ―security‖ is a 
prominent theme in Japan’s national energy strategy. The government endeavours to 
enhance economic security by minimizing energy costs, national energy security by 
reducing dependence on imported energy, and environmental security by supporting 
sustainable energy solutions which will not adversely impact the environment (METI, 
2006). However, not all forms of security are considered equal in energy policy 
planning.  
 
Economic security is accorded top priority in Japan because the nation has learned 
through experience that economic prosperity can capacitate security in all other forms. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Japan’s natural environment was significantly degraded 
as a result of insufficient environmental governance in the face of unfettered industrial 
activity (Tsuru, 2000). Economic prosperity of the 1980s provided the financial means 
for environmental restoration. Similarly, from a national energy security perspective, 
corporate prosperity enhanced tax revenues and enabled the government to finance the 
development of the nuclear energy industry. Japan’s nuclear energy plants have 
greatly enhanced domestic power generation capabilities (comprising 35% of power 
generation).  
 
There is a degree of symbiotic interplay between economic security and national 
energy security policy objectives. A healthy economy can finance national energy 




security initiatives. Conversely, bolstering national energy security helps stabilize 
energy costs which enhance economic security. Consequently, a synthesis is achieved 
by seeking policies which will facilitate a long-term stabilization of energy costs at the 
lowest possible level. One approach to stabilizing energy costs is to endeavour to 
replace technologies which use feed-stocks that are imported from politically unstable 
nations with technologies which use feed-stocks that are imported from stable nations. 
One other approach is to improve domestic generation capacities (nuclear, renewables 
etc.). As section 10.3.3 will describe, policies exist which exemplify both approaches. 
 
Although the attainment of environmental security is not as exigent as nurturing 
economic and national energy security, environmental concerns still bear weight in 
energy planning. Japanese national planners understand that climate change has the 
potential to seriously derail global economic development; and in the process, 
attenuate prospects for domestic economic prosperity. Accordingly, the Japanese 
government is currently intent on achieving its goal of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions to 6% below 1990 levels by 2012 and recently, new Japanese Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama announced that Japan will seek to reduce GHG emissions 
by 25 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. To achieve the initial 2012 goal, the 
Japanese government aims to reduce CO2 omissions related to energy generation by: i) 
sustaining the current transition from oil to gas power, ii) enhancing nuclear power 
capacity, iii) expanding energy efficiency programs, and iv) promoting greater 
inclusion of renewable energy into Japan’s electricity grid (Government of Japan, 
2005; METI, 2006).  
 




However, the greatest flaw of Japan’s national energy strategy relates to 
environmental security. One of the government’s energy policy goals prior to PM 
Hatoyama’s announcement was to extend nuclear energy capacity to deliver 40% of 
the nation’s electricity needs by 2030 (Amari, 2006). Under the current emission 
reduction strategy, the announcement of more ambitious GHG reduction targets will 
likely further fuel plans to expand Japan’s nuclear capacity. Although this will help 
mitigate CO2 emissions, it will also tax national capabilities to manage the effective 
disposal of nuclear waste. Due to a shortage of viable landfill sites, municipal and 
industrial waste management have already reached a crisis state in Japan (Barrett, 
2005). Accordingly, it seems improbable that the Japanese government will be able to 
effectively identify suitable locations to safely sequester ever-increasing amounts of 
nuclear waste.  
 
10.3.2 Formulating Policy 
Japan’s energy strategy has not changed substantively over the past two decades. In 
the late 1990s, Japanese government energy policy objectives were: 1) to improve 
energy utilization efficiency, 2) to restructure the national energy mix to incorporate 
renewable energy sources and, 3) to positively promote and pursue international 
cooperation in the energy field (Ushiyama, 1999). In 2004, these energy policies were 
conceptually recast as the 3E’s: i) economic growth, 2) energy security and 3) 
environmental protection (IEA, 2004a).  
 
More recently, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
revealed a ―New Energy Strategy‖ that identified three ―new‖ primary objectives 
(METI, 2006, p. 1):  




 Establishment of energy security measures that our people can trust and rely on 
 Establishment of the foundation for sustainable development through a 
comprehensive approach for (sic) energy issues and environmental issues 
altogether. 
 Commitment to assist Asian and world nations in addressing energy problems. 
 
Although this latest manifestation of Japan’s energy strategy is more loquacious, the 
3E’s are still clearly evident in the first two objectives. Moreover, the third ―new‖ 
objective is evocative of the international cooperation objective instituted in the 1990s. 
 
10.3.3 Power Generation Policy Programs 
The penchant for prioritising economic security explains why certain energy 
initiatives in Japan have received more government support than others. In this section, 
Japan’s five policy program areas related to power generation are analysed in the 
context Japan’s strategic energy objectives. 
 
 10.3.3.1   Conservation Programs 
Energy conservation initiatives took root in Japanese energy policy following the oil 
crises in the 1970s. Japan’s Energy Conservation Law was passed in 1979 and has 
subsequently undergone four revisions. The revisions set progressively rigorous 
standards to encourage energy efficiency in industry. Also in 1979, the Japanese 
Energy Conservation Center (ECCJ) was founded in order to spearhead 
comprehensive outreach efforts in energy conservation. Since then, a significant 
number of conservation programs have been established. Appendix 10.1 summarizes 
some of the more notable programs.  




There are at least three ways in which conservation programs support economic 
security objectives. Firstly, conservation efforts obviate capital investment to facilitate 
energy efficiency (Sovacool, 2008a). Accordingly, the fiscal impact of such programs 
is comparably light. Secondly, waste alleviation associated with conservation 
improves corporate profitability (Reinhardt, 1999). Consequently, industry resistance 
to conservation programs has been negligible. Thirdly, conservation initiatives 
typically exhibit the highest benefit-to-cost ratios (Komor, 2004). In short, successful 
conservation programs enjoy a synergic relationship with the 3E’s. They enhance 
corporate performance, reduce energy import dependency and lessen the impact of 
power generation (per KWh) on the environment.  
 
As of 2005, per capita energy consumption in Japan was 4.2 tonnes of oil equivalent 
energy per year. This is significantly lower than consumption levels in Canada (8.4 
tonnes) and the United States (7.9 tonnes) but similar to per capita energy 
consumption levels in France (4.4 tonnes), Germany (4.2 tonnes) and the UK (3.9 
tonnes) (OECD, 2007). The Japanese government believes that conservation programs 
in conjunction with programs to develop energy efficient technologies (discussed next) 
can catalyze a reduction in per capita energy consumption by a further 50% (ANRE, 
2008a). This ambition is reflected in the government’s Guideline of Measures to 
Prevent Global Warming which establishes progress in energy efficiency as a critical 
objective for achieving its emission reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol 








 10.3.3.2.   Energy Efficiency through Technological Development  
The Japanese government has sponsored a plethora of initiatives to encourage the 
development of energy efficient technologies. Some of the more prominent initiatives 
are outlined in Appendix 10.2. Encouraging development of energy efficient 
technologies supports Japanese industrial development strategy in at least three ways. 
Firstly, industries, which use resources (i.e. energy) more efficiently, establish 
competitive advantage over foreign competitors (Porter, 1990; Porter & Van der Linde, 
1995). Secondly, the implementation of energy-efficient technologies hones 
engineering prowess which is a core competency in large scale construction activities. 
Thirdly, subsidizing the innovation and development of devices and equipment for 
improving energy efficiency, nurtures the growth of specialized businesses.  
 
A number of examples stand out as testament to the success of these initiatives. Japan 
has become one of the leading exporters of products and services to support energy-
efficiency in engineering and construction projects (EIA, 2008a). The 1500°C class 
gas turbines that have been developed in Japan boast the most efficient generation 
efficiency ratios in the world (52%). Similarly, Japan’s 600°C class supercritical 
pressure power generation technology for coal-fired power generation exhibits the 
highest level of thermal efficiency of the world (45%). Japan also boasts three 
companies that are world leaders in nuclear power generation technology (Toshiba, 
Hitachi and Mitsubishi) (ANRE, 2008a). In terms of the manufacture and sale of 
energy efficient equipment, Japanese firms such as Ebara, Mitsubishi and Toshiba 
produce some of the broadest arrays of energy-saving devices in the world. 
 




In terms of policy approach, incentives have tended to precede regulations. For 
example, when targeting industrial energy efficiency improvements, the government 
tasked the Japanese Business Council (Keidanren) with the responsibility for 
encouraging industry-led initiatives. The result was the Voluntary Action Plan on the 
Environment which covered 36 industries and involved 137 firms (IEA, 2004c). 
However, in industries where self-governance is difficult to coordinate (i.e. the 
building industry which has thousands of private contractors), or in cases where 
voluntary efforts are unsuccessful (i.e. improving energy efficiency in appliances), the 
government legislates targets. The revisions to the Japanese Energy Conservation Law 
illustrate this approach (see Appendix 10.1).  
 
 10.3.3.3.   Nuclear Energy Support Programs 
For decades, the lion’s share of government funding for energy research has gone into 
nuclear energy research. As figure 10.5 illustrates, over US$2 billion were annually 
allocated to nuclear research between 1981 and 2001. According to the Japanese 
Atomic Energy Commission (www.aec.go.jp), over US$2.5 billion have been 
committed to annual nuclear research activities since 2001. 
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This consistent commitment to nuclear energy research has yielded remarkable results.  
According to METI, nuclear power has surpassed coal-fired power as the cheapest 
energy technology in Japan. It is nearly 20% cheaper than LNG-fired power, over 
40% cheaper than hydropower had over 50% cheaper than wind power (ANRE, 
2008a).
17
 Japan’s dependence on imported oil has lessened considerably due to the 
expansion of nuclear power. Furthermore, three world-class competitors have 
emerged from Japan in the nuclear energy manufacturing field (Hitachi, Toshiba, and 
Mitsubishi). 
 
The ascendance of nuclear power in Japan has occurred despite intense public 
opposition. Such uncharacteristic resolve of the part of the government to defy public 
opinion underscores the extant political consensus that nuclear energy represents the 
only cost effective approach for significantly reducing CO2 emissions associated with 
power generation. During numerous discussions with energy industry experts in Japan 
over the past year, the phrase shikata ga nai (―there is nothing else we can do‖) was 
heard frequently in reference to nuclear energy development. 
 
The aforementioned concern over management of ever-accumulating volumes of 
nuclear waste has not gone unnoticed by government policymakers. Between 1998 
and 2008, an estimated US$13 billion was invested into research to develop 
approaches for minimizing and securely sequestering nuclear waste (JAEC, 2009). A 
cornerstone project is the development of Japan’s first reprocessing plant which was 
slated to open in 2000, but has been delayed by technical problems. The plant is 
                                                 
17
 It should be noted that the estimate pertaining to the cost of nuclear power does not include the long 
term cost of storing nuclear waste. As this case study will describe, this artificially inflates the 
attractiveness of nuclear energy. 




intended to enable the recovery of plutonium and reusable uranium from spent fuel. 
These recovery processes will help extend fuel resources and reduce the amount of 
high-level radioactive waste produced. Another key project is the commissioning of a 
uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plant that is slated to begin 
operation in 2012 (FEPC, 2008). When these projects are completed, they will 
exemplify progress made toward more efficient use of nuclear feed-stocks. However, 
these technologies will not resolve the dilemma of safely storing ever-increasing 
quantities of nuclear waste in a densely populated country. 
 
Perhaps due to public sensitivity regarding nuclear power, the government tends to be 
less forthcoming about nuclear program challenges. For example, the waste storage 
dilemma is seldom elaborated upon in government communications. Moreover, safety 
concerns are significantly downplayed. For example, in 2007, Japan released a White 
Paper on nuclear energy which summarized the safety of the technology in the 
following manner: 
In recent years, the world’s nuclear facilities have been stably operated 
without any serious incidents involving a massive release of radioactive 
material. The international community has criteria in place for nuclear facility 
(operators) (JAEC, 2008). 
 
It isn’t until later in the report, in a section on ―trends in nuclear energy‖ that ―recent 
nuclear energy community setbacks‖ are touched upon. These ―trends‖ include 
falsification of safety reports which led to the closure of a number of nuclear facilities 
in March 2007 and closure of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant after 
design concerns arose following inspections after the Niigata earthquake in July 2007 




(JAEC, 2008). In fact, the Japanese nuclear energy industry has experienced a number 
of ―setbacks‖ in the past including a sodium leak in a reactor in Fukui Prefecture in 
1995, an explosion at the Tokai reprocessing plant in 1997, a uranium 
mismanagement mishap in 1999 at a Tokai plant where over 100 workers were 
exposed to high doses of radiation, a 2002 scandal involving the falsification of safety 
records which led to the temporary shutdown of 17 plants, and a steam leak at the 
Mihama plant in 2004 which killed five workers. 
 
Another concern that has been the subject of political ―spin‖ concerns access to 
uranium supplies. The government has justified the ongoing transition from oil-fired 
power to nuclear power by reasoning that ―uranium can be considered a domestic 
energy source in view of the fact that it can be utilized for some years after 
importation‖ (ANRE, 2006, p. 6). Under this logic, imported automobiles would be 
domestic forms of transportation. 
  
 10.3.3.4.   Initiatives to Minimize Supply Risk 
Japan’s precarious dependence on foreign energy supplies has shaped public policy 
for over 100 years. An ambition to gain access to Korea’s ample coal reserves was a 
causal factor of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 (Paine, 2003). In the early 20th 
century, as the Japanese economy grew and its overseas military presence expanded, 
access to fuel-stocks became central to continued prosperity. Ultimately, Japan’s 
military defeat was expedited when American forces cut-off access to Japan’s 
Indonesian oil supply (Yergin, 1993). Accordingly, although economic justifications 
have superseded military justifications for enhancing national energy security, the 
Japanese policy ambition to improve national energy security has deep roots.  




Under Japan’s current national energy strategy, three strategic goals guide fortification 
of national energy security. The first goal is to gain preferential access to international 
energy supplies by supporting international energy exploration activities and 
infrastructure development. The second goal is to minimize dependence on energy 
imports from unstable nations. The third goal is to diversify the national energy mix in 
order to mitigate risks associated with overdependence on one energy resource.  
 
Over the past two decades, the Japanese government has aggressively pursued the first 
goal of engaging in cooperative international energy ventures. A public body, the 
Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC), spearheads Japanese efforts to finance 
overseas oil exploration and production (E&P) activities in return for a share in the 
finds (EIA, 2008a; Toichi, 2002). Between 1967 and 1997, the JNOC financially 
supported 359 E&P projects managed by foreign companies (Koike, 2008). Of recent 
note, the Japanese government helped coordinate private Japanese investment to 
support the development of the Sakhalin 2 project in Russia which will provide up to 
1.1 million tonnes of LNG annually to Japan (Sakhalin Energy, 2003).  
 
The goal of minimizing dependence on energy imports from unstable nations centres 
on reducing dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which accounts for 90% of Japan’s oil 
imports (ANRE, 2006). As figure 10.6 illustrates, the transition will be facilitated 
primarily through increased reliance on natural gas energy and nuclear power. Japan 
imports the majority of its natural gas from Indonesia (26.9%), Malaysia (22.8%), and 
Australia (14.8%) (ANRE, 2006). Therefore, a transition to natural gas helps avert 
reliance on Middle Eastern energy. Similarly, the majority of uranium is imported 




from Australia (33%) and Canada (27%) (ANRE, 2006). Consequently, substituting 
uranium for oil improves supply stability. 
 
Figure 10.6: The Changing Face of Japan’s Primary Energy Mix (Power + Transport) 
 
Source of data: (IEA, 2008c) 
 
Figure 10.6 also highlights Japan’s progress toward achieving the third goal of 
diversifying its energy mix. In 1973, 77% of the nation’s primary energy requirements 
were met through oil (ANRE, 2006). By 2005, the role of oil had diminished to 47% 
(IEA, 2008c). By 2030, Japan aims to establish a diversified energy mix with the bulk 
of reliance spread over four energy sources - coal, oil, natural gas and nuclear power. 
As will be discussed later, renewable energy is not expected to make a major 
contribution to energy diversification.  
 
 10.3.3.5.   New Energy Support Programs 
Renewable energy is not completely neglected in Japan. In fact, there have been, and 
still are, two policy approaches for promoting renewable energy diffusion. The first 
approach involves government sponsored research initiatives which are aimed at 
improving the commercial viability of renewable technologies. The second approach 




centres on legislation designed to create markets for renewable energy. Both policy 
approaches will be examined below. 
 
Government funding for renewable energy tends to target specific technologies. For 
example, as Figure 10.7 indicates, in response to the oil crises in the 1970s, solar 
thermal energy received an enormous boost in funding as the government sought to 
develop domestic energy sources. In the same period, funding for geothermal energy 
research also escalated as the government sought to expediently exploit Japan’s 
abundance of geothermal sites. By the mid-1990s, geothermal and solar thermal 
research waned as the technologies approached maturity. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, the most consistent funding initiative was in solar photovoltaic (PV) research. 
Annual government grants for solar PV research have exceeded US$50 million since 
1981.  
 


































































































































Solar Heating & Cooking
Source: (International Energy Agency, 2004b)
 
 
By international standards, government-sponsored renewable energy R&D programs 
in Japan are well-funded (IEA, 2008a). However, the targeted funding approach 
applied over the past 30 years tends to produce winners and losers. Solar PV research 




has been by far the biggest winner. Although the cost of solar photovoltaic electricity 
is still commercially unviable (about three times as expensive as wind energy), 
consistent funding has produced world-leading solar energy manufacturers. On the 
other hand, government funding in support of wind energy technology has been 
negligible (see figure 10.7). Aside from wind turbine prototype testing in 1992-1993 
(Inoue & Miyazaki, 2008), wind energy research has been largely ceded to private 
R&D initiatives.  
 
Figure 10.8: The Dynamics of ―New‖ Energy Generation in Japan 
 
Source of data: Report of Coordination Committee and Energy Supply and Demand Subcommittee of 
the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, August 2007. 
 
Figure 10.8 outlines the current and expected contributions of ―new‖ energy in Japan. 
It should be noted that geothermal energy and hydropower are not considered to be 
―new‖ energy. The data in figure 10.8 suggests where the majority of government 
renewable energy funding has been channelled since 2000. The research focus has 
primarily been on technologies to improve energy efficiency (i.e. waste power, 
underutilized energy, waste heat and wood chip waste).  
 




In addition to R&D support, the Japanese government also endeavours to promote 
renewable energy diffusion through legislative means. In 2003, the government 
introduced Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) legislation. Under this legislation, 
Japan’s utilities are required to purchase a specified amount of renewable energy each 
year. The utilities are free to choose amongst small and medium-sized hydropower, 
geothermal power, solar PV, wind, and biomass. The price they are obliged to pay for 
purchasing this energy is equal to the price paid by the end-consumer. In carrying out 
purchase obligations, the utility can either generate the renewable electricity itself, 
purchase the electricity from another provider or purchase new energy certificates 
from another utility which has surpassed its RPS quota (IEA, 2009). The Japanese 
RPS also has a ―banking‖ mechanism which allows utilities to store credits for any 
renewable energy acquired that exceeds quota (ANRE, 2008b). Annual RPS quotas in 
terawatt hours are presented in Table 10.1. 
 
Table 10.1: Annual RPS Generation Quotas (in TWh) in Japan, 2003-2014 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
7.32 7.66 8.00 8.34 8.67 9.27 10.33 12.20 13.15 14.10 15.05 16.00 
Source of data: (IEA, 2009) 
 
The RPS quota for 2010 is projected to equal 1.35% of the total annual amount of 
electricity generated nationally. By 2014, the RPS quota will have inched up to 
comprise 1.63% of national electricity generation (Englander, 2008). With a number 
of renewable energy technologies competing for this small allocation, competition is 
heated. Toshio Hori, president of Green Power Investment Corporation in Tokyo sums 
up the situation by pointing out that the targets provide no incentive for renewable 
energy providers to undertake the investments necessary to grow (Englander, 2008).  
 




Given the prioritization of enhancing economic security in energy policy planning, 
one perhaps should not be too surprised by the government’s apathy toward renewable 
energy. Currently, all forms of renewable energy are considerably more expensive 
than nuclear and coal-fired power in Japan. However, at current levels, the RPS 
legislation has negligible impact on the overall cost of electricity. Research indicates 
that the RPS legislation results in a premium of ¥0.1 per kWh (US 0.1¢ per kWh) on 
electricity produced (Nishio & Asano, 2003). If the research estimate is accurate, the 
government could significantly increase the RPS quota and still preserve economic 
security, which it values so dearly. 
 
In concluding this summary on Japan’s RPS program, it is worth noting that solar 
photovoltaic energy is accorded special treatment under this program. Each kWh of 
solar PV electricity that is purchased equates to 2 kWh generated by other renewable 
energy technologies (IEA, 2009). Although this policy provides much-needed support 
for Japan’s solar PV manufacturers, it is a regressive policy in terms of climate change 
mitigation initiatives. A utility that purchases its entire RPS quota from solar PV 
generators would offset 50% less CO2 emissions than if the RPS quota were filled 
entirely through other forms of clean energy. 
 
10.3.4 Policy Benchmarks 
Initiatives within the five program areas outlined above are expected to contribute to 
achievement of the following energy goals for 2030 (Amari, 2006): 
1. Improve energy efficiency by at least 30%. 
2. Reduce oil dependence by 40% or lower. 
3. Reduce oil dependence in the transport sector to 80%. 




4. Target the share of nuclear power in electricity generation to 30-40%. 
5. Increase the share of crude oil owned by Japanese companies to 40%. 
 
The fact that nuclear power is the only technology that is accorded a specific 
benchmark for top-level energy goals highlights the central role that nuclear power 
plays in Japan’s national power generation strategy. 
 
10.4 WIND POWER IN JAPAN: THE NUMBERS 
When considering the potential for wind power in Japan one must recognise that 
Japan faces the same hurdles that confront most heavily populated, developed nations. 
Onshore, competition for land use force wind sites to more remote, less urbanized 
areas which gives rise to increased transmission costs (Wizelius, 2007). Offshore, 
wind power potential in Japan is high but has yet to be aggressively exploited due to 
the higher costs associated with offshore wind power development (cf. Dong, Wong, 
Zhou, & Ziser, 2008). Yet, geographic constraints notwithstanding, technical wind 
potential in Japan is still significantly higher than current installed wind power 
capacity, which amounted to 1880 MW as of December 2008 (WWEA, 2009). Data 
compiled by the Geographical Survey Institute in Japan indicate that a mid-range 
estimate of 70,000 turbines could be situated at 964 prospective onshore and offshore 
sites (Ushiyama, 1999). Assuming a turbine power rating of 2 MW, this implies that 
there is 140,000 MW of wind power potential in Japan, almost 75 times current 
installed capacity. In the short run, the New Energy and Industrial Technology 
Development Organization (NEDO), which is a government research agency, foresees 
at least 10,000 MW of installed wind capacity as being a feasible target by 2020 




(Inoue & Miyazaki, 2008). In short, despite Japan’s geographical constraints, there is 
evidence of significant amounts of untapped wind power potential in Japan. 
 
As Figure 10.9 depicts, compared to other major economies, Japan clearly lags behind 
in wind power development. Comparing the three largest economies, installed wind 
power capacities in the USA and Germany wind power are over 12 times that of Japan. 
Italy, which shares Japan’s heavy reliance on imported energy, boasts twice as much 
installed wind power capacity as Japan. In short, the Japanese government’s 
subordination of renewable energy has had predictable consequences for wind power 
development in Japan. 
 
Figure 10.9: Wind Power Capacity in Japan – A Global Comparison 
 
Source of data: (WWEA, 2009) 
 
Figure 10.10 shows the growth of wind power capacity from 1992 to 2008 and 
presents the government’s target for 2010 (ANRE, 2006). In order to reach this very 
modest target of 3000 MW of installed capacity by 2010, existing wind power 
capacity Japan would have to increase by 60% over the next two years. As the trend 




line of Figure 10.10 demonstrates, if the pace of growth remains unchanged, Japan 
will likely fall short of its 2010 target.  
 
Figure 10.10: The Past and Future of Wind Energy in Japan 
 
 
The apathy that underpins the government’s wind capacity target for 2010 of 3000 
MW is clear when viewed from the bigger picture. If the 3000 MW target is reached, 
the annual contribution to Japan’s electricity supply will amount to 1% (IEA, 2008c). 
Although, reaching this target would bring the wind power capacity up to the same 
level as geothermal power capacity, it will still pale in comparison to other renewable 
technologies. Solar PV and biomass power generation will be 2.5 times greater than 
the power supplied by wind energy (ANRE, 2006). Moreover, hydropower generation 
will exceed wind power generation by a factor of 10 (IEA, 2008c). In short, even 
within the context of Japan’s uninspired renewable energy programs, wind power 








10.5 BARRIERS TO WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT 
The ten regional utility monopolies in Japan are the gatekeepers of Japan’s electricity 
market. Understanding the factors that discourage the utilities from purchasing wind 
power illuminates the challenge ahead for wind power diffusion efforts. Essentially, 
three dominant themes underpin utility resistance: i) cost disincentives, ii) operational 
inconveniences, and iii) strategic conflicts. These themes will be examined in turn. 
 
10.5.1 Cost Disincentives 
In Japan, electricity is sold to the end-consumer at a fixed price regardless of the 
generation technology used. The government acts in a regulatory role to ensure that 
the retail price is established at a level that will not exact undue hardship on energy 
consumers. This system precludes Japan’s utilities from strategically managing retail 
energy costs. With fixed retail prices, profitability for Japan’s utilities comes down to 
cost control – minimizing the cost of power generation, maximizes gross margins.  
 
Table 10.2: Comparative Electricity Generation Costs in Japan 
Power source Generation cost 
(¥ per KWh) 
Capacity factor 
Hydroelectric  ¥8.2-13.3 45% 
Oil-fired  ¥10.0-17.3 30-80% 
LNG-fired ¥5.8-7.1 60-80% 
Coal-fired ¥5.0-6.5 70-80% 
Nuclear ¥4.8-6.2 70-85% 
Photovoltaic ¥46.0 12% 
Wind ¥10.0-14.0 20% 
Source: (ANRE, 2008a) 
 
Given the importance of cost control for profitability, utilities are incentivized to 
favour the cheapest technologies. Table 10.2 has been extracted from the Japanese 
government’s Annual Energy Report for 2007. According to this government data, 




nuclear power, coal-fired power and LNG-fired power represent the cheapest sources 
of electricity in Japan. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that these three 
technologies supply over 80% of Japan’s electricity (IEA, 2008c). The cost 
comparisons also highlight why utilities are reluctant to purchase more wind power 
than is mandated by the government and why the government is hesitant to mandate 
higher purchases of wind power – it appears to be costly.  
 
There is, however, reason to question the accuracy of the data presented in Table 10.2. 
As the table indicates, the cost of generating wind power in Japan (including the cost 
of grid connection) is estimated to be ¥10-14 per kWh (approx. US$0.10-0.14). In 
comparison, a study by the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) estimates the 
cost of wind power (including grid connection costs and incorporating a 7.5% 
discount rate) in Europe for comparable medium speed wind sites (2100-2500 load 
hours per year) to be ¥8.2-9.7 per kWh (Morthorst & Awerbuch, 2009). The disparity 
between Japanese and European wind energy costs is particularly noteworthy given 
that the cost of capital in Japan is lower than in Europe and this would justify 
application of a lower discount rate, causing wind generation costs to be lower in 
Japan. Although the higher cost of wind in Japan is partly explained by Japan’s higher 
cost base for key materials (such as steel), higher land lease costs and higher labour 
costs, two other less obvious factors exacerbate the inflation of wind cost estimates in 
Japan – use of a highly conservative capacity load factor for the cost calculation and 
demands placed on wind developers to fully mitigate the challenges posed by 
intermittency.    
 
 




 10.5.1.1.   The Capacity Load Factor Question 
The cost estimate for wind is based on a capacity load factor (CLF) of 20%. Such a 
low CLF is typically associated with low wind areas that are borderline financially 
viable. In Japan’s case, the majority of sites chosen for wind power developments are 
medium wind areas (Ushiyama, 1999; Yamaguchi & Ishihara, 2007). In such areas, 
achieving a CLF of 24%-26% is common (Morthorst & Awerbuch, 2009). If the cost 
of wind power was recalculated using a capacity load factor of 25%, the costs would 
be approximately 25% lower (i.e. ¥7.5-¥10.5).  
 
Nevertheless, under the current costing regime where external costs are ignored, even 
if the cost of wind power were 25% lower, the costs of nuclear, coal and LNG power 
would still be cheaper. However, a narrower cost differential implies that 
incorporating more wind energy would have a less dramatic impact on the bottom line 
of Japan’s utilities than implied by the data presented in Table 10.2. Furthermore, the 
adoption of a US$20 per ton tax on CO2 emissions or a similar tax on nuclear waste 
disposal would make wind energy commercially competitive (Boyle, 2004). 
 
 10.5.1.2.   The Intermittency Question 
Stochastic power flows are widely regarded as the biggest hurdle facing wind energy 
diffusion today (Ackerman, 2005; Boyle, 2004; DeCarolis & Keith, 2006). The 
current technological consensus appears to be that wind energy can contribute up to 
20% of a large scale electricity grid’s power without requiring additional backup 
systems to cover power fluctuations associated with wind intermittency (DeCarolis & 
Keith, 2006; EWEA, 2009). This is made possible by more effectively utilizing 
surplus capacity that is already built into the system (Boyle, 2004).  




In Japan, the utilities contend that the stochastic nature of wind power poses 
unacceptable risks to grid stability. Accordingly, there are reported cases of electric 
utilities forcing wind energy providers to assume the cost of storing the energy 
generated in order to sell it to the utility in consistent flows. According to one report, 
this requirement increases the cost of wind energy by as much as 50%, severely 
curtails profit margins for wind energy providers and dampens market development 
(Englander, 2008). 
 
The demands that Japan’s utilities place on wind energy providers seem unreasonable 
when considering that Japan’s current wind power capacity amounts to a little over 
1% of the total power supply. NEDO, Japan’s largest public research and development 
organization, has concluded that the national electricity grid could accommodate wind 
power contributions of 10-20% before additional backup capacity is needed to address 
stochastic power flows (Nagai, Yaga, & Ameku, 1995).  
 
To summarize the verity of cost disincentives, in the absence of carbon taxes or 
nuclear waste management fees, wind energy is approximately 50% more expensive 
than the dominant electricity sources; however, resistance to wind energy based on 
concerns over managing stochastic power flows are unfounded at current capacity 
levels. 
 
10.5.2 Operational Inconveniences 
Even if the cost gap between wind energy and Japan’s dominant electricity sources 
could be narrowed, there is a prevailing sense amongst members of Japan’s wind 
energy community that utilities resist wind energy because the technology is an 




operational bother. The aforementioned stochastic power flows exemplifies an 
operational drawback. Although higher amounts of wind power can be incorporated 
into existing electricity grids without necessitating increases to reserve capacity, the 
inherent power fluctuations complicate the dynamics of electricity supply planning 
and require system adjustments. Without incentivization, incorporating more wind 
capacity is an added inconvenience that monopolies can do without.  
 
Another operational bother is the added work involved in integrating a plethora of 
wind turbines into the electric grid. If a utility wishes to add 1 GW of generating 
capacity by constructing a nuclear power plant, grid planners would have at least three 
years lead time to plan a grid connection to the site (Sovacool, 2008a). Conversely, to 
generate an equivalent amount of power (inclusive of load factor differences) through 
wind energy, over 1,000 2-MW turbines would be required. Grid planners would have 
to coordinate grid connections to a number of sites within construction lead time 
intervals that can be as short as 4-6 months (Wizelius, 2007).  
 
10.5.3 Strategic Conflict 
For over 50 years, Japan’s utilities have enjoyed monopoly control over the power 
generation supply chain from resource acquisition to power generation to transmission 
and distribution (FEPC, 2008). Under the existing system, the utility business plan is 
straightforward: 1) strive to negotiate the best possible retail energy prices with 
government regulators, and 2) seek to reduce operating costs by simultaneously 
utilizing the least expensive energy generation technology and investing in cost 
minimization research. Wind energy (and other renewable energy options) threatens to 
upset this business model. 




Incorporating wind energy into the electricity grid poses a dilemma for utility 
strategists. On the one hand, a utility could decide to develop wind energy projects 
itself; thereby, incurring the time-consuming obligations associated with site selection, 
project planning, community relations, environmental impact assessments, project 
management etc. On the other hand, the utility could decide to avoid the logistical 
bother and purchase wind energy from private providers. However, delegating 
responsibilities for generation will result in profits and control leaking from the 
monopolized supply chain. Moreover, under either option, lower margin wind energy 
would displace profitable energy generated by conventional technologies. Clearly, 
neither of the alternatives holds much appeal. 
 
In summary, the comparatively high cost of wind energy, the operational 
inconveniences associated with incorporating wind energy into existing electricity 
grids and the destabilizing impact that wind energy diffusion can have on the existing 
utility business model incentivize utilities to resist wind energy adoption (Inoue & 
Miyazaki, 2008). Espousing unfounded concerns over technical hurdles or 
exaggerating cost disparities exemplify such resistance.  
 
10.6  GRAND PLAN OR GROUP THINK? 
The analysis presented in this case study has attempted to explain the phlegmatic 
approach to wind energy development in Japan. The specific goal of the analysis was 
to qualitatively evaluate two opposing hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that wind 
power has been deemphasized because amidst Japan’s grand power generation plan, 
there are better strategic alternatives available. The second hypothesis was that wind 
power is viewed as extraneous by a homogenous policy culture which is fixated on an 




alternative strategic approach to power generation despite indications that the current 
strategy is sub-optimal.  
 
Results of the analysis indicate that the latter hypothesis appears more credible. As 
discussed, the current strategy will fail to achieve the 3E objectives in the long run. In 
terms of enhancing environmental security, expanding the nuclear energy program 
should help reduce CO2 emissions; however, it will also sire critical new 
environmental challenges related to the disposal of hazardous waste. Moreover, 
regardless of the confidence of energy planners in the safety of the technology, Japan 
is still a nation that is prone to earthquakes. An earthquake centred on a nuclear power 
plant or a nuclear waste storage facility would put this confidence to a test.  
 
In terms of long-term enhancement to economic well-being and national energy 
security, the decision to support the expansion of Japan’s nuclear power program 
shifts Japan’s dependence on overseas resources from one commodity to another. 
Although uranium is currently an inexpensive commodity, Japan is not alone in its 
pursuit of nuclear power program expansion. The inevitable acceleration of demand is 
certain to have an inflationary influence on the price of uranium.  
 
Japan’s national energy strategy can be summed up as a ―Hail Mary pass‖. It is a high 
risk strategy that delivers short-term economic benefits at the expense of long-term 
sustainability. Future generations in Japan will be saddled with the dual challenges of 
managing enormous stockpiles of nuclear waste and facilitating the development of 
new technologies for generating electricity when uranium supplies dwindle and the 




cost of uranium escalates. As the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan 
concedes, there are 85 years of commercially viable uranium stores left on the planet.  
 
Finally, it is ironic given the prioritization of nuclear energy in Japan that one of the 
goals of Japan’s ―New Energy Strategy‖ is to ―assist Asian and world nations in 
addressing energy problems‖. While some Japanese bureaucrats labour to achieve this 
goal, others are actively pursuing negotiations with foreign governments to try and 
purchase the right to sequester nuclear waste somewhere other than Japan. This is not 
the type of ―assistance in addressing energy problems‖ that will engender positive 
overseas relationships. 
 
10.7 TOWARD A BETTER PLAN 
There are a host of initiatives that the Japanese government could implement to 
redress the unsustainable approach to national power generation planning that 
currently exists. In this concluding section, four policy initiatives are introduced as 
requisite first steps toward a more sustainable power generation strategy that more 
effectively meets the 3E objectives. 
 
Firstly, the more significant external costs associated with each power generation 
technology should be internalized to reflect the true cost of power generation. For 
example, assuming the cost of carbon credits to be US$20 per ton, the Japanese 
government is currently subsidizing coal-fired energy with approximately 2¢US per 
kWh, oil-fired energy with approximately 1.5¢US per kWh and LNG-fired energy 
with approximately 0.6¢US per kWh (Sovacool, 2008a). This subsidy is in the form of 
requisite government purchases of carbon credits in order to offset excessive national 




CO2 emissions (in order to meet its Kyoto Protocol obligations) (Government of Japan, 
1998). Similarly, costs related to the sequestration of nuclear waste are not currently 
included in the cost of nuclear power generation. This artificially inflates the 
commercial attractiveness of nuclear power. In contrast, wind power providers are 
required to absorb all external costs associated with their projects, including costs 
associated with grid connection, transmission sub-stations, environmental damage 
mitigation and in many cases, the cost of electricity storage (Englander, 2008). 
Enforcing a full accounting of any significant costs associated with power generated 
through fossil fuel and nuclear plants will allow policymakers to make economically 
optimised decisions based on a balanced playing field.  
 
This does not necessarily mean that retail electricity prices have to increase. 
Subsidizing retail electricity prices to allay the threat that higher electricity costs will 
dampen economic growth prospects is an industrial policy decision that would be 
justifiable if the subsidies could not be used more effectively elsewhere. However, the 
current practice of subsidizing the costs of specific inefficient energy technologies is 
economically sub-optimal. It makes inferior technologies appear better on paper.  
 
Secondly, bolder RPS quotas are necessary. As explained earlier, research suggests 
that up to 20% of Japan’s electricity could be generated through intermittent 
renewable sources (i.e. solar PV, wind, wave or tidal power) without requiring 
additional storage or generator backup. Even under the current electricity costing 
system (in which wind energy is 50% more expensive than conventional energy 
sources because externalities are not internalized), a 20% contribution of wind power 
would have a low impact on aggregate energy prices and even a lower impact on 




corporate profitability. A 20% contribution from wind would result in an aggregate 
electricity cost increase of about 10%. In firms where energy costs represent 10% of 
overall operating costs, this increase would amount to a 1% increase in operating costs.  
 
Increasing RPS quotas is important because expanding the scale of wind power 
deployment would force utilities to amend their grid management systems in order to 
efficiently accommodate higher levels of intermittent energy inputs. These upgrades 
would cultivate the competencies necessary for incorporating higher contributions in 
the future. Given the impending perils of climate change, the 20% target should 
receive short-term priority. A 20% wind power target for 2020 would not be 
unreasonable. 
 
Thirdly, the electricity generation industry should be fully liberalized. Currently a 
form of ―Japanese‖ liberalization exists whereby utilities have monopoly control over 
all but small specialised segments of the national energy supply chain (FEPC, 2008). 
Operation of the electricity grid should be clearly separated from the energy 
generation function. While it is widely accepted that electricity distribution constitutes 
a natural monopoly (Harris, 2006), power generation should be open to competition in 
order to ensure that generation costs are minimized.  
 
Serendipitously, increasing the RPS quota (recommendation one) will partially 
catalyze market liberalization. A higher RPS quota will encourage heated competition 
for a lucrative revenue pool and result in lower renewable energy costs. However, in a 
well-managed feed-in tariff system – which is what the RPS system is – the subsidized 
purchase price should be decreased over time to encourage cost minimization 




behaviour on the part of renewable energy providers (Komor, 2004). Consequently, in 
the absence of mainstream market liberalization, renewable energy providers will 
eventually be forced to compete with the energy generation arms of the utilities. 
Under such competitive circumstances, renewable energy providers would be hard-
pressed to defeat the competition. This implies that steps toward full market 
liberalization should be taken in conjunction with the recommended increase in the 
RPS quota. 
 
Lastly, the Japanese government should provide more R&D funding for research 
aimed at making electricity storage systems more cost effective. Efficient energy 
storage technologies would allow intermittent renewable energy technologies to play 
an unlimited role in national electricity generation. In the absence of cost effective 
energy storage, wind energy contributions over 20%-30% will incur additional costs 
associated with added back-up requirements to smooth power intermittency 
(Ackerman, 2005). Although research is already underway in Japan in this regard, the 
scale of funding pales in comparison to funding set aside for nuclear power research. 
Funding for energy storage technologies on a scale similar to nuclear power funding 
could yield technological breakthroughs which would facilitate electricity grids 
comprised of 100% intermittent renewable energy. Not only would improved power 
storage synthesize Japan’s objectives of achieving economic well-being, national 
energy security and environmental security (3Es), it would also nurture the emergence 
of a new power storage industry.  
 
In concluding this review of Japan’s wind power policy, it should be apparent from 
the analysis provided herein that Japan is in a precarious position in regard to 




developing a sustainable national electricity generation system. Wind power can be 
only part of the solution. If the technical potential of 140,000 MW of installed wind 
power capacity projected by the Geographical Survey Institute in Japan were 
achievable, wind power could conceivably provide approximately 430 TWh of 
electricity annually (assuming a capacity load factor of 35%). This amount of 
electricity would satisfy only about 48% of Japan’s current electricity needs (FEPC, 
2008). Including the 5% contribution currently made by hydro and biomass, there is 
still a shortfall of 47% that must be accommodated through a combination of fossil 
fuel power, nuclear power and/or energy efficiency measures. In short, given current 
technical and economic constraints, it is highly probable that a decarbonized 
electricity mix in Japan would have to incorporate a degree of nuclear energy at least 
in the short run to help cover the 47% shortfall; and even then, it is probable that a 
high amount of installed gas-fired electricity capacity would be required to provide the 
necessary peaking capacity to accommodate such high levels of wind power. 
 
This predicament underlines the importance of both intensifying research into cost-
effective, utility-scale storage systems and continuing to champion energy efficiency 
initiatives in all sectors of the Japanese economy. Advances in storage technology and 
progress in improving energy efficiency from both the demand and supply sides will 
reduce the amount of fossil fuel and nuclear power needed to cover energy supply 
shortfalls.  
 
Ultimately, the dilemma that Japan faces epitomizes the quandary faced by most large 
industrialised nations. Until new technologies emerge, electricity needed to preserve 
the current economic status quo will likely have to come partially from either nuclear 




power (inducing waste management problems) or fossil fuel combustion (inducing 
carbon storage problems). However, regardless of the decisions made in regard to 
satisfying electricity supply shortfalls after all renewable energy options have been 
exploited to full capacity, exploiting the potential of renewable energy in general and 
wind power in particular should be accorded top priority if Japan wishes to minimise 
the externalities that reliance on fossil fuels and nuclear power cause. 
  
In the 13th century, divine winds came to the assistance of the Japanese nation; 
however, without the strategy that the Japanese implemented to deter the Mongol 
forces from landing, the arrival of the ―divine winds‖ would have been too late to have 
saved the nation. Similarly today, if Japanese policymakers accept the challenge of 
laying the strategic foundation necessary for wind to play a role in Japan’s energy 
transformation, it may very well be that once again wind will prove to be ambrosial.  




 Appendix 10.1: Significant Energy Conservation Initiatives in Japan 
 
1978 Establishment of the Energy Conservation Center, Japan (ECC J.) 
 A government-sponsored foundation responsible for promoting the efficient use of energy 
1978 Introduction of ECCJ Energy Audits Program 
 Free energy audits provided for small and medium-sized companies. To date, approximately 5600 
assessments have been carried out. Target companies are those with capital of less than ¥100 
million or less than 300 employees. 
1978 Introduction of ECCJ Energy Audits Program 
 Free energy audits provided for small and medium-sized companies. To date, approximately 5600 
assessments have been carried out. Target companies are those with capital of less than ¥100 
million or less than 300 employees. 
1979 Energy Conservation Law (AKA. The Law Concerning the Rational Use of 
Energy) 
 Mandated energy management programs in approximately 3,500 large factories. 
1980 Publication of enhanced building standards for housing developments  
1983 Revision to the 1979 Energy Conservation Law  
 Regulatory and structural revisions to streamline the licensing and audit processes. 
1992 Building Standards Upgrade  
 All standards for housing developments were upgraded to meet benchmarks established for colder 
regions of Europe and North America. 
1993 Further Revision to the 1979 Energy Conservation Law  
 Tightened energy efficiency standards in factories and applied new standards to office buildings. 
 Established energy efficiency standards for air-conditioners, fluorescent lamps, televisions, 
copying machines, computers, and magnetic disk units. 
1993 Introduction of Law for Energy Conservation and Recycling Support  
 Introduced to financially assist business operators who voluntarily tackle such activities as 
rationalization of energy use and utilization of energy efficient technology. 
1997 Establishment of the Headquarters of Measures to Arrest Global Warming  
 Tasked with the responsibility of identifying comprehensive energy conservation measures to 
control CO2 emissions. 
1998 Further Revision to the 1979 Energy Conservation Law 
 Expanded the number of ―designated energy management factories‖ to include medium-sized 
factories. Over 9,000 medium-sized factories and businesses affected by new standards. 
 Introduction of the Top Runner Program which established best practice efficiency targets for 12 
categories of products: passenger cars, diesel passenger cars, trucks, diesel trucks, air-conditioners, 
fluorescent lights, electric refrigerators, TV sets, computers, VCRs, magnetic disk units, and 
copying machines.  
2000 Establishment of eEnergy Conservation Labelling System  
 Featuring the introduction of energy standards and a labelling system for household appliances. 
2006 Further Revision to the 1979 Energy Conservation Law 
 Tightened energy efficiency standards in affected factories and businesses. 








 Appendix 10.2: Significant Energy Efficiency Technology Initiatives in Japan 
 
1995 The Energy Star Program  
 A labelling program which provides energy-saving criteria for office equipment.  
1996 Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment 
 A voluntary industry effort organized by the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) involving 36 
industries and 137 organizations. Each industry voluntarily sets energy efficiency targets and 
publicizes results on an annual basis. 
1998 Financial Support Program for Combined Heat and Power 
 15% assistance toward the equipment cost for large-scale cogeneration projects. 
 Debt guarantees provided by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development 
Organization (NEDO). 
1999 Regional Subsidies 
 Initiatives include local government support for the introduction of advanced energy-saving 
equipment, community energy-saving activities, the creation of energy-saving models, 
development of practical energy-saving techniques, development of techniques for electrical loss 
reduction and optimum device control in operating equipment, medium and small businesses 
energy conservation programs, development of energy efficient equipment businesses, promotion 
of field tests for the introduction of high performance industrial furnaces, and the promotion of 
energy-saving development of housing and office buildings. 
2000 METI Committee on Advanced Demand Side Management  
 Committee which seeks to influence consumption patterns through the creation of policies for the 
promotion of businesses which provided energy-saving goods and services and policies that will 
encourage users to invest in energy saving equipment. 
2000 The Green Procurement Law. 
 Promotes the purchase of equipment that reduce environmental impact. 
2001 Introduction of Solar Power in Government Office Buildings 
 Aiming to install 410 kWh of solar power capacity in 13 government offices. This program is 
designed to serve as a model project in order to encourage other institutions and companies to 
introduce solar power. 
2008 Creation of Green Energy Partnership  
 The aim of the partnership is to bring together manufacturers, retailers, green power generation 
companies, green power certificate issuers and community stakeholders to join forces to promote 









WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates a theme that is commonly encountered by policymakers in a 
number of policy settings - how can appropriate policies be developed when two (or 
more) seemingly valid, yet disparate scientific or technical estimates confound 
objective analysis? The study adopts the context of wind power development policy in 
Taiwan to demonstrate how to employ organizational analysis to identify factors 
which influence subjective assumptions underpinning disparate estimates of wind 
power potential and then demonstrates the application of two concepts from chaos 
theory – fitness landscapes and strategic real options – for guiding policymaking 
amidst the existence of technological dissent. In contrast to progressively declining 
subsidies that are commonly associated with fledgling renewable energy programs, 
this study introduces the concept of progressively escalating procurement rates to 





After a cursory review of Taiwan's energy situation and its national energy strategy, 
wind power appears to be an obvious candidate for fast-track development policies. 
Key objectives of Taiwan's national energy strategy include enhancement of domestic 
power generation capacity, minimization of power generation costs, stabilization of 
fuel-stocks cost, and reduction of CO2
 
emissions leading to a target of 50% of 2000 
emission levels by 2050 (TBOE, 2009b). With hydropower in Taiwan nearing 
maximum capacity, wind power is the only under-utilized utility-scale power source 
that possesses the attributes for meeting all these objectives. Yet, evidence indicates 
that the development of wind power in Taiwan has hit a plateau. Taiwan's only private 
wind power developer recently announced an intention to shift its operational focus to 




other national markets unless the government takes measures to improve the 
unprofitable business conditions for wind power in Taiwan (Lu & Ko, 2009). 
 
As the reader will learn, estimating wind power potential in Taiwan is a contentious 
issue. On the one hand, the Taiwan Power Company (Taipower) – Taiwan’s public 
utility – estimates that wind power potential is moderate; and as a result, it prioritizes 
other technologies and other policies for achieving national strategic energy goals. On 
the other hand, Infravest – a private wind power developer – contends that wind 
power potential is much greater than Taipower estimates and harnessing this potential 
could contribute significantly to achieving national strategic energy goals. The theme 
of this chapter centres on the challenge of developing policy when confronted with 
two disparate technical estimates that both appear to be based on sound reason and 
judgment. Although the context of this case study centres on wind energy policy, the 
challenge of developing sound policy when two (or more) seemingly valid, yet 
disparate scientific or technical estimates confound objective analysis is relevant to 
policymakers in all fields. 
 
One of the key contributions that this study aims to make is to demonstrate how 
techniques attributable to chaos theory can be applied to the resolution of political 
deadlocks caused by dissenting yet equally plausible scientific evaluations. The study 
also contributes to the propagation of knowledge for fostering renewable energy 
capacity expansion through policy instruments by introducing a new policy 
application for development subsidies. Development subsidies are typically seen as 
mechanisms for supporting the development of renewable energy technologies that are 
not yet commercially viable. Under such circumstances, an effectively managed 




incentive system incorporates mechanisms for gradually reducing the subsidy in order 
to encourage developers of renewable energy technologies to innovate and minimize 
costs. In this study, a strategically managed procurement rate program is put forth as a 
mechanism for supporting market development of a mature technology, wind power. 
In this new application, the procurement rate program incorporates a mechanism for 
gradually increasing the rate in order to incentivize development of sites deemed 
commercially unviable under the old rate.  
 
In considering challenges to implementing the development subsidy recommended in 
this chapter, the study concludes with an examination of the concept of strategic intent 
which is a strategic management concept that advocates the importance of structural 
realignment to support changing strategy. In Taiwan's case, Taipower's strategic 
behaviour to date has been entirely consistent with the government’s mandate to 
enhance national energy security. If the government wishes to encourage Taipower to 
aggressively support the expansion of wind power capacity, it must re-align 
Taipower's strategic objectives and redesign incentive programs to encourage a more 
aggressive approach to seeking out new wind power sites.  
 
The format of this chapter is as follows. Section 11.2 outlines Taiwan's energy 
situation. It provides an overview of the power generation industry, describes the 
industry structure, summarizes strategic challenges relating to energy governance and 
describes some of the programs designed to meet these challenges. Section 11.3 
provides an overview of wind power in Taiwan and analyzes two disparate estimates 
of realizable wind power potential. The analysis attempts to explain why these 
estimates differ and how this influences the policymaking process. Section 11.4 




provides advice for Taiwan's energy policymakers in regard to how to proceed with 
wind energy policy development in the face of conflicting wind power potential 
estimates. In this section concepts are borrowed from chaos theory to steer the 
policymaking process. In section 11.5, the recommendations put forth in section 11.4 
are discussed in relation to Taiwan's current development incentivization program. 
The discussion reveals how a new subsidy program could be effectively appended to 
Taipower's current approach. Finally section 11.6 concludes with a summary of 
lessons that policymakers and analysts can glean from the Taiwan story. 
 
11.2 TAIWAN’S ENERGY SITUATION 
11.2.1  Market Overview 
With just under 23 million living on a 32,000 km² island, Taiwan is one of the most 
densely populated nations in the world. It is also one of the world's most affluent 
nations with a per capita GDP of US$31,900 (PPP) in 2008 (CIA, 2008). The 
combination of a highly concentrated, affluent population and an expansive industrial 
sector has inauspiciously fuelled Taiwan’s ascension to become the world's third 
highest per capita consumer of electricity (TBOE, 2005), mushrooming from 2,871 
kWh / person in 1986 to 9,977 kWh / person in 2006 (TBOE, 2007). Despite its 
comparatively small population size, Taiwan was the 17th largest national consumer 
of electricity in the world 2008, with aggregate electricity consumption of 233,000 
GWh (CIA, 2008). Furthermore, as Figure 11.1 illustrates, due to a proliferation of 
electricity-intensive industries, energy consumed for power generation is playing an 
increasingly dominant role in Taiwan's energy profile.  
 
 




Figure 11.1: The Expanding Role of Electricity in Taiwan's Energy Profile   
 
Source: Taiwan Bureau of Energy (TBOE, 2007) 
 
Taiwan is heavily dependent on imported fuel-stocks for power generation. Aside 
from electricity generated through hydropower and co-generation, the remaining 
81.1% of electricity generated in 2006 employed imported fuel-stocks.  
 
Table 11.1: Taiwan’s Evolving Electricity Mix 
KL of Oil Equivalent
Source of Electricity KLOE % KLOE %
Conventional Hydro 652               5% 727            1% 0.60%
Coal-fired Thermal 4,686           33% 22,821       39% 8.24%
Oil-fired Thermal 1,777           12% 4,798         8% 5.09%
LNG-fired Thermal -                0% 8,270         14% -
Nuclear Power 7,195           50% 11,170       19% 2.22%
Solar and Wind Power 4                   0% 20               0% 8.28%
Cogeneration -                0% 10,224       18% -
Solar Thermal -                0% 0                 0% -




Source: Taiwan Bureau of Energy (TBOE, 2007) 
 
Although imports of coal have risen significantly in the 20-year period 1986-2006, 
growth in oil imports have slowed due to government efforts to replace oil-fired 
power with LNG-fired power. In terms of low-carbon power sources, national 
hydropower capacity has nearly reached peak potential, nuclear power capacity is 
expected to increase by 2.7 GW in 2011 when Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plant 
commences operation (TBOE, 2009b) and renewables (solar and wind power) have 
been slow to develop as utility-scale power sources (TBOE, 2007) (Table 11.1).  
(data in KL of Oil Equiv.) 




The nation's reliance on fossil fuel energy for power generation (61.9%) fosters two 
noteworthy problems for Taiwan's energy policymakers. Firstly, the volatile nature of 
fossil fuel prices destabilizes industrial strategy and erodes corporate profitability. To 
date, such adverse impacts have been side-stepped by government regulatory refusal 
of Taipower appeals to pass along cost increases to end-consumers (Hsin-Chin Shih, 
2007). However, due to significant amplification of fossil fuel costs over the past three 
years, Taipower has suffered increasingly large financial deficits which must be 
reconciled through a drawdown of reserve capital. Losses of NT$23.25 billion 
(US$705 million) in 2006, NT$330 billion (US$10 billion) in 2007 and NT$130 
billion (approximately US$4 billion) in 2008 have severely depleted Taipower’s 
capital reserves thereby impairing financial well-being and raising concerns of 
insolvency, prompting Taipower's Vice-president of Finance Wen-Kuei Tsai to quip 
―If we close, who is going to supply electricity to the nation?" (Ho, 2007). The second 
problem related to Taiwan's reliance on fossil fuels is that Taiwan's per capita carbon 
dioxide emissions are enormous. In 2006, per capita CO2 emissions in Taiwan (13.19 
tonnes per capita) were the third-highest in the world behind only Australia (20.58 
tonnes) and the United States (19.78 tonnes) (Tchii, 2009). As Taiwanese President 
Ma Ying-Jeou asserted in a 2008 World Environment Day speech, although Taiwan is 
not a member of the UN, nor a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, Taiwan has an 
obligation to the international community to take the matter of decreasing greenhouse 
gas emissions seriously.  
 
11.2.2  Industry Structure 
Responsibility for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in 
Taiwan has been historically vested with Taipower which is a public monopoly. 




Virtually all transmission and distribution lines in Taiwan are installed and owned by 
Taipower (K. M. Wang, 2006). 
 
End-user electricity pricing is fixed by government energy regulators after consulting 
with Taipower and taking into consideration global energy pricing trends and the 
competitive needs of domestic industry. As suggested earlier, Taipower faces extreme 
consumer and political antipathy regarding appeals to pass along cost increases to end-
consumers. Consequently, between 1983 and 2006 electricity prices in Taiwan were 
held unchanged. In July 2006, Taipei was allowed to raise its rates by 5.8% in order to 
compensate for increased fuel costs (L. Wang, 2008). Two subsequent price increases 
of 12.6% in July and October of 2008 have done little to attenuate operating losses. 
Table 11.2 indicates the extent to which electricity is underpriced. As the table 
illustrates, the shortfall between average cost and retail price in 2008 amounted to 
1.85 US cents per kilowatt hour (kWh). With 233,000 GW hours of electricity 
consumed in 2008, this represents an aggregate operating margin deficit of US$4.255 
billion. It is, however, worth noting that the cost estimates from Taipower in Table 
11.2 are indicative of the politicized nature of energy pricing in Taiwan. Taipower 
claims that the cost of advanced nuclear power in 2008 was US¢1.88 / kWh. Given 
that advanced nuclear power was estimated at US¢4.9 / kWh in the US in 2007 
(Sovacool, 2008a) and advanced nuclear power in Japan cost approximately US¢6.4 / 
kWh in 2007 (FEPC, 2008), this estimate is of dubious accuracy if it entails the total 
capitalised cost of advanced nuclear power. Nevertheless, although there is reason to 
doubt the accuracy of the nuclear cost estimate, the overall cost estimate and the 
average end consumer prices which provide support for the contention that Taipower 
is operating in deficit are subject to external auditing; and as a result, they are reliable. 




Table 11.2: Cost and Retail Price of Electricity in Taiwan in 2008
18
 
Electricity Source Cost in US¢ per Kilowatt Hour* 
Oil 15.33¢ 
Natural Gas 17.82¢ 
Coal Power 5.67 ¢ 
Nuclear (Advanced technology) 1.88 ¢ 
  
     Overall Cost per kWh for Taipower in 2008:                            8.82¢/ kWh 
     Average End Consumer Price:                                                      6.97¢/ kWh 
Average Gross Margin Deficit per Kilowatt Hour:                             1.85¢/ kWh 
*Calculated using the following exchange rate: NT$33/US$1 
 
Executives at Taipower face limited options for managing operational finances. 
Regarding retail price control, Taipower has to accept the prices set by government 
regulators. Regarding cost control over fuel-stocks, purchase prices of imported fuel-
stocks are largely fixed through long-term supply contracts which are deemed 
necessary for supporting Taipower's main strategic remit to maintain a secure and 
reliable electricity supply
19
. Essentially, Taipower managers only have significant 
control over operating costs and capital equipment costs. Although government 
monopolies are infamous for cost inefficiencies, the recent financial deficits posted by 
Taipower are less attributable to operational inefficiencies than to the unenviable 
position of having to adhere to fixed retail prices when material costs are increasing.   
 
In 1994, in an attempt to improve market efficiency, the government partially 
liberalized the electricity market. Under this initiative, the electricity market was 
opened to independent power producers (IPP) and Taipower was required to sign 25-
year power purchase agreements (PPA) with these power producers (K. M. Wang, 
2006). As Table 11.3 indicates, nearly one-third of Taiwan’s electricity generation 
                                                 
18
 This data was provided by Mark Chuang, Director of The Corporate Planning Department of 
Taipower through personal e-mail correspondence on May 23, 2009. 
19
 Interview with Taipower executives on May 15, 2009 




capacity now rests with IPPs. The success of the 1994 liberalization campaign is 
easily explained. Taipower is required to purchase electricity from IPPs at a price that 
equals the cost that Taipower incurs for generating electricity through similar 
technologies at its own facilities. Given the added costs associated with Taipower's 
mandate to ensure energy security, and with prices guaranteed for 25 years through 
PPAs, profits for IPPs are virtually guaranteed after winning contracts (Hsin-Chin 
Shih, 2007). Unfortunately, this system fails to introduce the requisite competition to 
encourage enhanced production efficiency at Taipower. In fact, diffusing power 
generation in this way likely undermines Taipower's economies of scale. 
 
Table 11.3: The Expanding Role of Private Electricity Generation Capacity in Taiwan 
TAIPOWER CAPACITY (MW) 2000 2003 2005 2007 
Total Hydro 4,422.0 4,502.0 4,501.0 4,513.0 
Conventional 1,820.0 1,900.0 1,899.0 1,911.0 
Pumped storage 2,602.0 2,602.0 2,602.0 2,602.0 
Total Thermal 17,819.0 17,886.0 19,231.0 21,016.0 
Coal-fired 8,100.0 8,100.0 8,650.0 8,800.0 
Oil fired 5,405.0 3,563.0 3,609.0 3,610.0 
LNG fired 4,312.0 6,223.0 6,972.0 8,606.0 
Wind - 2.0 18.0 131.8 
Nuclear 5,144.0 5,144.0 5,144.0 5,144.0 
Total Taipower 27,385.0 27,534.0 28,894.0 30,804.8 
     
IPP CAPACITY (MW) 2000 2003 2005 2007 
Thermal 7,385.0 12,557.0 14,236.0 15,001.0 
Cogeneration 5,134.0 6,807.0 7,016.0 7,781.0 
IPP's 2,250.0 5,750.0 7,220.0 7,220.0 
Hydro - 8.8 10.7 22.2 
Wind 2.6 6.1 6.1 55.9 
Solar 0.1 0.5 1.0 2.4 
Total Non-Taipower 7,387.7 12,572.4 14,253.8 15,081.5 
     
TOTAL CAPACITY (MW) 2000 2003 2005 2007 
Total Generation Capacity 34,772.7 40,106.4 43,147.8 45,886.3 
Total IPP Share of Capacity 21.2% 31.3% 33.3% 32.9% 
Source: (TBOE, 2009a) 
 
 




11.2.3  Present Strategic Challenges 
Enhancement of national energy security dominates Taiwanese strategic energy policy. 
Taiwan's utter dependence on energy imports implies that adverse international energy 
market dynamics (over which Taiwan has no control) could deeply affect domestic 
socio-economic stability (Yue, Liu, & Liou, 2001). Broadly speaking, there are two 
overarching objectives guiding Taiwan’s national energy security strategy. Firstly, a 
series of strategic programs are in place to mitigate the risk of energy supply 
disruption. Secondly, strategic programs to mitigate the risk of energy price instability 
are also progressively unfolding. Figure 11.2 outlines the five main program streams 
which support these two strategic objectives. The figure also provides some examples 
of key initiatives which fall under each program stream. 
 
The program stream most relevant to renewable energy developers involves efforts to 
bolster Taiwan's indigenous supply of energy because Taiwan's dependence on 
imported energy ranks with Japan and Italy as being amongst the most precarious in 
the world. There are three major initiatives underway to upgrade indigenous energy 
supplies.  
 
The first initiative is the implementation of a Renewable Energy Development Bill 
that was finally passed in June 2009 after being mired in legislative debate for the past 
seven years (Tchii & Wang, 2009). The bill formalizes a subsidy program for 
renewable energy and establishes the legal basis for the creation of a pricing 
commission which will quantify procurement prices and purchase targets for each 
form of renewable energy.  




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The second initiative strives to strengthen Taipower's renewable energy development 
programs. In the short-term, Taipower plans to further encourage wind power capacity 
development, aiming for an ultimate goal of 2159 MW of installed wind power 
capacity by 2010 (Lin et al., 2009). However, as Chi-Yuan Liang, an economist at 
Academia Sinica observes, achievement of this target is doubtful given that only 281 
MW of installed capacity currently exists.
20
 In the long-term, Taipower is investing in 
solar photovoltaic (PV) power research because it is believed that solar PV power has 




The third initiative for enhancing domestic energy supplies entails augmentation of 
the IPP program. The government has proposed amendments to the Electricity Act 
which will make it easier for renewable energy providers to develop projects in 
Taiwan (K. M. Wang, 2006). 
 
Another program stream of relevance to wind energy developers involves efforts to 
diversify Taiwan’s pool of national energy suppliers and the type of energy that is 
purchased. In terms of diversifying national suppliers, Taiwan aims to reduce its 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil which accounts for 80.8 % of its oil imports (TBOE, 
2009b). In terms of diversifying the energy mix, Taiwan is attempting to facilitate a 
transition from oil to LNG for power generation (K. M. Wang, 2006). Moreover, the 
role of nuclear power in the power generation mix will be fortified when the fourth 
nuclear power plant comes online in 2011 (TBOE, 2009b). In terms of the role 
renewable energy will play in the diversified energy mix, Taiwan is aiming to increase 
                                                 
20
 Source: Bloomberg New Service, ―Energy Bureau Looking to Boost Wind-Power 10-fold‖, 28 
September 2007. 
21
 Interview with Taipower executives on 15 May 2009. 




the contribution that renewable energy makes to national power generation from 5.9% 
in June 2007 to 12% by 2020 (Lin, et al., 2009; TBOE, 2009b). While the bulk of 
current renewable capacity consists of hydropower (1922 MW of 2782 MW) (TBOE, 
2008), wind and solar PV technologies are expected to contribute most to achieving 
the 12% target (TBOE, 2008). 
 
The three other main program streams include initiatives to enhance efforts to improve 
right of access to foreign energy supplies, initiatives to enhance power generation 
efficiency at Taipower through technical upgrading and initiatives to improved 
demand-side power utilization. Although initiatives to improve energy efficiency are 
typically seen as most cost effective, perceptions that renewable energy capacity is 
limited (to be further elaborated upon in the next section), place even greater impetus 
on embracing aggressive energy efficiency goals. The current objective is to improve 
energy efficiency by at least 2% per year based on 2005 energy intensity levels with 
an aggregate goal of reducing energy intensity to 50% of the 2005-level by 2025 
(Taiwan MOEA, 2008). Already there are a number of programs in place to encourage 
improved utilization efficiency in industry, the residential sector and government 
circles (Hsiu-Chuan Shih, 2008).  
 
In addition to the strategic challenges related to enhancing national energy security, 
politicians and citizens alike are beginning to view Taiwan's high per capita CO2 
emissions as a national mark of shame. Taiwan has struggled with decoupling 
electricity growth from GDP growth. For the past 25 years, the economic and CO2 
emission growth rates have paralleled one another with both measures increasing by 
over 400% between 1980 and 2006 (Hsin-Chin Shih, 2007). Despite the fact that 




Taiwan’s diplomatic status prevents membership in international climate change 
mitigation regimes, Taiwan's current President Ma Ying-jeou, in an address at the 
National Energy Conference held in April 2009, announced commitments to stabilize 
CO2 emissions at the 2008-level between 2016 and 2020, reduce national CO2 
emissions to the 2000-level by 2025 and to further reduce that amount by 50% by 
2050 (Tchii & Wang, 2009). Given Taiwan's massive dependence on fossil fuels, this 
is a bold initiative that will require significant structural adjustments to Taiwan's 
power industry. 
 
11.2.4  Evaluation of Taiwan’s CO2 Emission Reduction Challenge 
In interviews with executives of the Taiwan Bureau of Energy (TBOE) and Taipower, 
there was general agreement that many of the initiatives for enhancing national 
security would also contribute to CO2 emission reductions. Progress in improving 
supply-side generation efficiency and demand-side energy utilization can help to 
attenuate the aggregate amount of energy used; and in doing so, reduce related CO2 
emissions. Initiatives to diversify the energy mix can also lessen CO2 emissions. In 
particular, reducing reliance on oil by enhancing contributions from nuclear power, 
renewable energy and LNG can facilitate sizable CO2 emission reductions. However, 
executives at both the TBOE and Taipower were quick to point out that renewable 
energy potential was encumbered by land constraints and as such, the contribution that 
these technologies could make to CO2 emission reduction was perceived to be 
marginal in comparison to improvements in energy efficiency or progress toward 
adopting a cleaner energy-mix profile. 
 




Overall, there was a considerable amount of scepticism expressed by policymakers 
who were interviewed over the viability of achieving the President’s penultimate CO2 
emission target of 50% of 2000-levels by 2050. A rough analysis explains the source 
of scepticism. Between 2000 and 2007, power generation capacity expanded by 32% 
(from 34,772 MW to 45,886 MW) to accommodate escalating power demands. If 
growth trends continue at a similar pace, over 240,000 MW of installed capacity 
would be required by 2050. If we optimistically assume that Taiwanese initiatives to 
improve supply-side and demand-side energy efficiency resulted in a doubling of 
energy efficiency (which would be an unprecedented national achievement), Taiwan 
would still require 120,000 MW of installed capacity to meet electricity demands in 
2050. Evaluating the contributions each clean energy technology could make to the 
2050 capacity estimate (120,000 MW) provides insight into the amount of fossil fuel 
energy that would still be required to meet electricity requirements. Table 11.4 
summarizes the growth potential for each clean energy technology. Based on 
estimates provided by executives of Taipower and the Bureau of Energy, the 
maximum potential capacity for clean electricity amounts to 58,000 MW. 
 
Table 11.4: Growth Potential of Alternative Energy Technologies in Taiwan 
Alternative Energy Technology Max. Capacity 
Potential by 2050 
Source of Estimate 
Wind Power 3,000 MW Taipower (assuming technology 
advances) 
Solar, Geothermal, Tidal Power  3,000 MW Bureau of Energy targets 
Hydro power 5,000 MW Extrapolation of growth trend 
Cogeneration 30,000 MW Optimistically assuming a 400% growth 
in capacity 
Nuclear power 17,000 MW Taipower estimate of capacity 
expansion potential for current sites (20 
reactors) 
TOTAL CLEAN ENERGY 58,000 MW  
 




This informal analysis tells us that if the estimates of potential are accurate and 
barring major technological breakthroughs, an additional 62,000 MW of installed 
fossil fuel generation capacity would be needed to cover our hypothetical 120,000 
MW capacity requirement for 2050. Even if Taiwan were to fulfil this additional 
capacity requirement by utilizing only LNG-fired power (in order to minimize CO2 
emissions), CO2 emissions from the thermal power plants under this hypothetical 
scenario would still be 30% greater than 2000-levels. As this hypothetical scenario 
illustrates, meeting the government's interim goal of reducing CO2 emissions to 2000-
levels by 2025 and the penultimate goal of reducing CO2 emissions to 50% of 2000-
levels by 2050 appear to represent Herculean challenges.  
 
Whether or not Taiwan succeeds in its quest to meet its ambitious CO2 emission 
reduction targets critically hinges on the accuracy of the maximum capacity estimates 
for each alternative energy technology represented in Table 11.4. As the above 
analysis indicates, if these alternative energy capacity estimates are accurate, then 
even the achievement of unprecedented gains in energy efficiency improvement will 
fail to come close to the established targets.  
 
Perusing the capacity estimates presented in Table 11.4, the wind power capacity 
estimate appears to be particularly conservative. In terms of facilitating a transition 
away from fossil fuel energy, wind power is the proverbial "low hanging cherry" on 
the tree of options. Globally, wind power is now commercially competitive with 
LNG-fired and oil-fired power (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006; Morthorst & Awerbuch, 
2009). If the cost of social and environmental externalities associated with fossil fuel 
combustion are factored into a cost comparison, wind power is also commercially 




competitive with coal-fired power (Sovacool, 2008a). Given the commercial viability 
of this clean energy resource, nations which are endeavouring to expediently bolster 
renewable energy capacity should strive to fully exploit the potential capacity of wind 
power. If wind power capacity in Taiwan could be expanded to capacity levels found 
in vanguard nations such as Denmark and Germany, 20-30% of total power 
requirements could be met through this one energy source. Accordingly, one of the 
crucial questions that should be asked in regard to renewable energy development in 
Taiwan is ―What is the reason for such a low wind power capacity estimate?”. 
 
As this analysis of wind power policy in Taiwan will illustrate, in attempting to 
answer this question, a series of intriguing insights will emerge in regard to policy 
making amidst technical uncertainty. The Taiwan wind power story should encourage 
policymakers to consider how the existence or absence of technical information 
influences their policy realms. Moreover, the recommendations put forth for guiding 
policymakers in designing policy amidst uncertainty are strategic management 
techniques that can be readily adapted to policy design and implementation in any 
number of policy fields. In short, what follows is a story of wind power development 
in Taiwan, but application of the recommendations put forth is relevant to all 
policymakers. 
 
11.3 WIND POWER IN TAIWAN  
11.3.1  Market Overview 
Government policy has significantly influenced the development of Taiwan's wind 
power industry. In May 1998, the government announced a renewable energy 
expansion plan aimed at boosting the renewable energy supply to 3% of total power 




generation by 2020 (Tsai, 2005). In March 2000, The Bureau of Energy announced a 
support program for wind power demonstration projects which included subsidies of 
up to 50% of the installation cost for wind power demonstration systems (up to a 
maximum subsidy of NT$16,000 (US$480) per kilowatt) (Huang & Wu, 2009). This 
catalyzed a number of wind power demonstration projects and by the end of 2003, 
installed wind power capacity amounted to 8.54 MW (Tsai, 2005). In 2002, the 
Renewable Energy Development Bill mentioned earlier was drafted which put forth 
policies to support more vigorous development of renewable energy projects (Wu & 
Huang, 2006). While the bill was being debated in the Executive Yuan, Taipower 
announced interim plans to offer 10-year energy procurement contracts at a contract 
price of NT$2 (approximately US 6.16¢) per kWh (Wu & Huang, 2006). The 
contractual period has been subsequently extended to 15-years (Lin, et al., 2009). This 
procurement program accelerated wind power capacity expansion. In 2004 alone, 18 
MW of wind power capacity was installed.  
 
Although the Renewable Energy Development Bill was finally approved in June 2009, 
the development of concrete incentives will take some time because an energy 
commission needs to be set up to consider appropriate pricing levels given Taipower’s 
precarious financial situation. In the meantime, Taipower's interim program for 
purchasing wind energy at US 6.16¢ per kWh is still stimulating development. Despite 
criticism that the purchase price of US 6.16¢ per kWh is too low to stimulate large-
scale investment (Lu & Ko, 2009), wind power capacity in Taiwan continues to 
expand. As of 2008, there were 155 wind turbines amounting to 281.6 MW of 
installed capacity at various locations around Taiwan (see Table 11.5).  
 




Table 11.5: Wind Power Facilities in Taiwan 






Penghu Jhongtun: Phase 1 Taipower 4 2.4 
Shihmen ( 1st NPP ) Taipower 6 3.96 
Hengchun ( 3rd NPP ) Taipower 3 4.5 
Penghu Jhongtun: Phase 2 Taipower 4 2.4 
Taoyuan Datan Taipower 3 4.5 
Taoyuan Dayuan- Guanyin Taipower 20 30 
Taichung Power Plant Taipower 4 8 
Taichung Harbor Taipower 18 36 
Changbin Industrial Park Taipower 23 46 
Hsinchu Siangshan Taipower 6 12 
Yunlin Mailiao Formosa Heavy Industries  4 2.64 
Hsinchu Chunfong Cheng Loong Corp. 2 3.5 
Miaoli Jhunan InfraVest GmbH 4 7.8 
Miaoli Dapeng InfraVest GmbH 21 42 
Changbin Lugan Luway / InfraVest GmbH 33 75.9 
    
TOTALS  155 281.6 MW 
Source: (TBOE, 2008) 
 
In addition to current installations, 230 onshore wind turbines sporting combined 
capacity of 467.8 MW are now at various stages of planning or construction (see 
Table 11.6).  
 
Table 11.6: Wind Power Onshore Facilities under Development in Taiwan 







 Taipower Private Sector 
Planning 119 239.5  70.8 168.7 
Consent 71 149.5  68 81.5 
Construction 40 78.8  35.1 43.7 
      
TOTALS 230 467.8  173.9 293.9 
Source: (TBOE, 2008) 
 




Additionally, Taiwan's first offshore wind power development which will total 300 
MW of wind power capacity has recently been ratified by the Executive Yuan and is 
now in the initial stages of planning. When these projects are completed, Taiwan will 
be able to boast a total installed wind power capacity of 1049.4 MW (TBOE, 2008).  
 
As a result of these positive developments, the Taiwanese government has raised its 
long-term target capacity target for renewable energy to 10% of total electricity 
capacity by 2010 and 12% of total electricity capacity by 2020  (TBOE, 2009b). The 
anticipated contribution from wind energy has been estimated at 2159 MW of 
installed capacity by 2010. This amounts to 42% of the 2010 target for renewable 
energy (5130 MW). Coupled with the current installed capacity for hydropower of 
1911 MW (see table 11.3), wind and hydropower together are expected to account for 
79% of installed renewable energy capacity in 2010 (Lin, et al., 2009).  
 
In terms of aggregate national wind power potential estimates, excellent wind 
potential can be found along Taiwan's western coastline, its southern peninsula and 
several small surrounding islands. These areas are characterized by wind speeds that 
are greater than 4 m/s at 10 m above ground (Chang, et al., 2003). Moreover, many 
prospective sites in Taiwan feature between 3000-3500 hours per year of harvestable 
wind.
22
 Unfortunately, the majority of Taiwan's population resides along the western 
coastline. Therefore, although technical potential for wind energy in Taiwan may be 
high, competing land uses severely limit exploitable capacity (Yue, et al., 2001). 
Estimates of wind power potential for Taiwan are both disparate and contentious. 
Taipower, for example, estimates that total technical potential for wind energy in 
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Taiwan is 4600 MW of onshore potential and 9000 MW of offshore potential. 
However, when factoring in current land-use restrictions, the economic viability of 
siting wind turbines in various locations and competition for development, Taipower 
contends that only a portion of total technical potential is currently realizable and that 
realizable potential is somewhat malleable because improved economic conditions 
tend to enhance realizable potential.  Taipower estimates that current realizable wind 
energy potential amounts to 1000 MW onshore and 1200 MW offshore after factoring 
in development limitations. This implies that the government target for 2010 of 2159 
MW represents nearly full exploitation of realizable potential under current economic 
conditions. If Taipower's estimate for total realizable wind power of 2200 MW is 
accurate, full exploitation would amount to 4.8% of 2007’s installed electricity 
generation capacity (Table 11.3: 2007 data). Moreover, when the projects that are 
currently in development are finally completed, 75% of onshore realizable potential 
and 25% of offshore realizable potential will have been exploited.  
 
On the other hand, Karl-Eugen Feifel of Infravest (Taiwan's only private wind power 
developer) estimates that 3000 MW of onshore wind power and 5000 MW of offshore 
wind power could be feasibly realized if Taipower increased its wind power 
procurement rate from the current level of US6.06¢ per kWh to US12.12¢ per kWh. 
This procurement rate would still be considerably less than the rate at which Taipower 
generates oil-fired power, which is 15.33¢/kWh (Table 11.2). Infravest contends that 
procurement rates that exceed US8.48¢ per kWh would begin to make inland projects 
financially viable and intensify project activity. If Infravest’s estimate for total 
realizable wind power of 8000 MW is accurate, full exploitation of all wind power 
potential would amount to a robust 17.4% of 2007’s total installed electricity 




generation capacity. Under Infravest’s projections, when the projects that are currently 
in development are finally completed, only 25% of realizable onshore potential and 
6% of realizable offshore potential will have been exploited.  
 
The importance of wind power in contributing to Taiwan's CO2 emission reduction 
efforts varies significantly depending on which of these two estimates best 
approximates reality. Moreover, the nature and intensity of government policies for 
expediting wind power expansion would likely differ depending on which estimate is 
accurate. If the Taipower estimate of realizable potential is accurate, one could argue 
that Taipower has done a superb job of reducing the cost of wind power procurement 
while fostering capacity development programs that have nearly fully tapped onshore 
wind potential. In such a case, the main policy challenges going forward would be to: 
i) design an incentive system to encourage the development of offshore wind power 
projects which are typically more expensive to construct and, ii) sweeten the 
incentives for onshore wind power development in order to encourage developers to 
harness the remaining 25% of onshore potential which likely includes less financially 
lucrative wind farm sites. Conversely, if the Infravest estimate for realizable wind 
energy potential is accurate, a great deal of wind power potential remains untapped. 
Under this scenario, maximizing wind power capacity could contribute significantly to 
CO2 emission abatement; therefore, the main policy challenge going forward would be 
to design bold development policies in order to amplify the pace of wind power 
development.  
 




11.3.2  Evaluating Disparate Projections for Wind Power Potential 
 



















Onshore 4600  1000  21.7% 3000  65.2% 
Offshore 9000  1200  13.3% 5000  55.6% 
Total 13,600 2200  16.2% 8000  58.8% 
 
 
In comparing Taipower and Infravest estimates of realizable wind power potential, the 
primary source of disparity appears to stem from differing assumptions made when 
deriving realizable potential from technical potential. As Table 11.7 illustrates, if one 
were to assume that the Taipower estimates for total technical potential are reasonably 
accurate, as we have assumed in this paper, the realizable potential estimates from 
Infravest are considerably bolder than the Taipower estimates. The most obvious 
reason why these estimates would differ stems from the economic assumptions each 
party makes because typically in wind power markets, higher procurement prices 
make previously unviable sites viable, thereby enhancing realizable potential 
estimates. Infravest’s estimate for realizable potential is based on a specific end-price 
scenario (US¢12.12 per kWh) and reflects what Infravest believes is achievable if the 
government were to raise the purchase price for wind power. Although Taipower 
executives did not explain the rationale for their estimate of realizable potential, their 
estimate appears to be based on the current procurement price of US¢6.06 per kWh 
which even Taipower executives admit is too low. In short, the Taipower estimate 
appears to reflect a degree of insouciance toward wind power development. One 
possible explanation for this is that nuclear power expansion is both anticipated and 




supported by Taipower executives. Accordingly, wind power may be viewed as an 
added threat to the nuclear power development program which is already a hotly 
contested political issue. However, as the following paragraphs will illustrate, 
competing economic assumptions do not tell the whole story. Influences arising from 
disparate organisational characteristics also impact estimates of realizable potential.  
 
Infravest’s first wind power project was in Germany. Executives in the firm possess 
extensive knowledge regarding the evolution of the German wind power industry. As 
such, projections for realizable wind power potential in Taiwan are likely influenced 
by the German precedent of how a wind power market can flourish under proper 
market incentives. Indeed, in an interview with Infravest Chairman Karl-Eugen Feifel, 
who is a German national, he specifically drew attention to the history of wind power 
development in Germany to emphasize how inland sites that typically exhibit inferior 
wind quality can develop in the presence of commercially attractive development 
incentives. Experience with the evolution of the wind power market in Germany also 
provides Infravest with one other insight regarding the nature of wind power 
development. In Germany, commercially attractive development incentives 
encouraged German farmers to organize cooperatives to invest in wind turbines as a 
secondary source of income from existing farmland (Komor, 2004). This phenomenon 
enhanced the amount of realizable potential because it added a number of existing 
agricultural plots to the pool of prospective sites. Typically, conservative estimates of 
realizable potential would exclude such land that is already reserved for other uses. It 
is very likely, that Taipower's estimate of realizable potential has underestimated the 
potential for siting wind turbines on existing agricultural plots. Overall, it can be 
surmised that Infravest's estimate of realizable wind power potential in Taiwan is 




influenced by experience with developing wind power in other countries that may or 
may not be fully applicable for Taiwan. 
 
Regarding Taipower's estimate, there is evidence to indicate that organizational 
characteristics induce conservative estimation of realizable wind power potential. One 
of the key mandates of public monopolies is to safeguard the public interest. 
Taipower's mandate is no different. Its priority is to enhance energy security. 
Accordingly, the ideological approach embraced by Taipower strategists is 
significantly different than the ideological approach that strategists from a private 
utility operating in a liberalized market would adopt. A comparison of probable 
strategic behaviour illustrates the relevance of this ideological difference for 
estimation of realizable wind power potential. The purported cost of LNG-fired power 
in Taiwan is US 17.82¢/kWh, while the procurement cost of wind power is set to 
equate with the cost of generating wind power at Taipower owned wind farms, US 
6.06¢/kWh. A profit-seeking utility that is less concerned about enhancing energy 
security would seek to substitute wind power for LNG-fired power in order to 
maximize profitability. Assuming that the average wind turbine can generate 2190 
hours of capacity power per year (applying an average capacity factor of 25%), for 
each 1000 MW of wind power capacity that replaces LNG-fired power, the utility 
would save US$257.5 million per year.
23
 With cost savings of this magnitude, a profit-
seeking utility would aim to maximize capacity expansion of wind power at the 
expense of LNG-fired power. For aggressive firms, this may threaten the integrity of 
the electricity grid because of the importance of LNG-fired power in supporting peak-
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1000) x (0.1782 – 0.0606)) = US$ 257.5 million per year.  




load fluctuations. Wind power cannot serve the same function (Boyle, 2004). 
Conversely, Taipower has resisted such a substitution strategy because the forces 
which catalyze profit-seeking behaviour (i.e. lucrative bonuses and promotions based 
on profit maximization) are not the primary forces governing strategic behaviour at 
Taipower. Although Taipower executives may be somewhat incentivized to improve 
financial performance, they are primarily evaluated on performance in relation to 
preserving national energy security. This ideological difference influences Taipower's 
perspective on wind power potential because their strategic planners are less 
incentivized to ferret out all wind power development options. On the other hand, 
profit-seeking firms would be much more aggressive in identifying new sites to 
exploit and as such, would be more apt to produce more vigorous estimates of 
realizable potential. 
 
Another organizational characteristic which likely dampens Taipower's estimate of 
realizable wind energy potential is a more conservative perspective on managing 
public opposition in comparison to the prevalent perspective at Infravest. Infravest 
largely views public opposition as a commercially resolvable hurdle. As the Chairman 
of Infravest pointed out in an interview, opposition to wind power developments are 
frequently resolvable through compensatory payments made to dissenting parties.
24
 
On the other hand, Taipower's perspective reflects the government's aversion to public 
antipathy. Public opposition to energy projects is something to be avoided if possible. 
These divergent perspectives on managing public opposition influence the estimation 
of wind power potential because a component of any realizable potential estimate 
includes assumptions regarding the amount of technical potential that could be 
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harnessed without incurring public opposition. For example, during an interview with 
an official at the Bureau of Energy, it was mentioned that an environmental group had 
recently lodged an objection to offshore wind power development due to concerns that 
such developments could adversely affect the habitat of an endangered marine 
mammal, the white-beaked dolphin. The official pointed out that if the concern is 
validated, prohibitions to offshore wind power developments in certain areas may be 
inevitable.
25
 Therefore, the Taipower estimate may exclude sensitive marine habitats, 
while the Infravest estimate might not. 
 
Although there may be other ideological differences between Taipower and Infravest 
which further induce disparate assumptions upon which realizable wind energy 
potential is estimated, the examples provided above are sufficient for qualifying the 
nature of the two estimates. The Infravest estimate can be considered to be a best case 
scenario predicated on the assumption that the Taiwanese wind power market will 
respond similarly to the German wind power market if proper market development 
incentives are enacted. Meanwhile, the Taipower estimate can be considered to be a 
highly conservative estimate that has been significantly tempered by organizational 
characteristics which encourage guarded projections. 
 
In summary, seeking to understand the ideologies guiding behaviour within an 
organisation sheds light on its strategic behaviour. In this case, such an analysis helps 
us to conclude that actual realizable wind energy potential in Taiwan is likely 
considerably more than 2200 MW projected by Taipower; however, it may not be as 
high as Infravest estimates, 8000 MW. What our analysis fails to do is to give us an 
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accurate indication of where actual realizable wind energy potential lies on this 
spectrum. Accordingly, it may seem logical on the surface to recommend that the 
government commission one or more additional independent studies of wind energy 
potential in Taiwan.  
 
The problem with funding additional wind power potential studies is that the resultant 
estimates will likely be no better than the Taipower or Infravest estimates at predicting 
actual realizable potential. This is because the accuracy of such estimates is dependent 
on the nature of subjective assumptions made when estimating both technical potential 
and realizable potential. For example, in estimating technical potential, an estimate 
based on an assumption that the average rated turbine capacity in the future will be 4 
MW (which is a reasonable assumption given that 5 MW and 6 MW systems are 
currently being produced) could wind up being 100% higher compared to an estimate 
which assumes the average rated turbine capacity will be 2 MW (which may be the 
most economical size in the future), depending on estimates made in regard to how 
many turbines are clustered together and what the spacing is between the turbines. 
Similarly, assumptions made regarding the degree to which technically feasible sites 
can actually be developed will have a huge impact on final capacity estimates. 
  
Updating an older study of realizable wind energy potential in Taiwan serves to 
illustrate the impact that assumptions can have on final estimates. In 1999, the Taiwan 
Energy Commission (the predecessor of the Bureau of Energy) commissioned a study 
which concluded that there was 8046 km² of land in Taiwan graced with average wind 
speeds greater than 4 m/s at 10 m heights. In estimating onshore wind power potential, 
researchers assumed that the rated capacity of the average wind turbine would be 1.8 




MW and that only 2.5% of 8046 km² could be earmarked for wind farms due to 
competing land uses, site impracticalities, land-use restrictions etc. In estimating 
offshore potential, the researchers concluded that 700 km² of coastal seabed in areas 
of suitable wind quality were accessible at depths less than 15 m. The researchers 
further estimated that only 10% of the 700 km² could be exploited due to practical 
constraints such as access limitations, interference with shipping lanes etc. In 
aggregate, the study concluded that there were 1667 MW of onshore wind power 




If the 1999 estimate for onshore potential was recalculated under the assumptions that 
the average rated turbine capacity would be 3.6 MW (which is currently feasible), that 
the increase in turbine size would result in 33% fewer total turbines placed across the 
country and that 4% of the land exhibiting average wind speeds of greater than 4 m/s 
could be developed (which is the norm used in German calculations) (Yue, et al., 
2001), the estimate for onshore wind power potential would increase from 1667 MW 
to 3574 MW.
27
 Furthermore, if the 1999 estimate for offshore potential was updated to 
incorporate advances in turbine technology, reworking the calculations based on an 
average rated turbine capacity of 4 MW (the emergent norm for offshore turbines) 
would be reasonable. Moreover, due to advances in platform technology, revising the 
estimate of exploitable area from 10% to 20% of the 700 km² could be justified. 
Under these revised assumptions, the offshore wind power potential would be revised 
upward from 2333 MW to 6947 MW if we were to once again assume that the 
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realizable wind power potential to be 2200 MW. 
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increase in turbine size would result in 33% fewer total turbines placed across the 
country.
28
 In short, a revised set of assumptions would increase the 1999 estimate of 
total realizable wind power potential in Taiwan from 4000 MW to 10521 MW. Under 
these revisions, Taiwan would be transformed from a nation with negligible wind 
power potential to a nation in which wind power could contribute significantly to 
national power generation. 
 
The point of this illustration is not to introduce yet another estimate of realizable wind 
power potential in Taiwan, but to highlight the point that estimates of wind power 
potential are dependent on the nature of assumptions made in regard to the variables 
included in the estimates. In turn, such assumptions are heavily influenced by 
ideological biases and vested interests. So where does this leave Taiwanese 
policymakers who wish to have as accurate an indication as possible regarding 
realizable wind power potential in order to ascertain the contribution that wind power 
could make to a fuel import reduction and CO2 emission reduction strategy and design 
appropriate policies to guide wind power expansion?  
 
11.4 DESIGNING POLICY AMIDST UNCERTAINTY 
The absence of a scientifically objective estimate for wind power potential places 
Taiwanese energy policymakers in the unenviable position of having to develop 
policies amidst an environment of uncertainty. As undesirable as this position may be, 
developing policy in an environment of uncertainty is a common challenge for 
policymakers. Although the elements of uncertainty may differ, policymaking almost 
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always occurs in complex, dynamic environments (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). 
When developing strategies for complex, dynamic environments, insights from chaos 
theory can prove useful.  
 
11.4.1  Fitness Landscapes 
Eric Beinhocker (1999) describes a complex, dynamic business environment as being 
analogous to a geographic landscape (which he calls a ―Fitness Landscape‖) that is 
constantly changing due to volcanic activity and plate tectonics. He posits that the task 
of accurately predicting where the tallest mountains will emerge (which is his analogy 
for a prime emergent market opportunity) is unfeasible due to the complexity of latent 
forces. Consequently, the best strategic approach for operating in a complex, dynamic 
environment is to utilize available information to predict areas of likely emergent 
activity (in his analogy this is accomplished by identifying geological conditions 
conducive to mountain formation) and prepare the firm for rapid response when 
opportunities do emerge. Applying this approach to the challenge faced by Taiwanese 
energy policymakers, a program could be implemented to stimulate wind power 
development and monitor the pace and scope of activity. Policymakers should then be 
prepared to enhance the stimulus measures should the pace or scope of activity fail to 
meet expectations. Given that the preferred policy instrument for stimulating wind 
power development in Taiwan has been a fixed procurement rate, it would be a logical 
extension of this policy to prime wind power development by increasing the 
procurement rate. The natural question that arises when pondering an increase in the 
procurement rate is, What level of increase should be implemented? 
 
 




11.4.2  Real Options 
Another perspective on developing strategy in complex, dynamic business 
environments provides guidance for addressing this question. Robert Grant (2005) in a 
leading textbook on strategic analysis describes a concept that he refers to as real 
options. A real option is essentially a risk mitigation technique for uncertain 
environments that is modeled upon the underlying principle of stock options. The idea 
is to limit risk exposure by implementing conservative programs that permit strategic 
forays into areas of promise without incurring full financial risk. As performance data 
emerge, managers begin to revise and reset strategic direction. The revised strategies 
catalyze new outcomes which are then evaluated and the process begins a new 
iteration.  
 
A real options strategy is applicable to public policy circumstances in which a general 
program direction is understood to be desirable but the overall impact of program 
implementation is not fully predictable. An underlying premise of a real options 
strategy is acceptance that program implementation in complex, dynamic policy 
settings will never produce optimal results due to the confounding influence of 
unforeseen variables. Consequently, optimizing policy in such a policy setting is done 
by making small adjustments to the existing program as information emerges 
regarding performance of the program. 
 
Examining what a real options strategy is not, helps to shed light on what it is. A real 
options strategy is not a workable approach for situations that require emergency 
response. For example, it would not be acceptable to test potentially suitable policy 
responses in addressing an outbreak of avian flu. A real options strategy is also not a 




"ready, fire… aim" strategy. Prior to implementing a real options strategy, extensive 
background research is required in order to develop the best possible policy design. 
With a real options strategy, there is clear initial direction; however, there is also an 
understanding that initial program implementation may not be the most effective 
solution. It is an "aim, fire, re-aim, fire" strategy. A real options strategy is also not a 
strategy that can be applied to situations involving dichotomous outcomes (i.e. live or 
die; pass or fail etc.) because such situations are optimized when the favoured 
outcome is produced - there is no scope for adjusting the policy to optimize the 
outcome. Lastly, a real options strategy is not a "satisficing" strategy which is deemed 
successful upon producing satisfactory results. Rather, a real options strategy is an 
iterative process that begins with an initial policy based on best available data and 
then progresses to a performance evaluation stage which subsequently lead to program 
refinements in order for the cycle to begin again. It seeks to produce optimal results 
over time.  
 
11.4.3  Applying Chaos Theory to Wind Power Development Policy 
Relating the concept of real options to the challenge of establishing new higher wind 
power procurement rates, policymakers would be best advised to initiate a moderate 
increase that is high enough to capitalize new activity but not too high to significantly 
alter Taipower's cost base. It is time well spent to try and seek an optimized price for 
encouraging in-land development because for every 1000 MW of installed capacity, 
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There are a number of possible methods for identifying a suitable procurement rate 
increase. One method of establishing a procurement rate that will catalyze inland 
development exploits Taipower’s own competency in wind power development. 
Taipower could establish an inland wind farm of its own in order to ascertain its cost 
and then base the revised procurement rate on this cost. A rough projection based on 
feedback from interviews indicates that the cost of generating wind power from an 
inland site plus the addition of a small mark-up to induce private development 
suggests a wind power cost of approximately US 9.09¢/kWh, which is 50% higher 
than the current procurement rate. Given that procurement prices in countries such 
Germany, Belgium Portugal, France and Spain all exceed US 12¢/kWh
30
, an initial 
increase to US 9.09¢/kWh would represent a conservative ―real option‖ adjustment 
that will catalyze new development.  
 
Monitoring systems should be established prior to implementation of the initial 
procurement rate increase in order to evaluate performance of the enhanced rate 
(Mallon, 2006). Tracking the growth rate in applications for wind power development 
permits might be the best benchmark for monitoring the effectiveness of the new 
procurement rate. When applications for wind power development permits begin to 
exhibit a trend toward unabated decline (i.e. six months of progressive decline), it 
indicates that a further increase in the procurement rate may be required to encourage 
accelerated development. However, as was the case with the initial procurement rate 
increase, any additional increases should not be too excessive because a slowdown in 
wind power development permits may also indicate that the market is nearing 
saturation. Only by gradually sweetening the procurement rate can policymakers 
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unconditionally confirm whether the wind power market is slowing due to 
profitability constraints or capacity constraints. 
 
The reason that a real options strategy is well-suited to wind power market 
development stems from the manner in which wind power markets typically evolve. 
In new wind power markets, developers begin by exploiting the most financially 
attractive sites first. Typically, coastal sites which are blessed by high quality wind 
and which lay in closest proximity to a grid connection are developed first (Wizelius, 
2007). The wind power market continues to expand as developers exploit all viable 
sites where revenues earned exceed operating costs plus required rates of return. 
Eventually a first stage of saturation is reached wherein the commercially attractive 
sites have been fully developed leaving only unprofitable sites for future development. 
At this stage, in the absence of economies of scale or technological developments 
which reduce project costs, further subsidies become necessary to catalyze market 
expansion. Increasing the procurement price represents such a subsidy. Once all the 
commercially attractive sites at this higher level of subsidization are fully developed, 
the cycle once again slows. In wind power markets around the world, the sequence of 
development typically begins with coastal sites that boast superior wind quality 
followed by coastal sites with less superior wind quality, then inland sites and finally 
offshore sites (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006; Wizelius, 2007). Since wind power markets 
typically evolve in commercially viable stages, programs which introduce 
progressively higher procurement rates are effective at controlling costs while 
stimulating activity.  
 
 




11.5 INTEGRATION WITH THE CURRENT STRATEGY 
Auspiciously, the foundation for an effective development incentive system is already 
in place in Taiwan. As described earlier, Taipower already offers wind power 
providers US 6.06¢/kWh for wind power generated and this has cost effectively 
incentivized initial development. Although even executives at the Bureau of Energy 
who were interviewed for this study admitted that US 6.06¢/kWh may now be too low 
given current market dynamics, establishing this low rate of procurement catalyzed 
development of the most commercially viable wind power sites. Although it may be 
true that US 6.06¢/kWh is now too low to facilitate inland wind power projects, it is 
undeniable that Taipower's procurement policy to date has benefited the public by 
positively contributing to Taipower's bottom line. Assuming that Taipower's cost of 
producing wind power at its wind farms is at least equal to the cost at which it 
procurers wind power from private providers (US 6.06¢/kWh)
31
 and assuming that the 
average wind turbine provides 8760 hours of operational wind power each year at a 
capacity factor of 25%, wind power contributed at least US$5.6 million to Taipower's 




Emerging signs that the most financially attractive wind power sites have been 
developed indicate that the time might be right for increasing the procurement rate. 
With 281.6 MW of installed wind power capacity and another 467.8 MW of wind 
power capacity at various stages of planning and development, onshore wind power 
capacity in Taiwan will reach 75% of the total realizable potential estimated by 
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Taipower. Incentives are needed to encourage offshore developments. Moreover, even 
officials from the Bureau of Energy have acknowledged that 6.06¢/kWh is too low to 
encourage development of less profitable inland wind power projects (or more costly 
offshore projects).
33
 Finally, Taiwan's only private wind project developer has taken 
the extreme measure of publicly denouncing the current procurement price as an 
impediment to development. It has indicated that unless the current procurement rate 
changes, it may be forced to consider shifting development plans to other markets.  
 
A hypothetical example which assumes a modified procurement rate of US 
9.09¢/kWh serves to illustrate the financial benefits that such an increase could have 
for Taipower. If 3000 additional MW of wind power capacity (in-land and offshore) 
could be developed as a substitute for oil-fired power which the government wishes to 
phase out
34
, the resultant cost savings would amount to US 6.24¢/kWh (cost of oil @ 
US 15.33¢/kWh – cost of wind @ US 9.09¢/kWh). Assuming that the new wind 
power facilities provide 8760 hours of annual power generation and a capacity factor 
of 25%, the addition of 3000 MW of wind power capacity would generate 6.57 billion 
kWh of electricity each year. At a cost savings of 6.24¢/kWh, the switch would save 
Taipower US$409,968,000 per year.  
 
Admittedly, increasing the procurement price to US 9.09¢/kWh will eventually result 
in cost increases for procurement of wind power at existing wind power installations. 
However, this represents a negligible cost given the US$410 million which will be 
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saved by switching from oil to wind power. Even if all existing wind power 
procurement contracts were renegotiated at the new rate of US 9.09¢/kWh, the overall 
cost increase to Taipower would amount to less than US$19 million. Clearly, 
absorbing a cost increase of US$19 million for the prospect of saving US$410 million 
represents a trade-off that any organization would accept. In reality, it is believed that 
the current procurement system contractually locks in purchases at the rate of US 
6.06¢/kWh for 15 years. Accordingly, in practice, a rate increase will not increase 
costs associated with existing wind power installations until this contractual period 
ends.  
 
11.6 POLICY LESSONS LEARNED 
11.6.1  Scientific and Technical Studies as Strategic Tools  
For policymakers in general, the Taiwan case study serves as a reminder that scientific 
and technical studies that are frequently commissioned to guide decision making are 
rarely objective. We saw how two technical estimates dealing with a common theme 
(the realizable potential of wind power) differed significantly due to incommensurable 
subjective assumptions upon which the estimates were based. Consequently, although 
this is not a new insight for policy experts, it serves as an important reminder that 
policy evaluation is frequently a continuation of politics by other means (Bovens, Hart, 
& Kuipers, 2006). For agents of change who are seeking to overcome opposition from 
vested interests, seeking to master the strategic applications of scientific and technical 
studies improves one's capacity for persuasion. For policymakers who are seeking 
transparency in decisions which impact the public, the case reminds us that efforts 
should be made to explicate the assumptions upon which scientific and technical 
studies have been carried out.  




The Taiwan case also demonstrates how attempts to understand the organizational 
culture of a given organization can help to shed light on the nature of technical or 
scientific assumptions it makes to defend its strategic practices. The caveat for public 
policymakers who are developing policies based on internally generated scientific or 
technical studies should be obvious. Technical studies which are developed by public 
organizations may understandably be based on assumptions which are inherently 
conservative. Therefore, decisions based on these studies may not fully incorporate 
market reactions to initiatives based on the merits of these studies. Policymakers 
should endeavour to compare internally generated scientific and technical studies to 
privately commissioned studies in order to assess the extent to which organizational 
forces influence objectivity. If policymakers at the Bureau of Energy in Taiwan 
undertook such an exercise, the disparity between Taipower and Infravest realizable 
wind potential estimates might have been enough to encourage a more aggressive 
policy toward wind power development. 
 
Finally, for policymakers in the field of energy, the case serves as a reminder that 
energy is a highly politicized field in which scientific and technical studies are 
regularly employed as strategic tools for defending ideological positions. Campaigns 
of misinformation have been highlighted as one of the most important contributors to 
public apathy over climate change (Hansen, 2008). In considering the nexus between 
Taipower’s estimate for realizable wind power potential and its suspiciously low data 
on the price of nuclear power in Taiwan (Table 12.2), one cannot help but wonder if 
there are not political influences that taint both data sets. If policymakers are to 
counter misinformation put forth by entrenched vested interests (i.e. nuclear and fossil 
fuel advocates and lobbyists), formal communication strategies must be put in place to 




counter such propaganda. This further implies that policy campaigns for encouraging 
organizations in the energy industry to modify strategic behaviour would benefit from 
strategic use of scientific and technical studies. 
 
11.6.2  The Real Options Strategy for Public Policy 
The Taiwan case study provided insight into requisite conditions for applying a real 
options strategy in public policy. Primarily, it is effective in complex, dynamic policy 
settings where a general policy direction is indicated but existing information is 
insufficient for supporting the implementation of aggressive policies which are then 
left to run their course. Other requisite conditions include: 1) the policy challenge 
must be non-critical (i.e. not an emergency response) because a real options strategy 
assumes that the initial policy will likely be suboptimal, 2) performance of the policy 
must be measurable on a progressive rather than a dichotomous basis because 
continual improvement is the goal, and 3) organizational and structural elements need 
to be malleable enough to support continuous policy improvement. These conditions 
describe many policy challenges. Consequently, it is a strategic approach that is 
widely applicable in the policy world. 
 
The Taiwan case study also provided some guidance on conditions which render real 
options strategies necessary. At some point during the lifespan of a policy, indications 
begin to emerge (usually from external sources) that the policy is potentially no longer 
appropriate. Amongst other reasons, indications of policy mismatch arise due to 
changing social dynamics, changing market dynamics, changes in ideology or even 
the emergence of data which indicate that the current policy may be either ineffective 
or misguided. In the Taiwan case study, social, commercial, and political changes 




catalyzed concern that perhaps the conservative wind power potential estimate upon 
which wind power development policy was predicated is considerably lower than 
actual realizable wind power potential. The emergent concern merits further attention 
because if actual realizable wind potential in Taiwan is significantly higher than 
Taipower projects, a robust wind power development program could substantially 
contribute to the achievement of desirable strategic objectives (improving domestic 
energy security, stabilizing energy prices, reducing CO2 emissions etc.) and save 
millions of dollars in costs. 
 
The case also demonstrated that in the presence of dissonance between a current 
policy position supported by vested interests and affected stakeholders, a real options 
strategy can mitigate opposition to change by producing tangible results which can be 
utilized to support a more comprehensive policy design. The history of policymaking 
has proven that it is easier to implement small programs than larger more expensive 
programs and it is easier to modify existing programs than to initiate new programs 
(Fischer, Miller, & Sidney, 2006; Salamon, 2002). Therefore, a real options strategy 
represents a formalized method for operationalizing policy insights which have stood 
the test of time. On a practical note, implementing a policy based on real options 
strategy also delivers an added benefit of allowing policymakers to modify policies 
based on actual experience in order to enhance effectiveness.  
 
In closing, it is insightful to differentiate a real options strategy from social 
experiments, which are well-known in policy circles and exhibit some similar 
characteristics. A social experiment is similar to a real options strategy in that both 
attempt to validate policies based on actual performance. In social experiments, 




researchers segregate a given population into a treatment group and a control group. A 
policy is then applied to the treatment group and the impact that this policy has on the 
group is compared to the control group in order to determine the effectiveness of the 
policy. The main purpose of a social experiment is to determine whether or not 
applying a policy is superior to the status quo (or another treatment) according to a 
prescribed set of performance indicators (Cook & Campbell, 1979). A social 
experiment does not necessarily seek to improve the policy itself. Conversely, a real 
options strategy does seek continual improvement. The manner in which a real options 
strategy makes iterative adjustments to policies based on ongoing feedback represents 
a fundamental difference that distinguishes it from social experiment strategies. 
However, this difference does not preclude the strategies from being combined. 
Conceivably, a real options strategy could be implemented in a manner that utilizes 
social experiments to track the effectiveness of each progressive policy improvement. 
Although the time-consuming nature of this approach would limit application, 
combining the two approaches together would induce a degree of scientific rigor to 
the application of a real options strategy that would not otherwise exist. This perhaps 
represents a future challenge for enterprising researchers interested in social 
experiment methodologies. 
 
11.6.3  The Expanded Use of Feed-in Subsidies 
In renewable energy policy circles, feed-in subsidies are generally promoted as policy 
tools which can allow fledgling technologies to gain a foothold in an established 
energy market (Komor, 2004). When employed for achieving such an objective, 
experience has shown that feed-in subsidies should be gradually decreased over time 
in order to encourage innovation and cost reduction efforts on the part of parties who 




are developing the technologies. The feed-in subsidy implemented in Germany in the 
1990s and subsequently amended in 2000 to reflect progressive cost improvements in 
renewable energy exemplifies the effectiveness of feed-in subsidies for supporting 
emergent technology (Komor, 2004).  
 
The Taiwan case study presents an alternative application of feed-in subsidies. It was 
asserted in the study that a feed-in subsidy can be aimed at established technologies in 
order to encourage innovation and reinvigorate market development. When employed 
for achieving these types of objectives, the feed-in subsidy should be raised rather that 
lowered over time. Initial procurement rates should be established at levels which are 
just sufficient to encourage the development of projects in the most commercially 
viable areas first. As the most economically attractive developments reach saturation 
point, the procurement rate should be increased to encourage market players to 
develop areas which may not have been exploited under the lower procurement rate. 
 
11.6.4  The Benefit of Conveying Strategic Intent 
Overall, the Taiwan case also reminds us that the concept of strategic intent which is 
well-known in strategic management circles also applies to public policy-making. 
Strategic intent can be defined as a conscious attempt by strategists to structurally 
commit an organization to a clear strategic direction (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989). The 
value of doing this is that it consolidates understanding of organizational objectives 
and engenders commitment. For example, when Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortes 
landed in Veracruz, Mexico in 1519 with the intent of establishing a colonial 
settlement, he purportedly ordered the demolition of the boats which had carried the 




settlers. By removing the strategic option of giving up and leaving, he effectively 
committed the settlers to establishing an effective colony. 
 
Critics of the concept of strategic intent warn that the strategy must be employed 
cautiously because in competitive environments the act of revealing one's strategy can 
allow competitors to exploit strategic weaknesses (Bartlett, et al., 2003). However, in 
public policy, the benefits associated with clarifying policy direction far overshadow 
the threats associated with exposing policy intents to those who may oppose the policy 
because effective coordination of stakeholders is frequently a requisite for policy 
success (Salamon, 2002).  
 
In the case of Taiwan, although there has been talk about radically reforming Taiwan's 
energy markets and President Ma has publicized a political commitment to reduce 
CO2 emissions to 50% of 2000-levels by 2050, there is a conspicuous lack of strategic 
intent to support achievement of such aspirations. If the goal is to encourage the 
emergence of a carbon-free energy sector, stakeholders must be incentivized to 
achieve such a goal. For example, new incentives should be devised for Taipower to 
encourage a prioritization of renewable energy capacity development. Barring the 
introduction of new incentives, Taipower will continue to do the exemplary job it has 
done in the past of securing Taiwan's national energy security. Similarly, incentive 
systems need to be designed to encourage market players to proactively seek out new 
sites. Admittedly, Taiwan is a nation that faces land constraints which place certain 
limits on the development of traditional renewable energy programs (i.e. biofuel 
initiatives, wind farms, applied title technology etc.). However, if incentives are 




significant enough, innovation will emerge and solutions will be found to facilitate a 
transition to more sustainable energy generation technologies.  





A STEP Toward Understanding Macro-Level Wind Power Development 
Policy Barriers in Advanced Economies 
 
Abstract 
Part 2 of this thesis examined wind power development in four economically 
advanced economies that exhibit phlegmatic progress in wind power development – 
Australia, Canada, Japan and Taiwan – with the objective of identifying impediments 
to wind power development in these nations. In this chapter, insights from all four 
cases studies are extracted and integrated into a STEP framework which summarises 
social, technical, economic and political forces that impede the pace of wind power 
development. The findings from the case studies lend general support to the widely 
accepted premise that implementation of economic policy instruments, which are 
designed to close the cost gap between wind power and entrenched fossil fuel power 
generation technologies, will enhance levels of wind power development. However, 
the findings also suggest that social, technical and political barriers can also impede 
the pace of wind power development. The conclusions of this analysis are two-fold. 
First, failure to mitigate all STEP forces may undermine the efficacy of any given 
economic policy instrument that aims to close the cost gap between wind power and 
entrenched generation technologies. Second, efforts to mitigate these impediments 





International negotiations aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate 
advanced levels of global warming have been characterized by ideological chasms 
that are so wide they have begun to resemble a circular debate between schoolboys 
concerning which flavour of ice-cream is truly the greatest in the galaxy. Yet, there is 
one area of common ground. Leaders of virtually every nation share a concern that 
replacing fossil fuel-based electricity technologies will adversely impact national 
economic well-being. As former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair summarizes, "The 




blunt truth about the politics of climate change is that no country will want to 
sacrifice its economy in order to meet this challenge, but all economies know that the 
only sensible long term way of developing is to do it on a sustainable basis.‖35 Leaders 
from key nations such as the United States, China, India, Canada and Australia have 
all publically bemoaned that a transition away from fossil fuel generated energy will 
impair the competitiveness of domestic industries in international markets (Hofman & 
Li, 2009; IGES, 2005; Weber & Peters, 2009). But is the phlegmatic pace of shifting 
to alternative energy technologies such as wind power really all about economics? 
Was Barrack Obama correct in his assessment of US energy policy that ―to truly 
transform our economy, protect our security, and save our planet from the ravages of 
climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the profitable 
kind of energy‖36? Or are there other obstacles which extend beyond the realm of 
economic rationality that inhibit the development of wind power, and if so what are 
they?  
 
Comparing the costs of electricity generation technologies is a complicated, 
contentious exercise. The process of estimating current cost profiles critically depends 
on assumptions made regarding inputs such as the specific technological components 
to be used, future costs for fuel stock procurement, connection distance to the power 
grid, and capacity load factor estimates, to name but a few malleable factors. 
Emergent research suggests that, depending on assumptions made, wind power is not 
necessarily a more expensive technology in comparison to nuclear power, oil-fired 
power or gas-fired power (Blanco, 2009; DeCarolis & Keith, 2006; Morthorst & 
Awerbuch, 2009; Sovacool, 2008a). Moreover, the majority of research indicates that 
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if the external economic and environmental costs associated with the various forms of 
electricity generation were internalized, wind power would be an economically 
superior form of electricity generation even compared to coal-fired power (ATSE, 
2009; Hirschberg et al., 2007; Sovacool, 2008a). In short, although there are no 
absolute claims that can be made when comparing generation costs across different 
technological platforms, there is evidence that cost disparity is not the only factor 
inhibiting wind power development. 
 
This chapter seeks to contribute to a clearer explication of barriers to wind power 
development by summarising all barriers that were evident in the case studies on wind 
power development in Australia (Chapter 8), Canada (Chapter 9), Japan (Chapter 10) 
and Taiwan (Chapter 11).  
 
To aid the identification and classification of barriers to wind power development in 
these nations, a STEP analysis was employed, wherein focused efforts were made to 
identify social (S), technical (T), economic (E) and political (P) factors that impinge 
on wind power development. In strategic management, a STEP analysis is a common 
tool for assessing exogenous influences on market development prospects (Grant, 
2005); and as such, it was deemed a transferrable tool for evaluating wind power 
market development prospects. 
 
A three-step coding approach was adopted for collating the data extracted from the 
case studies. First, all forces that could be identified as impeding development of wind 
power were extracted from each case study and background notes. Second, these 
forces were assigned to one of the four STEP categories. For example, reports that 




some communities in Japan opposed wind power development due to a predilection 
for preserving community aesthetics were assigned to the ―social‖ category of the 
STEP analysis under the heading ―community concerns over aesthetic intrusion‖. 
Similarly, there were also reports that Taiwanese maritime groups opposed offshore 
wind power development due to concerns over adverse impact on fishing grounds. 
This observation was also listed under the ―social‖ category under the heading 
―community concerns over adverse ecological impact‖. Third, an attempt was made to 
reduce the total number of elements assigned to each STEP category by searching for 
commonalities of elements; and when identified, grouping the common elements into 
condensed categories. For example, the two social hurdles described above were 
combined under the condensed heading of ―NIMBY concerns‖.  
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Sections 12.2-12.5 employ the STEP 
framework to summarize all the main hurdles to wind power development evident in 
the four case studies and background notes. This represents step two of the coding 
process described earlier. Section 12.6 combines the insights from the four case 
studies and presents a STEP analysis at a higher level of abstraction that conflates 
commonalities found in the case studies. This represents step three of the coding 
process described earlier. Section 12.7 outlines areas for further research and presents 
concluding observations. 
 
12.2 CASE BRIEF: AUSTRALIA 
12.2.1 Summarising the Wind Power Development Challenge in Australia 
Given that Australia boasts 24.1% of the world's economically viable reserves of 
brown coal and 5.4% of the world’s economically viable reserves of black coal, it 




should come as no surprise that coal-fired power dominates Australia's electricity mix. 
In 2006-07, brown and black coal accounted for 83.8% of Australia's electricity 
generation, with the remaining electricity supplied by natural gas (12%), hydropower 
(2%), oil (1%) and wind power (1%) (ABARE, 2009).  
 
Despite being a vast, scantily populated nation, wind power in Australia has fallen 
appreciably short of its technical potential. With most of Australia's coastal areas 
boasting average annual wind speeds in excess of 8 m/s (Coppin, et al., 2003), the 
potential of wind power to contribute at least 20% to Australia’s electricity supply is 
almost unequivocal (Diesendorf, 2003).  
 
The new Labor government which recognises the need for a bolder commitment to 
renewable energy announced a Renewable Energy Target (RET) initiative, which 
upon commencement in 2010 will mandate purchases of renewable energy with the 
objective being to encourage 45,000 GWh of renewable electricity generation by 2020 
(representing a 20% overall contribution to the electricity supply) (Government of 
Australia, 2009g). Unfortunately as Chapter 8 suggests, the efficacy of the RET is 
undermined by program flaws such as eligibility of waste coal mine gas (WCMG) for 
renewable energy credits (REC) under the RET, a multiplier mechanism which creates 
―phantom credits‖ (thereby reducing the pool of available RECs), the limited duration 
of the program which will discourage investment after 2020 and failure to pass 








12.2.2 STEP Variables that Impair Wind Power Development in Australia 
A STEP analysis of the conditions which led to this state of affairs in Australia 
provides insight into why the RET developed in this matter and highlights some of the 
hurdles that policymakers must seek to mitigate in order to enhance the scope and 
pace of wind power development (Table 12.1). 
 
Table 12.1: Key STEP Variables that Impair Wind Power Development in Australia 
Social 
 NIMBY concerns over aesthetics and ecological issues have stymied wind power development 
(Gross, 2007). 
 Low electricity prices fuel social resistance to more expensive electricity generation portfolios 
(Government of Australia, 2009c). 
 The fossil fuel industry is traditionally a major employer in Australia and still employs over 
100,000 workers (IEA, 2005). However, due to a 45% contraction of jobs since the mid-1980s 
(Diesendorf, 2003), there is a high degree of sensitivity to the threat of further job losses in mining 
communities. 
Technical 
 There are concerns over the stochastic properties of wind destabilizing grid load management (cf. 
Ackerman, 2005).  
 The liberalized electricity market complicates coordination of numerous, private electricity 
generators (NEMMCO, 2005). 
 Managing electricity inputs from many smaller wind power projects are more troublesome for 
utilities (ESAA, 2009). 
 Many regions of greatest wind potential are separated from the large population centres (Coppin, et 
al., 2003). This increases the cost of transmission. 
 Australia’s pooled purchase system for electricity complicates the process of integrating stochastic 
wind power inputs (NEMMCO, 2005).  
Economic 
 External costs of fossil fuels are not internalized (ATSE, 2009). 
 Significant effort is currently expended on improving energy efficiency rather than financing 
alternative energy projects. This absorbs finances and planning time (Government of Australia, 
2009h). 
 Government support for carbon capture and sequestration (AU$1 billion over 9 years) means that 
fossil fuel power plants receive free R&D support (Schlapfer, 2009). 
 Government support of wind power technology innovation (i.e. improving storage etc) is scant 
(Government of Australia, 2009h; IEA, 2005). 
 The RET program is not ambitious enough to effectively catalyze improved economies of scale for 
wind power (Government of Australia, 2009h; IEA, 2005).  
 Widespread concern exists over what higher energy costs will do to Australia’s economy (Gailey, 
2009; Schlapfer, 2009). 
 Inexpensive and secure fossil fuel resource availability relieves energy security pressures (IEA, 
2005; Owen, 2009). 




 The inclusion of WCMG as an eligible fuel under the RET creates an indirect subsidy to the coal 
industry (Government of Australia, 2009e, 2009g). 
 There is steadfast support for Australia’s fossil fuel sector which contributes substantial export 
revenues and royalties to government coffers (Government of Australia, 2009c; Riedy, 2003). 
Political 
 Fossil fuel electricity provision exhibits a degree of ―stickiness‖ due to the existence of established 
supply networks and transmission & distribution infrastructure (MacGill, et al., 2006; Riedy, 2003; 
Saddler, et al., 2007). 
 As a key exporter of uranium and coal (IEA, 2005), there is considerable political pressure in 
Australia to support these industries (Wesley, 2007). 
 States control electricity supply management but strategic cooperation between states to work 
toward a carbon-free electricity system is low (Moran, 2006). 
 Few concerns over foreign dependence on fossil fuel supplies. Relatively self-sufficient (IEA, 
2005). 
 Government backtracking exists regarding original Kyoto Protocol commitments (Government of 
Australia, 2008a). New short-term targets are too lax, long-term targets are too far off to catalyze 
immediate change. 
 Liberalized markets and decentralized generation make it hard to achieve technological 
collaboration (Chester, 2007; ESAA, 2009). 
 Commitment to other alternative energy technologies (notably solar thermal and geothermal) 
diffuses support for wind power (Government of Australia, 2009g). 
 Rejection of CO2 emission trading scheme (CPRS) undermines the efficacy of the RET 
(Government of Australia, 2009h). 
 
Table 12.1 summarizes the prominent barriers to enhanced development of wind 
power in Australia that were detailed in chapter 8. Continued government 
subsidization of fossil fuel technologies and failure to internalize the external costs 
associated with each electricity generation technology have created a false economy 
wherein coal-fired power is perceived to be the best economic alternative for 
generating electricity. As a recent government report highlighted, if the hidden costs 
associated with fossil fuel combustion were internalized, the current cost differential 
between wind power and coal-fired power which currently stands at between $AU30 - 
$40 per MWh (Macintosh & Downie, 2006), would be more than offset by a net 
increase in the cost of coal-fired power of $42 - $52 per MWh (ATSE, 2009). 
Unfortunately, the proposed cap and trade scheme (CPRS) has failed to clear political 
hurdles; and as such, the internalization of costs associated with CO2 emissions has 
yet to be achieved (Government of Australia, 2008b). 




However, the cost disparity between coal-fired power and wind power does not fully 
explain languid wind power development in this nation of high wind power potential; 
nor does it fully explain why external costs have not been internalised. There are 
social barriers which include misperceptions that a transition away from fossil fuel 
technologies will adversely affect the economic well-being of communities dependent 
on fossil fuel mining revenues. There are also misperceptions that wind turbines will 
adversely impact the aesthetics and ecology of communities.  
 
Technical barriers which centre primarily on the stochastic nature of wind power also 
exist. Concerns that high levels of wind power will destabilize the grid require 
technical solutions that require R&D support (Saddler, et al., 2007). Similarly, the 
challenge of managing wind power inputs from numerous sources within the context 
of Australia's pooled electricity purchase system requires systematic restructuring of 
load management systems.  
 
Finally, there is entrenched political support for Australia's fossil fuel industry and this 
support manifests itself through political initiatives to support carbon capture and 
sequestration research, the maintenance of robust coal industry support schemes and 
political resistance to the CPRS. 
 
In summary, in addition to enacting initiatives to close the economic divide between 
the costs of coal-fired power and wind power, all of these non-economic barriers need 
to be mitigated if Australia’s policymakers are to optimize wind power development 
policy. 
 




12.3 CASE BRIEF: CANADA 
12.3.1 Summarising the Wind Power Development Challenge in Canada 
Canada's electricity grid is the sixth largest in the world, supported by 124,240 MW of 
total installed generation capacity, incorporating six main generation technologies 
(Statistics Canada, 2009a).  As Table 12.2 indicates, hydropower resources in Canada 
are in abundance. In 2008, only China produced more hydropower than Canada (BP, 
2009). The responsiveness of hydropower generation makes it a perfect complement 
to wind power development (Boyle, et al., 2004). Consequently, if Canada's provincial 
electricity grids were integrated and optimized, the predominance of hydropower 
within Canada's electricity mix and vast tracts of undeveloped land provide the 
necessary conditions to technically displace coal-fired power and bestow Canada with 
an electricity mix dominated by low-carbon technologies.  
 
Table 12.2: 2007 Installed Electrical Generation Capacity by Source in Canada 
  2007 % of total 
Hydro 73,435,687 59% 
Wind and tidal 1,600,399 1% 
Coal  27,211,548 22% 
Nuclear 13,345,000 11% 
Internal combustion 593,480 0% 
Combustion turbine 8,054,193 6% 
TOTALS 124,242,314 100% 
(capacity in kilowatts)   
Data source: (Statistics Canada, 2009a) 
 
As chapter 9 emphasized, the main barrier to achieving the laudable goal of an 
electricity mix dominated by low-carbon technologies relates to the Canada's federal 
structure. Under Canada's federal charter, constitutional authority over electricity 
generation has been expressly assigned to Canada's provinces (Government of Canada, 




1867 / 1982). This constitutional fragmentation of electricity governance has spawned 
a national grid which is only loosely interconnected. Inter-provincial electricity 
connections are not nearly sufficient enough in order to allow electricity generated by 
hydropower sources to be effectively exchanged between provinces (National Energy 
Board, 2004). Moreover, some of Canada's provinces which happen to be rich in fossil 
fuel resources (notably Alberta and Saskatchewan) have insubstantial hydropower 
resources, accentuating fossil fuel dependence in these provinces (Statistics Canada, 
2009b).  
 
12.2.2 STEP Variables that Impair Wind Power Development in Canada 
As chapter 9 detailed and Table 12.3 summarises, in considering approaches for 
resolving the fragmentation of Canada's electricity grid, the federal government faces 
a number of social, technical, economic and political hurdles.  
 
Table 12.3: Key STEP Variables that Impair Wind Power Development in Canada 
Social 
 Heavy contribution from hydropower reduces social pressures to reduce carbon footprint 
associated with electricity (Valentine, 2010a). 
 Historically low electricity prices (NUS Consulting, 2007) fuel social resistance to more expensive 
electricity portfolios. 
Technical 
 Managing electricity inputs from many smaller wind power projects are more troublesome for 
utilities (Valentine, 2010a). 
 Concerns exist over stochastic wind power flows destabilizing the grid because inter-provincial 
grid connections are sub-optimal (National Energy Board, 2004). 
 Weak grid inter-connectivity between provinces stymies capitalization of full wind potential 
(National Energy Board, 2004) 
 Provinces that are rich in wind power potential (i.e. Alberta, Saskatchewan) seldom have access to 
hydropower for peak load support (Statistics Canada, 2009b). 
 Provinces that are rich in hydropower have low carbon footprints and reduced incentive to invest in 
wind power (Valentine, 2010a). 





 External costs of fossil fuels and nuclear power are not internalized (Valentine, 2010a). 
 A federal production subsidy of 1¢ per kWh for wind power is insufficient to make wind power an 
economically competitive alternative to coal power (Guha, et al., 2005). 
 Abundant fossil fuel resources reduce energy security risk (NUS Consulting, 2007). 
 There is strong support for fossil fuel in fossil fuel-rich provinces due in part to tax and royalty 
revenues earned on natural resource extraction (Alberta Provincial Government, 2008). 
 An acute federal budget deficit restricts the capacity to provide improved wind power production 
subsidies (Curren, 2009). 
Political 
 Fossil fuel electricity systems have a degree of ―stickiness‖ due to the existence of established 
supply networks in many provinces (Vicente, 2005). 
 There is considerable political pressure in Canada to support oil, gas and coal industries due to 
their economic value (Alberta Provincial Government, 2008; IEA, 2004b). 
 Provinces control electricity supply management but strategic cooperation between provinces to 
work toward a carbon-free electricity system is low (Liming, et al., 2008). 
 Few concerns over foreign dependence on fossil fuel supplies. Canada is largely self-sufficient 
(IEA, 2004b). 
 Government backtracking exists regarding original Kyoto Protocol commitments. The federal 
government has now announced less ambitious targets (Government of Canada, 2009). 
 Liberalized markets and no centralized control makes it hard to achieve national collaboration 
(National Energy Board, 2004). 
 Provincial constitutional authority over electricity governance enables provinces to resist federal 
attempts to coerce wind power development (Valentine, 2010a). 
 
Unquestionably, failure to internalise external costs associated with each electricity 
generation technology along with access to relatively cheap, abundant fossil fuel 
resources has created a false economy in Canada wherein fossil fuel-fired power is 
perceived to be economically superior. However, the economic cost disparities do not 
describe the whole story regarding languid wind power development in a nation with 
wind power potential that stands in the top echelon internationally. As chapter 9 
detailed, (and Table 12.3 summarised), there are a number of significant social, 
technical, political and economic barriers which impede progress.  
 




Constitutional delegation of authority over electricity governance to the provinces is 
patently the most significant of these barriers. It poses an enormous impediment to 
creating a national electricity management strategy capable of enhancing the level of 
inter-provincial electricity grid integration and collaboration necessary to fully tap 
wind power potential.  
 
Provincial authority over electricity governance also complicates resolution of many 
technical impediments. In order to ensure that stochastic wind power fluctuations do 
not destabilize provincial electricity grids, capacity enhancement of weak 
interprovincial grid connections is necessary; however, political incentive for enacting 
such technical fixes is currently weak. Provinces that are rich in hydropower, which 
serves a vital role in providing efficient peak-load support capability, would be 
understandably reluctant to voluntarily impinge on provincial self-sufficiency in this 
inexpensive, low-carbon energy resource through sharing capacity. Meanwhile, 
provinces boasting fossil fuel resource abundance are able to exploit existing fossil 
fuel excavation and transportation infrastructure and enjoy an abundance of relatively 
cheap fossil fuel energy.  
 
Even the economic realm is affected by Canada’s constitutional structure. The current 
federal subsidy for encouraging wind power development of 1¢ per kWh has been 
criticized as insufficient for fostering significant change within the current electricity 
regime (Guha, et al., 2005). Without internalizing the external costs of fossil fuel 
combustion, closing the price gap between wind power and coal-fired energy would 
require a level of federal funding that is likely untenable as federal government 
attempts to reduce a vitiating federal budget deficit (Curren, 2009). However, forcing 




provincial electricity regimes to internalise external costs is also less tenable when the 
provinces hold constitutional authority over electricity governance and each province 
views the challenge of abating CO2 emissions from different perspectives and with 
differing perceptions of exigency (Valentine, 2010a).  
 
Finally, although civic advocacy is prominent in Canada, there is a degree of 
insouciance in civic and environmental circles regarding CO2 emissions from 
electricity generation. The primary concern in Canada is on improving energy 
efficiency related to transportation and inefficient end-use activities (Government of 
Canada, 2009). The electricity sector tends to fly under the environmental radar 
(except in fossil fuel-intense provinces) because 71% of Canada's electricity is 
generated by low-carbon energy sources (59% hydro, 11% nuclear, 1% wind) 
(Statistics Canada, 2009a).  
 
In summary, the Canadian case study mirrors the Australian study in indicating that 
economic fixes alone will not fully optimise wind power development. In Canada, 
political hurdles are arguably as influential in blocking wind power development as 
economic hurdles. Moreover, social and technical hurdles also need to be addressed if 
Canadian policymakers wish to better exploit Canada’s wind power potential.  
 
12.4 CASE BRIEF: JAPAN 
12.4.1 Summarising the Wind Power Development Challenge in Japan 
As chapter 10 illustrated, Japan faces daunting national energy security challenges. 
Japan’s 127 million people (1.9% of the global population) consume 5.3% of all 
power generated in the world (IEA, 2008b). Yet, over 97% of the energy consumed in 




Japan comes from imported fuel stocks. Japan imports virtually all coal, oil and gas 
feedstock (FEPC, 2008).  
 
In order to improve national energy security, the government announced a five-
pronged strategy which includes the following goals: i) improve energy efficiency by 
at least 30%, ii) reduce oil dependence by 40% or lower, iii) reduce oil dependence in 
the transport sector to 80%, iv) target the share of nuclear power in electricity 
generation to 30-40% and, v) increase the share of crude oil owned by Japanese 
companies to 40% (Amari, 2006). In short, commitments to bolster renewable energy 
capacity are relegated to a secondary role in government energy security strategy. 
Wind power development in particular has been largely neglected.  
 
12.3.2 STEP Variables that Impair Wind Power Development in Japan 
Table 12.4 summarises some of the social, technical, economic and political hurdles 
outlined in chapter 10 that confront Japan's wind power developers. 
 
Table 12.4: Key STEP Variables that Impair Wind Power Development in Japan 
Social 
 NIMBY opposition in a nation that values traditional vistas impairs site selection (Maruyama, et 
al., 2007). 
 Resistance to government plans (i.e. governance of electricity) is customarily muted (Valentine, 
2009). 
 Geographic siting constraints exist due to high population density (Ushiyama, 1999; Valentine, 
2009). 
Technical 
 Concerns exist that stochastic wind power flows will destabilize the grid. This nurtures demands to 
store wind power before feeding it into the electricity grid (Englander, 2008). 
 Private regional utilities enjoy monopoly positions (FEPC, 2008) which inhibits interconnected 
―smart‖ grid development. 
 Managing electricity inputs from many smaller wind power projects are more troublesome for 




utilities (Valentine, 2009). 
 Sites with the greatest wind potential are separated from main population centers (Ushiyama, 1999; 
Yamaguchi & Ishihara, 2007). This increases the cost of transmission (Wizelius, 2007). 
 Entrenched prioritization of nuclear research (well over US$60 billion investment since 1981) 
(IEA, 2004c) . 
 Low estimates for wind power capacity load factors (20%) artificially inflate the cost of wind 
power (ANRE, 2008a; Morthorst & Awerbuch, 2009). 
Economic 
 External costs of fossil fuel and nuclear power are not internalized (Valentine, 2009). 
 Advanced nuclear power is seen as the key technology for economically meeting Japan’s future 
energy needs (JAEC, 2008, 2009). 
 Funding emphasizes energy efficiency initiatives over financing alternative energy projects 
(Government of Japan, 2005). This further diverts funding away from wind power storage. 
 Nuclear research is significantly subsidized by the government (IEA, 2004c). This results in 
artificially low cost estimates for nuclear power production (FEPC, 2008). 
 Research to improve storage of wind power received little government support (Valentine, 2009). 
 The renewable portfolio standard used to encourage development of renewable energy (targeting 
less than 1% of total electricity supply in 2009) is insufficient for substantively improving wind 
power economies of scale (Englander, 2008; Nishio & Asano, 2003). 
 Deep concerns exist regarding the impact of higher energy costs on a stagnant economy (METI, 
2006). 
Political 
 Nuclear power is a preferred long-term electricity technology due to its large-scale generation 
capability. Campaigns to improve the image of nuclear energy are evident (JAEC, 2008, 2009). 
 Nuclear power technology is considered to be an attractive export commodity (JAEC, 2008, 2009).  
 Fossil fuel electricity provision exhibits a degree of ―stickiness‖ due to the existence of established 
supply networks (Valentine, 2009) 
 Commitment to supporting other alternative energy technologies (notably solar PV) diffuses the 
market for wind power (IEA, 2004c, 2008a). 
 Due to lack of direct government pressure, regional utilities are less motivated to reduce CO2 
emissions through alternative energy projects. Meanwhile, wind power developers face 
interconnection hurdles established by the utilities (Englander, 2008). 
 
Of all the hurdles that wind power developers face in Japan, economic hurdles are the 
most daunting. Failure to internalize the external costs associated with fossil fuel and 
nuclear power creates sizable cost disparities between wind power and these 
entrenched power sources. Cost disparities are accentuated by ardent government 




R&D support for nuclear power and advanced fossil fuel power generation technology 
while R&D support for wind power and power storage technology is insignificant 
(IEA, 2004c). Most of Japan's utilities are so averse to managing the stochastic nature 
of wind power that wind power developers complain of being forced to store 
generated wind power prior to feeding it into the regional electricity grids (Englander, 
2008). This accentuates the cost disparity between wind power and the entrenched 
power sources. A renewable portfolio standard has been developed to encourage clean 
energy development but the mandated purchases for 2009 amount to less than 1% of 
the total electricity supply, too low to foster the levels of scale economies necessary to 
help wind power developers close the cost divide. 
 
Although it may seem logical to conclude that policies aimed at rectifying the cost 
disparities between wind power and other entrenched power sources would pave the 
way for amplified levels of wind power development, political roadblocks complicate 
the challenge. In addition to political reluctance to enforce internalization of external 
electricity generation technology costs out of concerns that higher electricity prices 
might threaten industrial competitiveness, two other political barriers foster 
perpetuation of the status quo. First, the Japanese government has granted regional 
monopolies to 10 private vertically-integrated utilities (FEPC, 2008). The higher cost 
of wind power undermines profitability unless utilities can successfully negotiate rate 
increases with inflexible government regulators. Therefore, utilities are reluctant to 
proactively pursue wind power expansion programs especially considering the 
technical burden of integrating stochastic power flows in the regional grids. Second, 
there is considerable political support for nuclear power capacity expansion (JAEC, 
2008, 2009). Consequently, an enormous amount of government research funding 




goes to nuclear research (well over US$60 billion channelled to nuclear power 
research since 1981) (IEA, 2004c) instead of to programs that could close the 
economic cost divide between wind power and the entrenched generation technologies. 
In short, the economic cost divide is a symptom of a host of complex political 
obstructions.  
 
Of the social factors that tend to deter wind power development, public apathy toward 
a national energy policy which supports nuclear power development over the 
enhancement of renewable energy capacity is most striking given the anti-nuclear 
sentiments that still exist in Japan. There appears to be an underlying belief that 
despite the hazards posed by nuclear power, particularly concerning waste disposal, 
technical solutions will eventually be developed to mitigate the externalities caused by 
nuclear power (Valentine, 2009).  
 
In summary, the Japanese case highlights the ineluctable nature of many of the STEP 
elements. Barriers in one realm (i.e. economic) are frequently underpinned or 
supported by obstacles in other realms (i.e. political, technical and social). Therefore, 
policy initiatives to alter electricity governance should seek comprehensive mitigation 
of STEP obstacles in order to minimize systematic impediments to policy 
effectiveness.   
 
12.5 CASE BRIEF: TAIWAN 
12.5.1 Summarising the Wind Power Development Challenge in Taiwan 
As chapter 11 explained, despite having a small population, Taiwan was the 17th 
largest national consumer of electricity in the world 2008, with aggregate electricity 




consumption of 233,000 GW hours (CIA, 2008). Like Japan, Taiwan is heavily 
dependent on imported fuel-stocks for power generation. Imported fuel-stocks fuelled 
81.1% of all electricity generated in 2006 (coal - 39.3%, oil - 8.3%, LNG - 14.3%, 
nuclear - 19.2%) (TBOE, 2007), with the remainder coming from hydropower and co-
generation. Although imports of coal rose significantly in the 20-year period 1986-
2006, growth in oil imports slowed due to government efforts to replace oil-fired 
power with LNG-fired power. In terms of low-carbon power sources, national 
hydropower capacity has nearly reached peak potential, nuclear power capacity is 
expected to increase by 2.7 GW in 2011 when Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plant 
commences operation (TBOE, 2009b) and renewables (solar and wind power) have 
been slow to develop as utility-scale power sources (TBOE, 2007). Historically, 
responsibility for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in Taiwan 
has rested with Taipower, which is a public monopoly. Virtually all transmission and 
distribution lines in Taiwan are still installed and owned by Taipower (K. M. Wang, 
2006), but the electricity generation sector is undergoing privatization (TBOE, 2009a; 
K. M. Wang, 2006). 
 
In the short-term, Taipower plans to further encourage wind power capacity 
development, aiming for an ultimate goal of 2159 MW of installed wind power 
capacity by 2010 (Lin, et al., 2009). In 2009, a Renewable Energy Development Bill 
was passed after seven years of political debate and resistance. However, the 
development of concrete development incentives will be delayed because a newly 
formed Energy Commission must now deliberate over setting appropriate pricing 
levels. In the meantime, Taipower has an interim program in place for purchasing 
wind energy at US 6.16¢ per kWh. Despite criticism that US 6.16¢ per kWh is 




insufficient to stimulate large-scale investment (Lu & Ko, 2009), wind power capacity 
in Taiwan continues to progress albeit sluggishly. As of 2008, there were 155 wind 
turbines amounting to 281.6 MW of installed capacity at various locations around 
Taiwan. As Chi-Yuan Liang, an economist at Academia Sinica summarised, 




Estimates of wind power potential in Taiwan are both disparate and contentious. 
Taipower, for example, estimates that total technical potential for wind energy in 
Taiwan amounts to 4600 MW of onshore potential and 9000 MW of offshore potential. 
However, current land-use restrictions and competition for development results in a 
much lower estimate for realizable wind energy potential – 1000 MW onshore and 
1200 MW offshore. On the other hand, Infravest (Taiwan's only private wind power 
developer) estimates that 3000 MW of onshore wind power and 5000 MW of offshore 
wind power could be feasibly realized if Taipower increased its wind power 
procurement rate from the current level of US6.06¢ per kWh to US12.12¢ per kWh.  
 
12.5.2 STEP Variables that Impair Wind Power Development in Taiwan 
Table 12.5 summarizes the major STEP barriers to wind power development in 
Taiwan that were examined in detail in chapter 11. 
 
Table 12.5: Key STEP Variables that Impair Wind Power Development in Taiwan 
Social 
 Social and political divisions over nuclear power keeps nuclear power on the agenda (Bor & Chou, 
2003; TBOE, 2009b; Tchii, 2009). 
 There are geographic siting constraints due to high population density (Yue, et al., 2001). 
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 Source: Bloomberg New Service, ―Energy Bureau Looking to Boost Wind-Power 10-fold‖, 28 
September 2007. 




 There are NIMBY concerns regarding offshore wind development driven by perceptions of adverse 
impact on fisheries and protected marine species (Tsai & Chou, 2005; Valentine, 2010b). 
Technical 
 Concerns exist regarding stochastic wind power flows destabilizing the grid. This results in 
demands by Taipower for wind power developers to build sub-transformers at each wind site 
(Valentine, 2010b). 
 Managing electricity inputs from many smaller wind power projects are more troublesome for 
utilities (Tsai, 2005; Valentine, 2010b). 
 Sites with the greatest wind potential (east coast) are separated from major population centers 
(west coast) (Huang & Wu, 2009; Yue, et al., 2001). This increases the cost of transmission. 
 Differences of opinion over total wind power potential in Taiwan results in political reluctance to 
aggressively pursue wind power (Chang, et al., 2003; Valentine, 2010b). 
Economic 
 External costs of fossil fuel power and nuclear power are not internalized (Valentine, 2010b; Yue, 
et al., 2001). 
 Deep concerns exist regarding the impact of higher energy costs on an already flagging economy 
(Tchii, 2009; K. M. Wang, 2006) 
 Funding emphasizes energy efficiency initiatives over financing alternative energy projects 
(Taiwan MOEA, 2008).  
 Government support for wind power research to improve storage is insufficient (Chiang, 2004; 
Taiwan MOEA, 2008; Valentine, 2010b; Wu & Huang, 2006). 
 The development incentive used to encourage development of wind power is criticized as 
insufficient for fostering development beyond the most attractive sites (Chen, Lu, Chi-Chuan, & 
Chang, 2008; Lu & Ko, 2009; Valentine, 2010b).  
 Financial budget constraints at Taipower limit prospects of the utility spearheading wind 
investment (Ho, 2007). Development is left largely to market players. 
 25-year electricity purchase contracts fix the generation profile for long periods of time (Valentine, 
2010b). 
Political 
 Taiwan is not a party to the UNFCCC framework so there are no formal international commitments 
to reduce CO2 emissions (UN, 1992). 
 The public utility has no competition and so decisions made on the electricity mix are final 
(Valentine, 2010b; K. M. Wang, 2006). 
 Fossil fuel electricity provision exhibits a degree of ―stickiness‖ due to the existence of established 
supply networks (Valentine, 2010b). 
 
In Taiwan, as in the other three case study nations, failure to internalize external costs 
associated with fossil fuel sources of electricity artificially inflates the economic 
attractiveness of fossil fuel electricity generation. However, cost disparity does not tell 




the whole picture. For example, oil-fired power cost Taipower an average of 
US¢15.33 per kWh in 2008, considerably less than the US¢12.12 per kWh which 
would purportedly catalyze significant offshore and onshore wind power development 
(Valentine, 2010b). Yet, Taipower has been reluctant to alter its current interim 
procurement price for wind power of US6.06¢ per kWh for many of the non-economic 
reasons explicated in Table 12.5.  
 
Taipower’s resistance to integrating high levels of wind power stems from a number 
of technical and operational concerns. First, Taipower contends that realizable wind 
power potential in Taiwan is limited and; therefore, wind power does not represent a 
viable long-term solution to low-carbon electricity generation. Second, Taipower 
engineers are concerned that incorporating significant levels of wind power will 
complicate load management due to the stochastic nature of wind power. Third, 
Taipower has significant sunken capital investment in fossil fuel power plants and has 
commitments to long-term fuel stock supply purchase contracts which lock Taipower 
into current technologies (Valentine, 2010b). Finally, Taipower is going through 
financial difficulties due to reluctance of the national government to permit Taipower 
to charge higher electricity prices to cover rising fossil fuel costs (Ho, 2007). 
Accordingly, it does not have the financial resources to risk investing in a power 
source of dubious potential. 
 
These technical, political and economic influences on strategic behaviour at Taipower 
are exacerbated by delays in passing and implementing the Renewable Energy 
Development Bill which would provide a legislative justification for Taipower to raise 
electricity prices to finance wind power development initiatives. Taiwan’s civic 




society has also played a minor yet not inconsequential role in the political process. 
Special interest groups concerned about adverse impacts to Taiwan’s fishing industry 
and endangered marine species (such as the white-beaked dolphin) have provided 
politicians who are opposed to wind power development with the necessary backing to 
stymie implementation of the Renewable Energy Development Bill. 
 
In summary, wind power development in Taiwan, like in the other three case study 
nations, is not impeded by just one or two barriers. A number of obstacles from all 
four STEP realms conflate within Taiwan’s electricity regime to create a network of 
mutually reinforcing, ineluctable barriers that all need to be addressed in order to 
optimise wind power development policy.  
 
12.6 TOWARD A GENERIC STEP FRAMEWORK  
In reviewing the STEP elements inhibiting wind power development in the four case 
study nations summarized in Tables 12.1, 12.3, 12.4 and 12.5, common elements 
became evident. Consequently, a coding exercise was undertaken to cluster the 
variables identified in each case study into fewer but broader categories in order to 
enhance manageability (Charmaz, 2006). The result is a framework composed of 
seven social forces, six technical forces, eight economic forces and eight political 
forces which generically describe the forces that stymie wind power development in 
the four nations (Table 12.6). In this section, each of the forces will be briefly 








Table 12.6: A STEP Framework of Factors Influencing Wind Power Development in 
Advanced Nations 
Social Technical Economic Political 
NIMBY Concerns Stochastic Nature of 
Wind Power 
External Costs not 
Internalized 
Political Conflict Over 
Optimal Electricity Mix 






Level of Fossil Fuel 
Industry Opposition 










Social Complacency Inadequate R&D to 
Improve Storage 














 Government Budget 
Limitations 
Weak Adjoining Grid 
Coordination 
  National Advantage in 
Other Energy Resources  
Lack of R&D Support for 
Wind Power 
 
12.6.1 Social Factors 
1. NIMBY Concerns entail perceptions that wind power developments adversely 
affect living standards and/or the surrounding ecology. It is noteworthy that 
international experience with wind power indicates many NIMBY concerns are 
misperceptions. For example, in contrast with concerns in Taiwan that offshore 
wind power plants could adversely affect the marine habitat, research in Europe 
indicates that the concrete foundations of offshore wind turbines can actually 
provide a safe harbour for the cultivation of corals necessary to support many 
aquatic creatures (Snyder & Kaiser, 2009). Similarly, concerns in Japan that 
onshore wind power turbines will degrade the beauty of scenic vistas have been 
contradicted by international experience wherein public support for wind power is 
generally positive in communities where such developments have been established 
(Firestone & Kempton, 2007; Haggett, 2008). The lesson for policymakers is that 




public perceptions need to be managed in order to minimize NIMBY resistance 
and separate actual threats from misperceptions (Gross, 2007). 
2. A low Level of Civic Activism was exhibited in Japan where citizens tend to 
avoid interfering in the process of governance. Politicians are elected to do a job 
and the decisions they make (i.e. postponing nuclear waste disposal planning) are 
not scrutinized to the extent they are in other countries. Nations characterised by 
low civic activism tend to exhibit political regimes driven by special interests (i.e. 
fossil fuel interests) and are susceptible to groupthink (Valentine, 2009).  
3. Geographic Hurdles are typically evident in smaller, densely populated nations 
such as Taiwan and Japan. In such nations, the erection of wind turbines will 
inevitably intrude on communal space; thereby, posing wind power developmental 
hurdles and inflaming NIMBY opposition. 
4. Market Information Asymmetry refers to insufficient public knowledge 
regarding the external costs associated with fossil fuel and nuclear power 
generation. If the public were more aware of the total costs of fossil fuel power 
generation, wind power developments would stand a better chance of being 
supported both in communities and at the national level because the cost 
disadvantage frequently attributed to wind power would be eliminated. For 
policymakers, it is imperative to ensure the public fully understands the true total 
costs associated with all generation technologies. 
5. Social Complacency is a form of ―Green Dutch Disease‖ that is characteristic of 
countries which enjoy an abundance of renewable resources, such as hydropower 
in Canada or geothermal power in Iceland. In terms of proactive public support for 
renewable energy, there appears to be diminishing returns as levels of installed 
renewable power capacity increase.  




6. Electricity Price Sensitivities were understandably evident in all case study 
nations. Perceptions that adding higher percentages of comparatively expensive 
wind power to the electricity grid would adversely affect national economic well-
being represent a common source of opposition to enhanced levels of wind power. 
However, academic evidence does not support these perceptions. A study done by 
the Australia Institute concluded that adding approximately 5% more wind power 
would only cost consumers AU$15-$25 per year extra  (Macintosh & Downie, 
2006).  The lesson for policymakers is that fear-mongering, which seems to be 
linked to campaigns to oppose wind power, needs to be countered with scientific 
enquiry to ascertain actual impact.  
7. Concerns over Community Impact were ironically evident in fossil fuel rich 
nations when it came to wind power development. In countries such as Australia 
and Canada, the fossil fuel sector is a major employer in some communities. Such 
communities are particularly sensitive to the threat of job losses associated with 
declining domestic use of fossil fuel resources. Given insatiable overseas demand 
for fossil fuel resources such concerns are largely unfounded. Nevertheless, for 
policymakers, the bifurcate challenge is i) to rectify any misperceptions through 
studies estimating actual impacts and ii) to clearly communicate the economic 
benefits that wind power projects generate, which in many countries have been 
shown to produce positive net employment (CanWEA, 2008b; Renner, 2008). 
 
12.6.2 Technical Factors 
1. The Stochastic Nature of Wind Power is frequently mentioned by utility 
managers and policymakers as a key deterrent to more aggressive wind power 
development policies. This concern was evident in all four case study countries 




but frequently exaggerated. The stochastic nature of wind power only becomes a 
threat to grid stability at high levels of wind power contribution. Not only has 
international experience demonstrated that up to 20% wind power can be 
incorporated into an electricity grid by utilizing existing spare capacity to provide 
stability, a number of mitigating techniques have also been developed to attenuate 
output fluctuations (Ackerman, 2005; Boyle, et al., 2004; Holttinen, 2008). 
Furthermore, even after all technical attenuation techniques have been exhausted, 
research has shown that existing storage technology adds only $10-$20 per MWh 
to the cost of wind power (DeCarolis & Keith, 2006; Diesendorf, 2003; Macintosh 
& Downie, 2006). In short, policymakers should be aware that although there is 
some validity to technical concerns over the stochastic nature of wind power, these 
concerns are frequently exaggerated either due to lack of sufficient technical 
knowledge or due to political gamesmanship. 
2. Multi-stakeholder Grid Management hinders wind power development in Japan, 
Canada and Australia. In Japan, 10 regional utilities enjoy monopolies over their 
respective regional grids. In Australia and Canada, the electricity grids in each 
state (or province) are administered by separate organizations, some public and 
some private. Effectively interconnected grids enhance system stability and 
support higher levels of wind power (Boyle, et al., 2004; EWEA, 2009). 
3. Logistical “Bother” tends to be an issue ignored by mainstream academic 
research but is an evident hurdle when speaking informally with engineers from 
electricity utilities. In order to integrate high levels of stochastic wind power flows 
into a power grid, load management systems have to be revised, wholesale 
electricity purchase programs need to be altered to suit unpredictable wind power 
flows and a greater number of grid connections must be installed and maintained. 




All of these obligations represent logistical activities that would otherwise not 
require attention. Consequently, for many engineers, wind power represents a 
logistical "bother". 
4. Distance to the Grid can render wind power projects commercially unviable. It 
has been estimated that the infrastructure costs associated with connecting to a 
grid in advanced economies are at least US$80 per meter (Wizelius, 2007). 
Therefore, if one were to establish wind turbines in a remote area in order to avoid 
NIMBY opposition, the connection cost for every 10 km span would amount to 
US$800,000. The obvious lesson for policymakers is that in order to minimise the 
cost (per kWh) of wind power in remote regions, larger scale wind power projects 
should prevail.  
5. Inadequate R&D to Improve Storage is both a technical and a political issue. 
The capability to economically store power would eliminate hurdles associated 
with the stochastic nature of wind power. Realizing the full promise of wind 
power and solar PV power depends on the development of economical storage 
technologies. 
6. Underestimated Potential was evident both in Japan and Taiwan. In Japan, wind 
power potential was estimated using a capacity load factor of 20% which was 
extremely conservative when compared to international data which suggests that 
30 to 35% is more representative of current technological capacity. Substituting a 
capacity load factor of 30% instead of 20% would yield a wind power potential 
estimate that is 50% higher. In Taiwan, the national utility (Taipower) and 
Taiwan's largest wind power developer (Infravest) have released wind power 
estimates that differ by over 360% (Valentine, 2010b). If the Taipower estimate is 
accurate, wind power potential in Taiwan is relatively low and other technologies 




should be prioritised. If the Infravest estimate is accurate, more emphasis should 
be given to supporting wind power development. In summary, although estimates 
of wind power potential are technical in nature, estimates are based on 
assumptions which underpin them, which in turn are influenced by ideologies and 
politics.  
 
12.6.3 Economic Factors 
1. External Costs Not Internalised refers to the economic costs associated with the 
social and environmental impacts of electricity generation technologies. External 
costs of any type are rarely incorporated into electricity generation cost data. For 
fossil fuels, CO2 emissions represent the most significant economic externality. 
For nuclear power, storage of nuclear waste and decommissioning of obsolete 
plants represent significant externalities. Failure to include these real external 
costs into the true total cost of electricity generation for each power source distorts 
market forces. For example, one Australian study indicates that if the 
environmental cost of greenhouse gas emissions were internalized, the cost of 
brown coal-fired power would increase by US$34/MWh, the cost of oil-fired 
power would increase by US$26/MWh and the cost of gas-fired power would 
increase by US$17/MWh (ATSE, 2009). Given the average wholesale price of 
electricity in Australia is AU$40/MWh (ATSE, 2009), internalizing economic 
costs associated with just CO2 emissions would significantly alter electricity 
market dynamics. The distortions caused by failure to internalize external costs 
unquestionably represent the largest barrier to wind power development within the 
STEP framework. 




2. A dominant presence of Other Competing Alternative Technologies hinders the 
development of wind power in two ways. Firstly, when governments prioritize 
other alternative energy technologies, they tend to commit higher levels of R&D 
and market support to these technologies. The end result is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy wherein the technologies that receive more support begin to display 
commercial progress, thereby justifying further support. Perhaps the best example 
of this is in Japan's nuclear power industry. Thanks to government investment of 
over $60 billion in R&D support since 1982, Japan's nuclear power industry boasts 
generation costs that are competitive with most other forms of fossil fuel 
electricity generation (IEA, 2004c). However, it is conceivable that $60 billion 
invested in virtually any alternative energy technology would achieve similar 
progress. Secondly, in many nations, financial support for renewable energy 
technology research and capacity development is limited. Consequently, gains by 
other technologies are made at the expense of wind power development. This is 
exemplified in Australia wherein power contributions from small-scale solar 
thermal technologies are favoured. In the first year of the RET program, every 1 
kWh of solar thermal power reduces the potential market for all renewable 
electricity by 5 kWh (Government of Australia, 2009g).  
3. Subsidies to Traditional Technologies still exist in many nations despite global 
warming concerns. All four of the case study nations subsidize traditional fossil 
fuel and nuclear power technologies in some manner. In Australia and Canada, 
government financial support exists for carbon capture and storage research 
(Government of Australia, 2009h). In Japan, nuclear power research receives 
enormous government financial support (IEA, 2004c). In Taiwan, the government 
subsidizes research in advanced fossil fuel generation technology (TBOE, 2009b). 




Not only do such subsidies mask the actual costs associated with traditional 
technologies, the financial commitments detract from the pool of government 
funding that could be used for supporting wind power development.  
4. Insufficient Renewable Energy Subsidies are particularly problematic in the 
absence of policies to internalise external costs associated with fossil fuel 
combustion. In all four case study nations, renewable energy subsidies failed to 
close the cost divide between fossil fuel electricity generation and wind power. 
Despite different policy tools employed – Japan has adopted a renewable portfolio 
standard, Taiwan has adopted a feed-in subsidy, Australia has adopted a 
mandatory purchase program, and Canada has adopted a production subsidy – in 
all cases, the aggregate subsidy was insufficient to allow wind power to effectively 
compete with fossil fuel technologies. The bottom line is that subsidies which fail 
to close the economic gap between the cost of fossil fuel electricity generation and 
wind power will produce sub-optimal results. 
5. Locked-in Fossil Fuel Purchase Commitments represent an economic hurdle to 
wind power development because long-term purchase obligations tend to delay 
phasing out undesirable technologies such as coal-fired power. Conditions in both 
Japan and Taiwan exemplify the "stickiness" that long-term fossil fuel purchase 
obligations have on the pace of technological transition. Both nations secure fossil 
fuel supplies through long-term purchase contracts with overseas suppliers; and 
once these commitments are made (Valentine, 2009, 2010b), the technologies that 
utilize these supplies often become entrenched for the duration of the purchase 
contract. 
6. Market Players Lacking Investment Incentives is common in nations where 
government support for wind power is unclear (Taiwan, Australia) or nugatory 




(Canada). In many affluent nations, wind power purchase guarantees are 
frequently of insufficient value and duration to provide wind power developers 
with the confidence necessary to begin making long-term market development 
commitments. Research indicates that wind power purchase guarantees need to be 
at least 15-years in duration in order to allow wind power developers to fully 
amortize project costs (Wizelius, 2007). Failure to provide such guarantees leads 
to exploitative behaviour in which wind power developers seek to exploit 
commercially attractive sites and then turn to other markets for new business. 
Such is the case in Taiwan. 
7. Insufficient support for renewables due to Government Budget Limitations 
emerged as a notable barrier to wind power development in Canada where an 
enormous federal budget deficit severely curtails the government’s ability to 
bolster renewable energy development subsidies (Valentine, 2010a). However, the 
existence of a national budget deficit is not the only obstacle in regard to 
government financial support. Periods of economic contraction tend to impair 
government revenues and place pressure on policymakers to find ways to support 
established levels of government service provision with reduced budgets. 
Accordingly, in stagnant economies, acquiring sufficient government financing to 
close the cost disparities between fossil fuel powered electricity and wind power is 
a contentious budget allocation issue. Overall, policymakers in support of wind 
power development need to understand that a number of interests compete 
annually for a fixed pool of government funds and financial support for wind 
power is usually attained by demonstrating that financially supporting wind power 
is a superior use of fiscal funds. This is a political process that requires systematic 
planning in order to maximise funding success.  




8. National Advantage in Other Energy Resources of some type poses barriers to 
wind power development in Australia, Canada and Japan. In Australia and Canada, 
governments enjoy sizable revenue flows from fossil fuel royalties and taxes 
(ABARE, 2009; Alberta Provincial Government, 2008). Accordingly in both 
nations, there is a high degree of political will to support fossil fuel industries and 
this translates into initiatives such as government funding for carbon capture and 
sequestration, despite indications that other alternative energy technologies may 
represent more prudent long-term electricity generation solutions. In Japan, 
advanced waste processing technology and nuclear reactor design are seen as 
promising exportable commodities which deliver the dual benefit of providing 
concentrated flows of comparatively cheap electricity and export revenues (JAEC, 
2008, 2009). The lesson appears to be that governments have a hard time 
disaggregating domestic energy planning from strategies to support fossil fuel or 
nuclear technology exports. Energy sources that have high export value tend to 
engender support within domestic electricity regimes. 
 
12.6.4 Political Factors 
1. Political Conflict over the Optimal Electricity Mix can be conceptualised on 
three levels. First there is understandable conflict between actors who support the 
status quo and those who seek some level of change. Resistance to those seeking 
change can be significant, as illustrated by rejection of legislation in support of 
CO2 emission trading in Australia. Second, within the realm of those seeking 
change, there are competing interests. These competing interests frequently 
oppose each other in the same manner that parties seeking change oppose parties 
who wish to maintain status quo. For example, in Australia, geothermal energy, 




concentrated solar thermal energy and wind energy are all supported by special 
interests, each seeking to obtain an increased portion of a fixed market. 
Furthermore, some alternative technologies are better equipped to financially 
compete against wind technology. For example, in Japan and to a lesser extent in 
Taiwan, there are strong pro-nuclear groups that argue vociferously for 
government research funding, thereby drawing funds away from wind power 
support initiatives. Finally, the existence of abundant supplies of fossil fuels or 
uranium gives rise to a political form of Dutch Disease – one shared reason why 
wind power potential in both Australia and Canada is underutilized is that both 
nations boast an abundance of traditional fuel stock reserves. Such wealth tends to 
discourage the level of strategic stretch necessary to proactively embrace a 
transition to renewable technologies. 
2. Fossil Fuel Industry Opposition inhibited wind power development in all four 
case study nations. Entrenched fossil fuel regimes enjoy considerable cost 
economies thanks to historical subsidization of fossil fuel generation infrastructure, 
decades of cumulative R&D investment (frequently supported by government 
subsidies) (Deffeyes, 2005) and political lobbying to discourage policies to 
internalise the external costs of fossil fuel combustion. In addition to commercial 
advantages, a fossil fuel plant can be operational for more than 30 years (Sovacool, 
2008a). These plants represent capitalized investments which locks-in utilization 
of fossil fuel generation plants.  
3. Diffused Alternative Energy Technology Support is a political obstacle as well 
as an economic obstacle because diffused research funding commitments detract 
from funding for R&D to support wind power. In Japan, financial support for solar 
PV research detracts from funding could be channelled into storage technology 




research. Similarly, in Australia, government support for solar thermal, geothermal 
and carbon capture and sequestration technologies channel funding away wind 
power development initiatives. Furthermore, in countries which have mandatory 
renewable energy purchase programs, such Australia, diffused support for 
alternative energy technologies typically reduces the market potential for wind 
power because it allows more technologies to compete for shares of a fixed market.  
4. The Prioritization of Energy Efficiency Initiatives is a political barrier in that 
the decision to prioritise energy efficiency (i.e. Japan and Taiwan) represents a 
political decision to exploit short-term gains before investing in sustainable energy 
technologies. Commitments to energy efficiency programs reduce the pool of 
funding available for other clean energy initiatives; and as such, hinder financial 
support for wind power R&D and market development. Although the situation is 
most evident in Japan, virtually all nations with CO2 abatement strategies have 
embraced the widely accepted notion that energy efficiency initiatives represent 
necessary first steps. 
5. Complacency Regarding CO2 Reduction programs is a political artefact that is 
enhanced by i) the absence of concrete international political commitments (i.e. 
Taiwan is not a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol), ii) political confidence that other 
policy measures will achieve the requisite CO2 reductions necessary to meet 
international obligations (i.e. Japanese authorities are confident that energy 
efficiency improvements can significantly abate CO2 emissions; Australian 
authorities view carbon capture and sequestration as the low-carbon technology of 
the future) or iii) general political apathy toward international obligations (i.e. the 
Canadian government has revised CO2 emission reduction targets upward after 
claiming that the previous targets established by the former governing party were 




unrealistic). As nations adopt stronger public CO2 emission reduction 
commitments, support for wind power tends to be elevated with the rising tide. 
6. The presence of a Vertically Integrated Utility Monopoly is a political hurdle to 
wind power development for at least three reasons. First, monopolies exhibit 
bureaucratic, non-commercial ideologies that tend to resist change (Posner, 1999). 
Second, government controlled monopolies are frequently insulated from external 
pressures to change. Strategic decisions regarding the types of fuel sources to be 
used for electricity generation are frequently made in well-insulated policy circles. 
This promotes "groupthink" wherein decisions made by the most powerful 
members of the strategic circle are embraced by all. The current situation in 
Taiwan exemplifies how this phenomenon can adversely impact wind power 
development. In Taiwan, key executives at Taipower (the government utility) do 
not believe there is sufficient wind power potential in the country to commit to 
aggressive wind power development programs. Third, utility monopolies are often 
mandated to keep electricity costs to a minimum and as such they can rarely 
accumulate sufficient capital to support wide-scale technology transitions 
(Valentine, 2010b).  
7. Weak Adjoining Grid Coordination is a technical hurdle in that failure to 
effectively connect adjoining grids represents a missed opportunity to enhance 
grid stability and safely accommodate higher volumes of stochastic wind power. 
However, there is also a political dimension in that governments typically initiate 
the negotiations necessary to make such connections happen. One of the main 
reasons why Denmark has been capable of supporting such a high level of 
installed wind power capacity stems from its interconnectedness with the broader 
European grid (Meyer, 2004; Toke, 2002). In Australia, Canada and Japan, sub-




optimal interconnectivity between regional grids prevents higher levels of wind 
power from being integrated into the respective grids without destabilizing 
operations.  
8. Lack of R&D Support for Wind Power was shown to inhibit wind power 
development in all four case study nations. In all case study nations, wind power is 
apparently considered to be a mature, commercially viable alternative energy 
technology; and as such, the government has ceded support for wind power to the 
free market. Unfortunately, with many fossil fuel technologies also receiving 
government support, wind power developers are forced to compete on an uneven 
playing field. While it is perhaps understandable to leave R&D funding to major 
wind turbine manufacturers such as the Vestas and Goldstar in order to improve 
turbine efficiency, investment in storage technologies which are vital for utility-
scale viability of both wind and solar power technologies need government 
support to consolidate focus. 
 
12.7 FURTHER RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS AND CONCLUSION 
The STEP framework presented in Section 12.6 conflates insights from the four case 
studies in Part 2 to demonstrate that wind power development initiatives in any given 
nation are subject to impediments arising from social, technical, economic and 
political forces. The main implication of this for policymakers is that economic policy 
instruments designed to catalyze free-market change such as carbon taxation, emission 
trading schemes, renewable energy production subsidies or renewable energy 
production tax credits are subject to confounding forces from other STEP realms. 
Forebodingly, neglecting the influence of these forces puts any given economic policy 
at risk of producing sub-optimal results. Promisingly, attempts to mitigate these 




impediments might represent a way to achieve better policy results with less financial 
commitment.  
 
Unfortunately, the STEP framework presented in this chapter falls short of providing 
policymakers with a definitive cognitive framework of forces which inhibit wind 
power development for at least four reasons. First, the framework has been developed 
from data extracted from only four case study nations. Analyses of more nations 
would help to validate the comprehensiveness of the variables presented in the STEP 
framework. Second, the four case study nations are all advanced economies. It is 
likely that the forces identified in the framework may differ depending on whether a 
country is industrialized, developing or underdeveloped. For example, many 
underdeveloped countries are characterized as exhibiting poor infrastructure, high 
levels of corruption and autocratic governments. It is very likely that in such countries, 
conditions pertaining to these three variables alone would have a significant impact on 
the pace, scale and scope of wind power development. Two separate frameworks may 
be necessary for understanding wind power development hurdles in developed and 
developing countries. Third, although the framework identified key STEP variables 
which have influence over wind power development in advanced nations, word 
limitations precluded an evaluation of the relative influence that these variables have 
on change within a given electricity regime. Understanding the relative influence of 
each variable is a necessary exercise if policymakers are to identify forces which will 
have the strongest potential for catalyzing electricity regime change. Fourth, given the 
numerous inter-relationships between the STEP forces, attempts must also be made to 
understand the nature of these connections and explicate how the forces which inhibit 
wind power development respond to changes occurring to other factors within the 




complex adaptive policy system. All four of these limitations need to be subjugated 
through further research in order to move the STEP framework forward from being a 
conceptual tool to a practical tool that policymakers can use to guide the development 
of better wind power development policy. 
 
In closing, it is worth reiterating that Part 2 of this thesis began with a question. Are 
there other obstacles that extend beyond the realm of economic rationality that inhibit 
the development of wind power, and if so what are they? The STEP framework 
presented in this paper presents evidence that non-economic obstacles do exist and 
provides a clearer explication of both economic and non-economic barriers to wind 
power development. Although the STEP categories might require refinement as more 
nations are examined in the context of this framework and deeper understanding of the 
influence that each STEP force has on wind power development both directly and 
indirectly (through catalyzing change in other forces) is required to allow 
policymakers to fully utilize the STEP analysis for improving wind power 
development policy, the framework as presented indisputably achieves the goals of 
demonstrating that other non-economic barriers to wind power exist and cataloguing 
the forces in manageable STEP clusters. From this perspective alone, the analysis 
presented herein advances understanding of the socio-technical political economy of 
wind power development. If policymakers took steps to try and mitigate the 
confounding influences of the barriers identified in this STEP framework, it is likely 
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